Philosopher's Imprint最新文献_第2页

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 2007-03-01 DOI: 10.3840/07001681

A. George

引用次数: 5

Innocent Statements and Their Metaphysically Loaded Counterparts 无辜者陈述及其形而上的对等物

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 2007-02-01 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769835.003.0002

Thomas Hofweber

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引用次数: 57

Kant's Empirical Account of Human Action 康德对人类行为的经验论

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 2005-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139507035.003

Patrick Frierson

引用次数: 31

The Question of Realism 现实主义的问题

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 2001-06-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0_1

K. Fine

引用次数: 230

A direction effect on taste predicates 味觉谓词的方向效应

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17169/REFUBIUM-29088

Alexander Dinges, J. Zakkou

{"title":"A direction effect on taste predicates","authors":"Alexander Dinges, J. Zakkou","doi":"10.17169/REFUBIUM-29088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17169/REFUBIUM-29088","url":null,"abstract":"Consider an utterance of ‘Fish sticks are tasty’ as made by a speaker who likes fish sticks. How will the speaker assess this claim when, at some later point in her life, she comes to dislike fish sticks? As true or as false? Will she retract her earlier statement or stand by it? More generally, will she use her present taste standard in assessing the claim or the standard she had at the time of the original utterance? The answer to this question is of vital importance for the recent discussion on the semantics and pragmatics of so-called “predicates of personal taste” (e.g. “tasty” and “fun”). The two major contenders for a semantics of predicates of personal taste are relativism and contextualism. Although these views make similar predictions in many cases, they crucially come apart when it comes to the indicated types of situations. Relativism predicts that the speaker’s assessment will depend on her later taste standard, that is, the taste standard governing the so-called “context of assessment” (e.g. Kölbel, 2003; Lasersohn, 2005; Stephenson, 2007; MacFarlane, 2014; Egan, 2014; Dinges, 2017). Meanwhile, contextualism predicts that the speaker’s assessment will depend on her original taste standard, that is, the taste standard governing the so-called “context of use” (e.g. Glanzberg, 2007; Stojanovic, 2007; López de Sa, 2008; Moltmann, 2010; Schaffer, 2011; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Plunkett and Sundell, 2013; Pearson, 2013; Marques, 2014; Zakkou, 2019). Which prediction is borne out by the data? Both relativists and contextualists typically take the data to favor their position. MacFarlane (2014: 141), for instance, holds that","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"357 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120960002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The Dear Self 亲爱的自己

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt7zw81s.11

H. Frankfurt

{"title":"The Dear Self","authors":"H. Frankfurt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctt7zw81s.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7zw81s.11","url":null,"abstract":"Harry Frankfurt 1. At the beginning of the Second Section of his treatise entitled Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant reflects upon the fact that, as it seems to him, it is practically impossible for us ever to know with any real assurance that what a person does possesses genuine moral worth. He is struck by how irredeemably uncertain we must always be concerning whether someone is properly to be regarded as having actually been virtuous. The difficulty that troubles him in this connection does not arise out of any doubts as to our ability to identify the particular sort of action that, in the circumstances under consideration, the laws of morality prescribe. For Kant, that is the easy part. The serious problem in arriving at judicious moral evaluations of what people do lies, as he sees it, in the impenetrable obscurity of human motivation. Even when it is clear that what a person has done conforms exactly, so far as his behavior goes, to all pertinent moral requirements, it may remain quite unclear whether the person acted virtuously. Indeed, however fully his explicit conduct satisfies the commands of the moral law, it may not earn him any moral credit at all. The mere fact that he has behaved in just the way that duty demands does not of itself warrant a judgment that he was morally worthy in what he did. Reaching a judgment of that kind is not warranted simply by what a person has done. It must take into account what was actually moving the person as he did it. According to Kant, there is no virtue in performing an action when the performance is decisively motivated by nothing more than what you yourself happen to want. If the desires that move you are desires by which you are moved simply for reasons of your own, it makes no difference whether those desires are directed benevolently towards the","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126866478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 28

The arts of action 行动的艺术

Philosopher's Imprint Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1080/00094056.1969.10729467

C. T. Nguyen

{"title":"The arts of action","authors":"C. T. Nguyen","doi":"10.1080/00094056.1969.10729467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00094056.1969.10729467","url":null,"abstract":"© 2020 C. Thi Nguyen This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020014/> T he theory and culture of the arts has been largely focused on the arts of objects and has largely ignored the arts of action. Here, I wish to draw attention to the neglected arts of action. These are the arts intended to engender agency and activity in their audience, for the sake of the audience’s aesthetic appreciation of that activity. This includes their appreciation of their own deliberations, choices, reactions, and movements. The aesthetics of our own actions are already a natural part of the rich experience of our lives. And the arts of action already exist in plenty; we are surrounded by them. Many of our artifacts are designed for the sake of encouraging and structuring the aesthetics of actions. Games, cities, food rituals, social dances, and more — all are forms which sculpt activity, often for aesthetic ends. But these arts have been inadequately appreciated in theoretical work on art and aesthetics, and often ignored in much public reflection on the value of the arts. They are rarely called “arts”, but, I argue, they deserve to be. Consider rock climbing. Rock climbing is a profoundly aesthetic enterprise. Climbing culture is replete with aesthetic lingo. Climbers talk about the beautiful movement of a climb, about the exquisite grace that a particularly tricky sequence called out of them. Many people climb in order to experience their own graceful, interesting, dramatic movement.1 What’s more, the quality of a climber’s movement is significantly conditioned by an external object. Each climb calls for a particular form of motion. One climb calls for powerful, direct, aggressive movement; another one for loose, monkey-like swinging around; another for dainty, precisely balanced, tiny steps. And climbs, and their implied movement, can be designed. In climbing gyms, “setters” design climbing routes, creating puzzles to solve in movement. And the particular details of those puzzles shape the nature of the resulting movement. Similarly, some board games are designed to encourage particular turns of mind. For example, the design of chess offers a concentrated access to a particularly elegant form of cogitation. The chess player gets to experience the emergence of a lovely solution from a","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121473126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0