Jean-Pierre Dubé, Günter J. Hitsch, Pradeep K. Chintagunta
{"title":"Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects","authors":"Jean-Pierre Dubé, Günter J. Hitsch, Pradeep K. Chintagunta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1085909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1085909","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a framework for measuring “tipping”---the increase in a firm's market share dominance caused by indirect network effects. Our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects. In practice, this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects. We build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware/software paradigm. To demonstrate its applicability, we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32/64-bit generation of video game consoles, a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects. In our example, we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong, economically significant increase in market concentration. We also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side, as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war, and on the supply side, as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131140836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fair Value Accounting and Financial Stability","authors":"Guillaume Plantin, H. Sapra, H. Shin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1275395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1275395","url":null,"abstract":"Market prices give timely signals that can aid decision making. However, in the presence of distorted incentives and illiquid markets, there are other less benign effects that inject artificial volatility to prices that distorts real decisions. In a world of marking-to-market, asset price changes show up immediately on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries and elicit responses from them. Banks and other intermediaries have always responded to changes in economic environment, but marking-to-market sharpens and synchronises their responses, adding impetus to the feedback effects in financial markets. For junior assets trading in liquid markets (such as traded stocks), marking-to-market is superior to historical cost in terms of the trade offs. But for senior, long-lived and illiquid assets and liabilities (such as bank loans and insurance liabilities), the harm caused by distortions can outweigh the benefits. We review the competing effects and weigh the arguments.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127029727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?","authors":"Luigi Zingales, Paola Sapienza, L. Guiso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.634210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.634210","url":null,"abstract":"How much do cultural biases affect economic exchange? We try to answer this question by using the relative trust European citizens have for citizens of other countries. First, we document that this trust is affected not only by objective characteristics of the country being trusted, but also by cultural aspects such as religion, a history of conflicts, and genetic similarities. We then find that lower relative levels of trust toward citizens of a country lead to less trade with that country, less portfolio investment, and less direct investment in that country, even after controlling for the objective characteristics of that country. This effect is stronger for good that are more trust intensive and doubles or triples when trust is instrumented with its cultural determinants. We conclude that perceptions rooted in culture are important (and generally omitted) determinants of economic exchange.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123942641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation","authors":"Luigi Zingales","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.536682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.536682","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits the controversy on regulation and applies its insights to the debate on corporate governance and mutual funds. The general result of this exercise is that a strong case can be made in favor of more mandatory disclosure. While theoretically there is scope also for other mandatory regulation, it is unclear whether its benefits exceed its costs. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how this ideal regulation could emerge from the political process, which tends to be dominated by incumbent firms. I propose a mechanism to reduce this bias.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131778565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investing in Equity Mutual Funds","authors":"Ľuboš Pástor, R. Stambaugh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.279994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279994","url":null,"abstract":"We construct optimal portfolios of equity funds by combining historical returns on funds and passive indexes with prior views about asset pricing and skill. By including both benchmark and nonbenchmark indexes, we distinguish pricing-model inaccuracy from managerial skill. Even modest confidence in a pricing model helps construct portfolios with high Sharpe ratios. Investing in active mutual funds can be optimal even for investors who believe active managers cannot outperform passive indexes. Optimal portfolios exclude hot-hand funds even for investors who believe momentum is priced. Our large universe of funds offers no close substitutes for the Fama-French and momentum benchmarks.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116345254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives Versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries, and Implications for Acceptance of IAS","authors":"R. Ball, Ashok Robin, Joanna S. Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.216429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.216429","url":null,"abstract":"The East Asian countries Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand provide rare insight into the interaction between accounting standards and the incentives of managers and auditors. Their standards derive from common law sources (UK, US, and IAS) that are widely viewed as higher quality than code law standards. However, their preparers’ incentives imply low quality. We show their financial reporting quality is not higher than under code law, with quality operationalized as timely recognition of economic income (particularly losses). It is","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115358623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
William R. Gebhardt, Charles M. C. Lee, B. Swaminathan
{"title":"Toward an Ex Ante Cost-of-Capital","authors":"William R. Gebhardt, Charles M. C. Lee, B. Swaminathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.145928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.145928","url":null,"abstract":"We use a discounted residual-income valuation model to compute an ex-ante cost-of-capital for a large sample of U.S. stocks that are covered by I/B/E/S analysts. We show that the ex ante cost-of-capital computed in this manner is correlated with a firm's degree of leverage, market liquidity, information environment, and earnings variability. Specifically, the market demands a higher risk premia for stocks with high book leverage and market leverage, low dollar trading volume or market capitalization, low analyst coverage, and more volatile (less predictable) earnings. The market also demands a higher risk premia for stocks with high book-to-market ratios and low price momentum. Traditional market risk proxies such as beta and return volatility are not significantly correlated with the ex ante cost-of-capital.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115538960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficiency and Distribution in Financial Restructuring: The Case of the Ferruzzi Group","authors":"A. Penati, Luigi Zingales","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.224439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224439","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the efficiency and distributional consequences of the largest out- of-court restructuring ever ($20 billion of debt). The restructuring was engineered by a five-bank committee composed of the largest creditors, which took effective control of the company at the onset of financial distress. We compare the payoffs obtained by creditors under the restructuring plan with those they would have obtained in the absence of it. We show that the plan implied a large redistribution among creditors with equal priority. This redistribution occurred without generating any apparent efficiency gain. When we factor in the value of control, we find that the restructuring plan favored the Restructuring Commit- tee, at the expense of other banks. Our analysis shows the importance of the allocation of control in financial restructuring and the possible efficiency costs of debt for equity swaps in restructurings. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate on the optimal bankruptcy procedures.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131253604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Costs of Equity from Factor-Based Models","authors":"R. Stambaugh, Ľuboš Pástor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.37060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.37060","url":null,"abstract":"Equity costs of capital for individual firms are estimated using several models that relate expected returns to betas on one or more pervasive factors. A Bayesian approach incorporates prior uncertainty about an asset's mispricing as well as uncertainty about betas and factor means. Substantial prior uncertainty about mispricing results in an estimated cost of equity close to that obtained with mispricing ruled out. Uncertainty about which pricing model to use appears to be less important, on average, than within-model parameter uncertainty. In the absence of mispricing uncertainty, uncertainty about factor means is generally the most important source of overall uncertainty about a firm's cost of equity, although uncertainty about betas is nearly as important.","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128728134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}