Missouri Charter Schools and Teacher Pension Plans: How Well Do Existing Pension Plans Serve Charter and Urban Teachers

C. Koedel, Shawn Ni, M. Podgursky, Brett Xiang
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There is no reciprocity between the systems, which means that teachers lose employer contributions if they change systems. Costs have risen sharply over the last decade in the STL and PSRS plans. They will begin rising in the KC plan in 2014. Other notable features of the pension landscape for public educators in Missouri include: • The strong back-loading of benefits in all three pension plans. Educators who teach for less than a full career suffer disproportionately large losses in pension wealth because they exit prior to becoming eligible for retirement benefits. • The “pull” and “push” incentives typical of final-average-salary defined benefit pension plans are present in all three Missouri pension plans. Strong retention incentives for mid-career teachers (“pull”) are followed by similarly strong “push” incentives that induce teachers to retire at relatively early ages. • The charter sector in both city districts has grown rapidly in the past decade. Charters schools now account for 41 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of teacher employment in KC and STL. Charter schools are currently not represented on the pension board in either city district. • The long-term retention rates for new cohorts of teachers in KC and STL, whether employed at charter schools or not, are low. This means that very few of these teachers remain in their pension plans long enough to collect full benefits. Retention rates in both cities are far below retention rates for PSRS teachers. • In addition to the general problems associated with using a heavily back-loaded pension structure to compensate teachers in high-attrition environments, urban schools (both charter and traditional) in Missouri also are disadvantaged in recruiting mid-career teachers or school leaders from neighboring districts because of the lack of reciprocity between the city plans and PSRS. For these reasons, we find that the maintenance of separate pension plans for Kansas City and Saint Louis teachers represents a costly barrier to school improvement that needlessly balkanizes the market for educators in the two metropolitan areas. A reform agenda for the pension plans should include the following elements: • Increased transparency in all plans. This would include “what if” projections of future costs under alternative economic scenarios. It also would include greater transparency regarding contributions versus benefits for educators with different spells of employment in the three plans. • Given the increasing charter-school presence in Kansas City and Saint Louis, charter schools should be represented on both the KC and STL pension boards. • Data on school and teacher quality should be linked to pension data at the state and district levels. This would produce greater transparency regarding how resources are distributed to schools through the pension plans and allow for evaluations of the school staffing effects of various pension plan characteristics. • Alternative plans for new teachers that would be less expensive and provide mobile retirement benefits should be considered, particularly in the city districts. Benefit mobility can be increased by reducing the back-loading of benefits. Switching plans would entail closing the current plans to new members. • Charter schools in PSRS districts should be allowed to partially or totally opt out of PSRS if they have an adequate retirement plan in place that provides mobile benefits. 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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This report examines teacher pension plans in Missouri, with a particular focus on the Kansas City and Saint Louis school districts. Missouri is unusual in that public educators are divided among three pension systems: the Kansas City Public School Retirement System (KC), which covers 3 percent of Missouri teachers; the Public School Retirement System of the City of St. Louis (STL), which covers 4 percent; and the state Public Service Retirement System (PSRS), which covers the remaining 93 percent of teachers. Kansas City and Saint Louis teachers are enrolled in Social Security, while teachers in the larger state system are not. There is no reciprocity between the systems, which means that teachers lose employer contributions if they change systems. Costs have risen sharply over the last decade in the STL and PSRS plans. They will begin rising in the KC plan in 2014. Other notable features of the pension landscape for public educators in Missouri include: • The strong back-loading of benefits in all three pension plans. Educators who teach for less than a full career suffer disproportionately large losses in pension wealth because they exit prior to becoming eligible for retirement benefits. • The “pull” and “push” incentives typical of final-average-salary defined benefit pension plans are present in all three Missouri pension plans. Strong retention incentives for mid-career teachers (“pull”) are followed by similarly strong “push” incentives that induce teachers to retire at relatively early ages. • The charter sector in both city districts has grown rapidly in the past decade. Charters schools now account for 41 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of teacher employment in KC and STL. Charter schools are currently not represented on the pension board in either city district. • The long-term retention rates for new cohorts of teachers in KC and STL, whether employed at charter schools or not, are low. This means that very few of these teachers remain in their pension plans long enough to collect full benefits. Retention rates in both cities are far below retention rates for PSRS teachers. • In addition to the general problems associated with using a heavily back-loaded pension structure to compensate teachers in high-attrition environments, urban schools (both charter and traditional) in Missouri also are disadvantaged in recruiting mid-career teachers or school leaders from neighboring districts because of the lack of reciprocity between the city plans and PSRS. For these reasons, we find that the maintenance of separate pension plans for Kansas City and Saint Louis teachers represents a costly barrier to school improvement that needlessly balkanizes the market for educators in the two metropolitan areas. A reform agenda for the pension plans should include the following elements: • Increased transparency in all plans. This would include “what if” projections of future costs under alternative economic scenarios. It also would include greater transparency regarding contributions versus benefits for educators with different spells of employment in the three plans. • Given the increasing charter-school presence in Kansas City and Saint Louis, charter schools should be represented on both the KC and STL pension boards. • Data on school and teacher quality should be linked to pension data at the state and district levels. This would produce greater transparency regarding how resources are distributed to schools through the pension plans and allow for evaluations of the school staffing effects of various pension plan characteristics. • Alternative plans for new teachers that would be less expensive and provide mobile retirement benefits should be considered, particularly in the city districts. Benefit mobility can be increased by reducing the back-loading of benefits. Switching plans would entail closing the current plans to new members. • Charter schools in PSRS districts should be allowed to partially or totally opt out of PSRS if they have an adequate retirement plan in place that provides mobile benefits. All new teachers in PSRS districts should participate in Social Security, which offers a basic and transparent mobile retirement benefit.
密苏里州特许学校和教师养老金计划:现有养老金计划如何为特许学校和城市教师服务
这份报告调查了密苏里州的教师养老金计划,特别关注堪萨斯城和圣路易斯学区。密苏里州的不同寻常之处在于,公立教育工作者分为三个养老金体系:堪萨斯城公立学校退休体系(KC),覆盖了密苏里州3%的教师;圣路易斯市公立学校退休制度(STL),占4%;以及覆盖其余93%教师的国家公共服务退休制度(PSRS)。堪萨斯城和圣路易斯的教师加入了社会保障体系,而大州的教师则没有。系统之间没有互惠,这意味着如果教师改变系统,他们就会失去雇主的资助。在过去十年中,STL和PSRS计划的成本急剧上升。KC计划将从2014年开始上调。密苏里州公共教育工作者养老金格局的其他显著特征包括:•所有三种养老金计划的福利都有很强的后负荷。那些教书时间不足整个职业生涯的教育工作者在养老金财富上遭受了不成比例的巨大损失,因为他们在有资格享受退休福利之前就辞职了。•最终平均工资固定收益养老金计划中典型的“拉”和“推”激励在密苏里州的所有三个养老金计划中都存在。对处于职业生涯中期的教师有很强的挽留激励(“拉”),紧随其后的是同样很强的“推”激励,促使教师在相对较早的年龄退休。•在过去的十年里,这两个城区的特许教育部门发展迅速。特许学校现在分别占KC和STL教师就业的41%和30%。目前,特许学校在两个城区的养老金委员会中都没有代表。•无论是否受雇于特许学校,KC和STL的新教师队伍的长期保留率都很低。这意味着这些教师中很少有人能在他们的养老金计划中保留足够长的时间来领取全部福利。这两个城市的留任率都远低于PSRS教师的留任率。•密苏里州的城市学校(包括特许学校和传统学校)除了在高流失率环境中使用沉重的养老金结构来补偿教师的普遍问题外,由于城市计划和PSRS之间缺乏互惠,在从邻近地区招聘职业中期教师或学校领导方面也处于不利地位。由于这些原因,我们发现维持堪萨斯城和圣路易斯教师的单独养老金计划是学校改善的一个代价高昂的障碍,不必要地将两个大都市地区的教育工作者市场分割开来。养老金计划的改革议程应包括以下要素:•增加所有计划的透明度。这将包括对不同经济情景下未来成本的“假设”预测。它还将包括提高三个计划中不同工作年限的教育工作者的缴款与福利的透明度。•鉴于堪萨斯城和圣路易斯的特许学校越来越多,特许学校应该在堪萨斯城和圣路易斯市的养老金委员会中都有代表。•学校和教师质量数据应与州和地区一级的养老金数据联系起来。这将在如何通过养恤金计划向学校分配资源方面产生更大的透明度,并可对各种养恤金计划特点对学校人员配置的影响进行评价。•应该考虑为新教师提供更便宜的替代计划,并提供流动退休福利,特别是在城市地区。可以通过减少福利的反向加载来增加福利的流动性。转换计划需要对新成员关闭现有计划。•PSRS地区的特许学校应该被允许部分或完全退出PSRS,如果他们有足够的退休计划,提供移动福利。PSRS地区的所有新教师都应该参加社会保障,它提供了一种基本的、透明的流动退休福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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