{"title":"激励与标准:四个东亚国家会计收入的性质及其对国际会计准则接受的影响","authors":"R. Ball, Ashok Robin, Joanna S. Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.216429","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The East Asian countries Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand provide rare insight into the interaction between accounting standards and the incentives of managers and auditors. Their standards derive from common law sources (UK, US, and IAS) that are widely viewed as higher quality than code law standards. However, their preparers’ incentives imply low quality. We show their financial reporting quality is not higher than under code law, with quality operationalized as timely recognition of economic income (particularly losses). It is","PeriodicalId":224732,"journal":{"name":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2194","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Incentives Versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries, and Implications for Acceptance of IAS\",\"authors\":\"R. Ball, Ashok Robin, Joanna S. Wu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.216429\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The East Asian countries Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand provide rare insight into the interaction between accounting standards and the incentives of managers and auditors. Their standards derive from common law sources (UK, US, and IAS) that are widely viewed as higher quality than code law standards. However, their preparers’ incentives imply low quality. We show their financial reporting quality is not higher than under code law, with quality operationalized as timely recognition of economic income (particularly losses). It is\",\"PeriodicalId\":224732,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2194\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.216429\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Chicago Booth Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.216429","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Incentives Versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries, and Implications for Acceptance of IAS
The East Asian countries Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand provide rare insight into the interaction between accounting standards and the incentives of managers and auditors. Their standards derive from common law sources (UK, US, and IAS) that are widely viewed as higher quality than code law standards. However, their preparers’ incentives imply low quality. We show their financial reporting quality is not higher than under code law, with quality operationalized as timely recognition of economic income (particularly losses). It is