{"title":"Two Conceptions of Phenomenology","authors":"Ori Beck","doi":"10.17863/CAM.38713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.38713","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenal particularity thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception’s phenomenology. Martin (2002a; 2002b), Campbell (2002), Gomes & French (2016) and others defend this thesis. Against them are Mehta (2014), Montague (2016, chp. 6), Schellenberg (2010) and others, who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate between them is now at an impasse. This paper aims to break through this impasse. It argues that we have reached the impasse because two distinct conceptions of phenomenology—a “narrow” conception and a “broad” conception— are compatible with our what-it-is-like characterizations of phenomenology. It also suggests that each of these two conceptions has its own theoretical value and use. Therefore, the paper recommends a pluralistic position, on which we acknowledge that there are two kinds of phenomenology: phenomenology narrow (an entity conceived according to the narrow conception) and phenomenology broad (an entity conceived according to the broad conception). The phenomenal particularity thesis is true only with respect to the latter.","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125214652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosopher's ImprintPub Date : 2018-05-24DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199276011.003.0013
R. Moran
{"title":"Getting Told and Being Believed","authors":"R. Moran","doi":"10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199276011.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199276011.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Richard Moran Recent interest in the epistemology of testimony has focused attention on what justification we may commonly have in the vast areas of life where we are dependent on what other people tell us. This dependence is not restricted to what we are told in face-to-face encounters, for we also take ourselves to know all sorts of things that only reached us through a long chain of utterances and documents, whose evidential status we have never investigated for ourselves and will never be in a position to investigate. And the content of such knowledge is not confined to the arcana of specialized studies but includes such mundane matters as the facts of one’s own birth and parentage, the geographical and institutional facts of one’s immediate environment, and the general facts that make up one’s basic sense of what the world is like. In part it is the enormity of this dependence that makes for the interest in the subject of testimony, combined with the apparent clash between the kind of epistemic relations involved here and the classic empiricist picture of genuine knowledge basing itself either on direct experience of the facts or on working out conclusions for oneself. It isn’t just that the bulk of what we take ourselves to know is so highly mediated, as even knowledge gained through a microscope or other scientific instrument must be; rather it is that the vehicle of mediation here—what other people say—seems so flimsy, unregulated, and is known in plenty of cases to be unreliable, even deliberately so. People do lie, get things wrong, and speak carelessly. And while we may realistically","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124399699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-Consequentialism Demystified","authors":"Howard L. M. Nye, D. Plunkett, J. Ku","doi":"10.7939/R3HD7P69M","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7939/R3HD7P69M","url":null,"abstract":"Many moral theories hold that what an agent morally ought to do is determined in part by the goodness of the outcomes of those actions currently available to her. However, some moral theories go further and claim that what an agent morally ought to do is determined solely by the goodness of the outcomes of her actions. Following one standard philosophical convention, we will call this stronger thesis consequentialism.2 It seems quite clear that bringing about good outcomes is one thing that there is moral reason to do. But why think that promoting the good is the only thing that morality prescribes? One way of defending this thesis is to employ substantive normative arguments, which seek to show that the plausibility of moral reasons to do other","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121647290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image","authors":"John Turri","doi":"10.31219/osf.io/9pcqk","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/9pcqk","url":null,"abstract":"The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status of epistemic closure in ordinary practice. Despite decades of widespread assumptions to the contrary in philosophy, ordinary practice is ambivalent about closure. Ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic closure principle, although it might endorse a source-relative version of the principle. In particular, whereas inferential knowledge is not viewed as closed under known entailment, perceptual knowledge might be.","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134356853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Degrees of Being","authors":"K. McDaniel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198719656.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719656.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Let us agree that everything that there is exists, and that to be, to be real, and to exist are one and the same. Does everything that there is exist to the same degree? Or do some things exist more than others? Are there gradations of being? Perhaps no view is more despised by analytic metaphysicians than that there are gradations of being. But what if, unbeknownst to them, they have helped themselves to the doctrine that being comes in degrees when formulating various metaphysical theories or conducting metaphysical disputes? What if gradation of being is already playing a significant role in their theorizing, albeit under a different guise? Consider the following technical terms employed in many contemporary metaphysical debates: ‘naturalness’ as used by David Lewis (1986), ‘fundamentality’ or ‘structure’ as used by Ted Sider (2009, 2012), ‘grounding’ as used by Jonathan Schaffer (2009) and others, and the ubiquitous ‘in virtue of’. I have argued elsewhere that, given certain plausible assumptions, the notion of degree of being or grade of being can be analyzed in terms of these notions.2 Here I will argue that, given certain plausible assumptions, each of these notions can be analyzed in terms of the notion that being comes in degrees or grades. There are several reasons why this result is interesting. First, the notions of naturalness, fundamentality, or structure are ones that most contemporary metaphysicians grant are intelligible, whereas the claim that existence, being, or reality might come in degrees is regarded by many metaphysicians as being unintelligible. One way to assist a philosopher in grasping a notion that she regards as unintelligible","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131838126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test","authors":"John Turri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3643930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3643930","url":null,"abstract":"Professional philosophers say it’s obvious that a Gettier subject does not know. But experimental philosophers and psychologists have argued that laypeople and non-Westerners view Gettier subjects very differently, based on experiments where laypeople tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects. I argue that when effectively probed, laypeople and non-Westerners unambiguously agree that Gettier subjects do not know.","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"26 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120941766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved","authors":"John Turri","doi":"10.31219/osf.io/8g2av","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/8g2av","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes. Section 1 introduces the Gettier problem. Sections 2–5 discuss instructively wrong or incomplete previous proposals. Section 6 presents my solution and explains its virtues. Section 7 answers the most common objection.","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126769757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosopher's ImprintPub Date : 2011-01-06DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314751.003.0009
Pekka Väyrynen
{"title":"Thick Concepts and Variability","authors":"Pekka Väyrynen","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314751.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199314751.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Some philosophers hold that so-called \"thick\" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of contextual variability in evaluative valence that are found in the literature fail to support the variability claim and that another sort of putative examples are open to a wide range of explanations that have different implications for the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation. I conclude that considerations of contextual variability fail to settle whether thick terms and concepts are inherently evaluative in meaning. In closing I suggest a more promising line of research.","PeriodicalId":224434,"journal":{"name":"Philosopher's Imprint","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121706129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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