Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, R. Fairlie, S. Desai, A. Herrmann
{"title":"Kauffman Indicators of Entrepreneurship: 2017 State Report on Early-Stage Entrepreneurship","authors":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, R. Fairlie, S. Desai, A. Herrmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3340028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340028","url":null,"abstract":"Kauffman Indicators of Early-Stage Entrepreneurship is a set of measures that represents new business creation in the United States, integrating several high-quality, timely sources of information on early-stage entrepreneurship. <br><br>This report presents indicators for all 50 states and the District of Columbia for 2017.","PeriodicalId":224041,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: State (Sub-Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122285531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Leroy, Carolyn Fryberger, Kasia Tarczynska, Thomas Cafcas, Elizabeth Bird, Philip Mattera
{"title":"Shortchanging Small Business: How Big Businesses Dominate State Economic Development Incentives","authors":"G. Leroy, Carolyn Fryberger, Kasia Tarczynska, Thomas Cafcas, Elizabeth Bird, Philip Mattera","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2771463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2771463","url":null,"abstract":"An analysis of more than 4,200 economic development incentive awards in 14 states finds that large companies received dominant shares, ranging between 80 and 96 percent of their dollar values. The deals, worth more than $3.2 billion, were granted in recent years by programs that, on their faces, are equally accessible to small and large companies. Yet big businesses overall were awarded 90 percent of the dollars from the programs analyzed, indicating a profound bias against small businesses.The fact that there is a slight amount of variation in the degree of big-business dominance among the states is not meaningful, since the programs vary in their targeting as does the industrial composition of the states covered. The key finding is how consistently the programs favor big businesses. This study errs to the generous in counting small businesses by assuming every award is to a small business unless proven otherwise. It also uses a multiple-variable set of criteria to define large businesses, informed by the small business groups whose opinions we recently published. Those criteria account for employment size as well as total number of establishments and local or independent ownership. Given small businesses’ important role in the economy — and their still-lingering credit access problems coming out the Great Recession — this massive allocation of tax breaks to big businesses is wasteful and ineffective economic development policy. As a policy solution, we do not recommend a simple reallocation of deals and dollars. Incentives such as those analyzed here often mean little to small businesses. Small business leaders whom we surveyed in our recent report In Search of a Level Playing Field, say that public goods such as education, transportation and job training that benefit all employers deserve more support. They emphasized that the long-lingering credit crunch from the Great Recession is their greatest challenge. To fund these public investments and credit access needs, we recommend that states reform their incentive rules by narrowing eligibility to exclude large recipients. One could call it means testing corporate welfare. To do so is entirely consistent with the theory of incentives, which is to address “market imperfections,” or to “prime the pump” and then pull back when the market’s invisible hand takes over.At the very least, states should substantially reduce the total amount of subsidy dollars flowing to big businesses, using safeguards such as dollar caps per deal (to end the surge since 2008 in nine- and ten-figure “megadeals”), dollar caps per job (to prevent the astronomical subsidy rates associated with capital-intensive projects like micro-chip fabrication plants), and dollar caps per company (to prevent a dominant employer from distorting spending).","PeriodicalId":224041,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: State (Sub-Topic)","volume":"340 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127388587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Missouri Charter Schools and Teacher Pension Plans: How Well Do Existing Pension Plans Serve Charter and Urban Teachers","authors":"C. Koedel, Shawn Ni, M. Podgursky, Brett Xiang","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2405988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2405988","url":null,"abstract":"This report examines teacher pension plans in Missouri, with a particular focus on the Kansas City and Saint Louis school districts. Missouri is unusual in that public educators are divided among three pension systems: the Kansas City Public School Retirement System (KC), which covers 3 percent of Missouri teachers; the Public School Retirement System of the City of St. Louis (STL), which covers 4 percent; and the state Public Service Retirement System (PSRS), which covers the remaining 93 percent of teachers. Kansas City and Saint Louis teachers are enrolled in Social Security, while teachers in the larger state system are not. There is no reciprocity between the systems, which means that teachers lose employer contributions if they change systems. Costs have risen sharply over the last decade in the STL and PSRS plans. They will begin rising in the KC plan in 2014. Other notable features of the pension landscape for public educators in Missouri include: • The strong back-loading of benefits in all three pension plans. Educators who teach for less than a full career suffer disproportionately large losses in pension wealth because they exit prior to becoming eligible for retirement benefits. • The “pull” and “push” incentives typical of final-average-salary defined benefit pension plans are present in all three Missouri pension plans. Strong retention incentives for mid-career teachers (“pull”) are followed by similarly strong “push” incentives that induce teachers to retire at relatively early ages. • The charter sector in both city districts has grown rapidly in the past decade. Charters schools now account for 41 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of teacher employment in KC and STL. Charter schools are currently not represented on the pension board in either city district. • The long-term retention rates for new cohorts of teachers in KC and STL, whether employed at charter schools or not, are low. This means that very few of these teachers remain in their pension plans long enough to collect full benefits. Retention rates in both cities are far below retention rates for PSRS teachers. • In addition to the general problems associated with using a heavily back-loaded pension structure to compensate teachers in high-attrition environments, urban schools (both charter and traditional) in Missouri also are disadvantaged in recruiting mid-career teachers or school leaders from neighboring districts because of the lack of reciprocity between the city plans and PSRS. For these reasons, we find that the maintenance of separate pension plans for Kansas City and Saint Louis teachers represents a costly barrier to school improvement that needlessly balkanizes the market for educators in the two metropolitan areas. A reform agenda for the pension plans should include the following elements: • Increased transparency in all plans. This would include “what if” projections of future costs under alternative economic scenarios. It also would include greater","PeriodicalId":224041,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: State (Sub-Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116576300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}