ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)最新文献_第7页

Trading Efficiency in Water Quality Trading Markets: An Assessment of Trade-Offs 水质交易市场的交易效率:一个权衡的评估

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1975598

Hugh McDonald, Suzi Kerr

{"title":"Trading Efficiency in Water Quality Trading Markets: An Assessment of Trade-Offs","authors":"Hugh McDonald, Suzi Kerr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1975598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1975598","url":null,"abstract":"Declining water quality as a result of increased nutrient leaching is a serious and growing concern, both internationally and in New Zealand. Water pollution issues have traditionally been addressed with command-and-control type regulation, but market-based nutrient trading schemes are becoming more widespread. In New Zealand, a cap-and-trade system has been implemented in Lake Taupo and another has been designed for Lake Rotorua. Despite the importance placed on avoiding transaction costs in water quality trading markets, there has been little discussion in the literature of practical policies to decrease these transaction costs, or any real assessment of when it is and is not optimal to decrease transaction costs. This paper begins to address these issues. We find that strong efforts to control time-of-trade transaction costs are most likely to be worthwhile in schemes with heterogeneous participants and large expected values and volumes of trading. The trading inefficiency that results from search and bargaining, and trade registration costs can be minimised at some cost. Regulators can reduce trade approval costs if they establish baseline leaching levels for all participants and design standardised leaching monitoring systems as part of the set-up of the system, and monitor all sources equally regardless of whether participants trade instead of estimating and approving changes in traders’ leaching at the time of each trade (as occurs in a baseline-and-credit system). Finally we find that while regulators may be tempted to restrict trading or increase measuring and monitoring requirements to increase the environmental certainty of a scheme’s outcome, environmental risk may be better addressed through a less certain but more stringent environmental target.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124854385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Investor Influence on Firms’ Environmental, Social and Governance Performance 投资者对企业环境、社会和治理绩效的影响

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1973724

Bill Rees

引用次数: 10

The Innovation and Imitation Dichotomy in Spanish Firms: Do Absorptive Capacity and the Technological Frontier Matter? 西班牙企业的创新与模仿二分法:吸收能力与技术前沿是否重要?

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1973790

V. Gombau, Agustí Segarra‐Blasco

引用次数: 76

Price Discovery and Distribution of Water Rights Linking Upstream Tree Plantations to Downstream Water Markets: Experimental Results 连接上游人工林与下游水市场的水权价格发现与分配:实验结果

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.2166/WP.2011.085

T. Nordblom, A. Reeson, J. Finlayson, I. Hume, S. Whitten, J. Kelly

{"title":"Price Discovery and Distribution of Water Rights Linking Upstream Tree Plantations to Downstream Water Markets: Experimental Results","authors":"T. Nordblom, A. Reeson, J. Finlayson, I. Hume, S. Whitten, J. Kelly","doi":"10.2166/WP.2011.085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2166/WP.2011.085","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports controlled experiments on markets linking downstream water entitlement holders with upstream landholders wishing to establish large tree plantations. The present study tackles the question of whether it matters who owns the initial water rights. Coase’s (1960) theorem suggests initial endowments will not affect final equilibrium outcomes, in terms of water prices and water rights held by the various parties. That theorem is tested through experiments with human subjects who blindly represent different groups of water users. These are land owners in upstream water supply sub-catchments and downstream urban, irrigation and ‘stock & domestic’ water users, each with pre-specified marginal values of water. These values and equilibrium results calculated in an earlier modelling study provide the theoretical base for evaluating the new results. In the experiment the initial endowments of water rights were shifted between the up and downstream participants. Strong ‘endowment effects’ were observed; participants who held the greatest initial endowments often traded away fewer units than predicted by the theoretical model and captured greater shares of the gains of trade. Including new tree plantations in the market for permanent water entitlements can engender positive changes in economic surpluses in all sectors, with greater levels of social equity and protection of downstream wetland assets. This is in sharp contrast with reductions in river volumes reaching downstream parties and environmental assets in the absence of regulations requiring purchase of entitlements to cover extra water use by new plantations.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131395233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Joint Product Improvement by Client and Customer Support Center: The Role of Gain-Share Contracts in Coordination 客户和客户支持中心的联合产品改进:收益分成合同在协调中的作用

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-10-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1949656

S. Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija

{"title":"Joint Product Improvement by Client and Customer Support Center: The Role of Gain-Share Contracts in Coordination","authors":"S. Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1949656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1949656","url":null,"abstract":"We study the role of different contract types in coordinating the joint product improvement effort of a client and a customer support center. The customer support center's costly efforts at joint product improvement include transcribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyzing market trends, and investing in product design. Yet this cooperative role must be adequately incentivized by the client, since it could lead to fewer service requests and hence lower revenues for the customer support center. We model this problem as a sequential game with double-sided moral hazard in a principal-agent framework in which the client is the principal. We follow the contracting literature in modeling the effort of the customer support center, which is the first mover, as either unobservable or observable; in either case, the efforts are unverifiable and so cannot be contracted on directly. We show that it is optimal for the client to offer the customer support center a linear gain-share contract when efforts are unobservable, even though it can yield only the second-best solution for the client. We also show that the cost-plus contracts widely used in practice do not obtain the optimal solution. However, we demonstrate that if efforts are observable then a gain-share and cost-plus options-based contract is optimal and will also yield the first-best solution. Our research provides a systematic theoretical framework that accounts for the prevalence of gain-share contracts in the IT industry's joint improvement efforts, and it provides guiding principles for understanding the increased role for customer support centers in product improvement.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131191952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 48

Did FIN 48 Limit the Use of Tax Reserves as a Tool for Earnings Management? 第48号财务报告限制了将税收储备作为盈余管理工具的使用吗?

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1656012

Richard A. Cazier, S. Rego, X. Tian, R. Wilson

{"title":"Did FIN 48 Limit the Use of Tax Reserves as a Tool for Earnings Management?","authors":"Richard A. Cazier, S. Rego, X. Tian, R. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1656012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1656012","url":null,"abstract":"We utilize new income tax reserve disclosures required under FIN 48 to examine whether managers use discretion over this accrual to manage earnings to meet the consensus analyst forecast. We find that firms with pre-managed earnings (i.e., earnings before the change in the tax reserve) that are below the consensus analyst forecast are far more likely to reduce their tax reserves and thus report higher net income. In fact, we find that 37 percent of firm-years with pre-managed earnings below the consensus forecast meet the forecast when the change in the tax reserve is included in earnings. In contrast, only 9.8 percent of firm-years with pre-managed earnings above the consensus forecast increased their tax reserves to the extent that it caused them to miss the consensus forecast. This asymmetric result is consistent with managers using their discretion over tax reserves to meet consensus analyst forecasts. Using a proxy for changes in tax reserves developed by Blouin and Tuna (2007), we also document a decline in the use of tax reserves to meet the consensus analyst forecast following the adoption of FIN 48. Nonetheless, our results using both estimated and actual changes in tax reserves clearly suggest that managers continue to use their discretion over this account to meet the consensus analyst forecast, although at a lower rate of recurrence than during the pre-FIN 48 time period.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121530863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Designing a Suitable Strategic Control Model for the Iranian Auto-Making Companies 设计适合伊朗汽车制造企业的战略控制模型

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1899228

M. Nazaripour, Behzad Parvizi

{"title":"Designing a Suitable Strategic Control Model for the Iranian Auto-Making Companies","authors":"M. Nazaripour, Behzad Parvizi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1899228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899228","url":null,"abstract":"Iran's autos haven't the required characteristics to enter the competitive global markets. Lack of comprehensive strategic controls is of the main problems of the Iranian auto-making companies to be competitiveness. Formulating strategic controls can be an effective factor to track and respond to progress toward strategic aims. Strategic control processes can ensure that strategic aims are translated into action plans designed to achieve these aims, and that the effectiveness of these plans is monitored. An effective strategic control process can ensure that an organization is setting out to achieve the right things, and that the methods being used to achieve these things are working. After reviewing and analyzing the famous models concerning the strategic controls such as: Schreyogg & Steinmann’s model, Simons’ model, and Ittner and Larcker’s model, this study attempts to design a suitable strategic control model for the Iranian auto-making companies to achieve their strategic aims. Through the designed model, the Iranian auto-making companies will have clear benchmarks and ultimately reliable measurements of how their companies are doing. This model will also enable the Iranian auto-making companies' executives to account for last-time changes during the implementation process.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121904828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Transfer Pricing Problem: When Multinational Corporations Shift Profits Across International Borders 转移定价问题:当跨国公司将利润转移到国际边界

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1899014

Baitshepi Tebogo

引用次数: 5

Merger Efficiency and Welfare Implications of Buyer Power 并购效率与买方权力的福利含义

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1888293

Özlem Bedre-Defolie, S. Caprice

引用次数: 4

Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment 股票期权归属条件、CEO更替与短视投资

ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-06-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1707539

V. Laux

引用次数: 98