Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts最新文献

{"title":"Can Stephen Colbert Bring Back Stephen Colbert? Alternate, Fictional Personas in Copyright","authors":"Kourosh Connor Shaffy","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V41I2.2033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V41I2.2033","url":null,"abstract":"This Note argues that Stephen Colbert should have the right to use his former Comedy Central persona on his new CBS show. Creator-performers of characters that are fictionalized versions of their own, real personas should not lose their rights to these characters because of copyright law. Traditional concerns associated with a need for copyright (for example, the danger of unapproved copying) are not present where the author’s presence is essential to performance of the character, as is certainly the case here. Nobody can play the fictional Stephen Colbert character but the real Colbert. An artist like Colbert must be free to use his character.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117154545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Blockchains, Orphan Works, and the Public Domain","authors":"Jake Goldenfein, Danita Hunter","doi":"10.7916/D8NC7HB2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8NC7HB2","url":null,"abstract":"This Article outlines a blockchain based system to solve the orphan works problem. Orphan works are works still ostensibly protected by copyright for which an author cannot be found. Orphan works represent a significant problem for the efficient dissemination of knowledge, since users cannot license the works, and as a result may choose not to use them. Our proposal uses a blockchain to register attempts to find the authors of orphan works, and otherwise to facilitate use of those works. \u0000There are three elements to our proposal. First, we propose a number of mechanisms, including automated systems, to perform a diligent search for a rights holder. Second, we propose a blockchain register where every search for a work’s owner can be recorded. Third, we propose a legal mechanism that delivers works into orphanhood, and affords a right to use those works after a search for a rights holder is deemed diligent. These changes would provide any user of an orphan work with an assurance that they were acting legally as long as they had consulted the register and/or performed a diligent search for the work’s owner. \u0000The Article demonstrates a range of complementary legal and technological architectures that, in various formations, can be deployed to address the orphan works problem. We show that these technological systems are useful for enhancement of the public domain more generally, through the existence of a growing registry of gray status works and clarified conditions for their use. The selection and design of any particular implementation is a choice for policy makers and technologists. Rather than specify how that choice should look, the goal here is to demonstrate the utility of the technology and to clarify and promote its role in reforming this vexed area of law.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123533527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Artificial Intelligence's Fair Use Crisis","authors":"Benjamin Sobel","doi":"10.7916/D8WW90T7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8WW90T7","url":null,"abstract":"As automation supplants more forms of labor, creative expression still seems like a distinctly human enterprise. This may someday change: by ingesting works of authorship as “training data,” computer programs can teach themselves to write natural prose, compose music, and generate movies. Machine learning is an artificial intelligence (AI) technology with immense potential and a commensurate appetite for copyrighted works. In the United States, the copyright law mechanism most likely to facilitate machine learning’s uses of protected data is the fair use doctrine. However, current fair use doctrine threatens either to derail the progress of machine learning or to disenfranchise the human creators whose work makes it possible. \u0000This Article addresses the problem in three parts: using popular machine learning datasets and research as case studies, Part I describes how programs “learn” from corpora of copyrighted works and catalogs the legal risks of this practice. It concludes that fair use may not protect expressive machine learning applications, including the burgeoning field of natural language generation. Part II explains that applying today’s fair use doctrine to expressive machine learning will yield one of two undesirable outcomes: if US courts reject the fair use defense for machine learning, valuable innovation may move to another jurisdiction or halt entirely; alternatively, if courts find the technology to be fair use, sophisticated software may divert rightful earnings from the authors of input data. This dilemma shows that fair use may no longer serve its historical purpose. Traditionally, fair use is understood to benefit the public by fostering expressive activity. Today, the doctrine increasingly serves the economic interests of powerful firms at the expense of disempowered individual rightsholders. Finally, in Part III, this Article contemplates changes in doctrine and policy that could address these problems. It concludes that the United States’ interest in avoiding both prongs of AI’s fair use dilemma offers a novel justification for redistributive measures that could promote social equity alongside technological progress.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116502324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"I Spy: Addressing the Privacy Implications of Live Streaming Technology and the Current Inadequacies of the Law","authors":"Kendall Elizabeth Jackson","doi":"10.7916/D8DV31X1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8DV31X1","url":null,"abstract":"We live in a world where almost everything is recorded. With tiny, powerful cameras in our pockets — on our phones, laptops, and tablets — we can digitally capture almost every aspect of our lives if we choose to. Not only can we capture our lives, we can transmit these recordings virtually instantaneously for almost anyone to see, and the range of uses for these videos is practically limitless. With applications like Twitter’s Periscope, Snapchat, Instagram and Facebook used for everything from capturing and exposing criminal activity or police misconduct, to disseminating makeup tricks and techniques, to showing us lip-syncing in our cars, we are utilizing live streaming and posting to a much more frequent extent. Because of the ubiquitous nature of these powerful little cameras, some pundits have argued not only that there is a waning notion of an expectation to privacy in public places, but that the people don’t mind the potential for constant video surveillance that this represents. Others contest this idea and argue that just because we’ve accepted these technologies. This Note argues that live-streaming technology has implicated a number of important privacy rights for various parties, from the videographer/streamers themselves, to the Internet Service Providers, to inadvertent participants in a third party’s livestream. Part I will briefly discuss the types of streaming currently available, focusing on an explanation of live-streaming and the transition from archived content applications to live streaming applications, and then move on to examining the trajectory of law around live streaming technology. Additionally, Part I will discuss which parts of the body of both state and federal intellectual property and privacy laws could apply to live streaming, including a discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Part II of this Note will use the frame established in Part I to analyze Facebook Live, comparing the live streaming service to more traditional broadcasting, and discussing the rights and liabilities that live-streamers, those who may inadvertently find themselves included in a live stream, and select third parties may have. Part III will conclude this Note by discussing potential policy implications and asking the question — where do we go from here?","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130051306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“You Be The Judge”: An Analysis of the College Art Association’s Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for the Visual Arts","authors":"Amy Lehrburger","doi":"10.7916/jla.v40i2.2059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/jla.v40i2.2059","url":null,"abstract":"This Note assesses the workability of the College Art Association’s Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for the Visual Arts, with a focus on the principle and attendant considerations for Making Art. The Note first looks at existing doctrine of fair use as it has developed over the last 40 years, before turning to the CAA’s Code of Best Practices, contextualizing the project within the history of fair use statements and attempting to summarize relevant objections and defenses to such efforts. Finally, the Note evaluates the Code and presents findings from interviews with artists. Ultimately, the Note suggests that the Code of Best Practices for Making Art is problematic for copyright owners and users, offering a hybrid of descriptive and aspirational recommendations rather than tools for complying with existing law.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129915912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lex Luthor Wins: How the Termination Right Threatens to Tear the Man of Steal in Two","authors":"Anthony Cheng","doi":"10.7916/D8MK6PJ6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8MK6PJ6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121936340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Response to Professor Menell: A Remix Compulsory License Is Not Justified","authors":"Dina LaPolt, Jay Rosenthal John Meller","doi":"10.7916/D8RN388F","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8RN388F","url":null,"abstract":"At the recent Columbia Law School Kernochan Center Symposium Creation Is Not Its Own Reward: Making Copyright Work for Authors and Performers, a diverse group of creators, academics, lobbyists and practicing attorneys presented their views on how copyright law succeeds or fails in providing the creators of copyrighted works with appropriate rights and protections in the ever-changing digital copyright ecosystem. Speakers disagreed not only on whether or not the copyright system was working in favor of or against the interests of creators, but also on fundamental copyright principles. This is not surprising; while most academics and practitioners seem to accept, to one extent or another, that creators are not treated well in the digital age, there is no consensus on the 200-year-old constitutional threshold question: should copyright be viewed as a property interest or an economic theory? If a property interest, then copyright might actually work better for authors and performers in the future. But if an economic theory, the chance for authors and performers to thrive and prosper in the digital era decreases dramatically. As part of this debate, Jay Rosenthal, one of the authors of this Article, proposed that the basic problem for creators in the digital age is that in the United States, the majority view regarding the fundamental philosophical basis of copyright is grounded in an economic theory-based approach rather than a property interest-","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132520622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who Owns Our Ancestors’ Voices?","authors":"T. Reed","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V40I2.2060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V40I2.2060","url":null,"abstract":"In Part I, this Note will explore federal cultural property statutes as well as the doctrines of common law copyright and aboriginal title, each of which might be employed to determine ownership interests in pre-1972 sound recordings made on Indian reservations. In Part II, this Note will present a case study, involving a nonindigenous collector who captured a massive body of Native American cultural expression prior to 1972, to illustrate the complexities of applying cultural property statutes and common law doctrines to these types of materials in the present. Finally, recognizing that the Copyright Act’s treatment of pre-1972 sound recordings has been identified by Congress as an area in need of revision,1 Part III explores the potential risks and benefits of applying the Copyright Act’s frameworks to pre-1972 sound recordings made on federally recognized Indian reservations. If Congress does have the power to impose these frameworks on pre- 1972 sound recordings made on tribal lands, how might such a framework affect tribal communities? And, should tribal communities oppose such a move by Congress?","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130438591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Transactional Origins of Authors’ Copyright","authors":"Rebecca Curtin","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V40I2.2057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V40I2.2057","url":null,"abstract":"One of the paradoxes of copyright history is that the Statute of Anne, which nominally recognized authors’ copyright for the first time, did not much change the day-to-day business of the Stationers who had previously enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the legal right to copy and who had also lobbied in support of the statute. This Article posits that commercial practice continued as it had because the concept of authors’ copyright had already begun to form in the contracts between authors and their publishers prior to the Statute’s enactment. These transactions, in some cases, gave authors greater rights in their work than the legal default required. Experience in the marketplace helped to assure both authors and booksellers that licensing transactions could support the creation and distribution of books in a world in which, going forward at least, authors would hold copyright in their new works. Commercial practice informed legal theory at this critical juncture in history and helped to change the legal and social norms associated with copyright. This Article draws on the records of the Stationer’s Company, parliamentary journals, and rarely seen, unpublished contracts from the eighteenth century and before to uncover the practical, transactional origins of authors’ copyright in England.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115376430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Copy Write: The Author Survival Guide","authors":"B. Meltzer","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V40I2.2058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V40I2.2058","url":null,"abstract":"This is a transcript of the 29th Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, given by best-selling author Brad Meltzer on March 24, 2016, about his time at Columbia Law School and the importance of doing what you love.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"1995 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132187229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}