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Disturbing the Quiet Life? Competition and CEO Incentives 扰乱了平静的生活?竞争与CEO激励
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0393
Stephan Kramer, Michal Matějka
{"title":"Disturbing the Quiet Life? Competition and CEO Incentives","authors":"Stephan Kramer, Michal Matějka","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0393","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although it is well understood that product market competition acts as a disciplining mechanism that reduces inefficiencies, our understanding of the implications for firms’ incentive design choices is still limited. We use a comprehensive new measure of competition and examine its effect on four major choices: CEO equity portfolio incentives, annual bonus plan incentives, choice of performance measures, and difficulty of financial performance targets. We find that competition reduces firm profits and total CEO compensation, including equity grants, which then also weakens portfolio incentives. Firms respond by adjusting annual bonus plans to restore incentives. Specifically, we find that competition goes together with stronger bonus plan incentives, more challenging annual performance targets, and a greater emphasis on long-term performance measures. Finally, we show that competition increases performance relative to annual bonus targets, which we interpret as evidence that CEOs work harder but get paid less in highly competitive environments. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M52.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-GAAP Reporting and Investment 非公认会计准则报告和投资
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0384
Charles G. McClure, Anastasia A. Zakolyukina
{"title":"Non-GAAP Reporting and Investment","authors":"Charles G. McClure, Anastasia A. Zakolyukina","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0384","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The wide-spread reporting of non-GAAP earnings suggests efficiency gains from doing so. By estimating a dynamic investment model, we examine the real implications of investors using both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings to value firms. When investors use the firm’s GAAP earnings only, the firm’s manager—who cares about current stock prices—underinvests, and his investment is sensitive to transitory earnings. Non-GAAP earnings can improve investment efficiency by adjusting for these transitory earnings, but can also hide inefficient investment by introducing opportunistic bias. Although non-GAAP earnings induce overinvestment, they dominate GAAP-only reporting. Counterfactual analysis reveals supplementing GAAP earnings with biased non-GAAP earnings increases firm value by 3.4 percent relative to GAAP-only reporting. Precluding bias reduces overinvestment and further increases firm value by 1 percent. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: E22; G31; G34; M40.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135890931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Contract Disclosure under External Scrutiny 外部监督下的合同披露
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0717
Carlos Corona, Tae Wook Kim
{"title":"Contract Disclosure under External Scrutiny","authors":"Carlos Corona, Tae Wook Kim","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0717","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine the effects of mandating compensation disclosure on executive incentive contracts, earnings management, firm value, and social welfare. We develop a moral hazard model with multiple principal-agent pairs facing an external monitor who allocates resources across firms to verify earnings management. With such scrutiny allocation, contracts exhibit externalities that create a coordination problem among principals. Contract disclosure enables principals to design the contract anticipating the monitor’s reaction. However, it may also exacerbate the coordination problem among principals because they do not consider externalities on other principals caused by the effects of their contract choices on the monitor’s scrutiny allocation. If internal controls are relatively weak, contract disclosure may make contracts more strongly contingent on reported earnings, increase earnings manipulation, and nevertheless increase social welfare. Contract disclosure improves firm value only if the scrutiny resources available to the monitor are not strongly constrained.\u0000 JEL Classifications: C72; D62; G38; M43; M46.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86861573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accounting Uniformity, Comparability, and Resource Allocation Efficiency 会计统一性、可比性与资源配置效率
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0024
Carlos Corona, Zeqiong Huang, Hyun Hwang
{"title":"Accounting Uniformity, Comparability, and Resource Allocation Efficiency","authors":"Carlos Corona, Zeqiong Huang, Hyun Hwang","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Uniformity is an essential feature of financial reporting, yet its desirability has long been debated. We study a model in which firms decide whether to adopt either their locally preferred accounting methods or a common method, followed by an investor allocating capital across firms. Firms’ choices of a common method are strategic complements in attaining more comparable reports. As a result, multiple equilibria may exist. Specifically, an equilibrium in which firms use their local methods always exists. However, an equilibrium in which firms adopt a common method exists if uniformity improves comparability significantly and firm-specific productivity shocks are large relative to the common productivity shock. Firms may fail to coordinate on adopting the Pareto-dominant accounting method, which may not even emerge as an equilibrium if investments exhibit substitutability. These coordination problems provide accounting regulation an opportunity to facilitate efficient capital allocation, thus providing a microfoundation for accounting measurement regulation.\u0000 JEL Classifications: D02; D61; D83; H11; M40; M41; M48.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76525354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wearing out the Watchdog: The Impact of SEC Case Backlog on the Formal Investigation Process 耗尽监管机构:SEC案件积压对正式调查过程的影响
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0157
Samuel B. Bonsall, Eric R. Holzman, Brian P. Miller
{"title":"Wearing out the Watchdog: The Impact of SEC Case Backlog on the Formal Investigation Process","authors":"Samuel B. Bonsall, Eric R. Holzman, Brian P. Miller","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0157","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We examine a comprehensive set of investigations by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement offices to provide evidence on the consequences of these office’s busyness on the formal investigation process. We find that higher office case backlog decreases the likelihood of an investigation into a restating firm. Our results show no evidence that higher backlogs affect the SEC’s ability to pursue cases involving revenue recognition issues and high insider trading, which is consistent with the agency’s stated priorities. But our findings indicate that busy SEC offices are less likely to pursue cases with the largest shareholder losses, which is inconsistent with SEC priorities. Backlog also impacts pursued investigations, leading to more prolonged investigations, a lower Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases likelihood, and smaller SEC penalties. Our evidence suggests that busyness undermines the SEC’s investigation process. JEL Classifications: G18; G38; K42; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition 共同所有权、高管薪酬与产品市场竞争
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0649
Matthew J. Bloomfield, Henry L. Friedman, Hwa Young Kim
{"title":"Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition","authors":"Matthew J. Bloomfield, Henry L. Friedman, Hwa Young Kim","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0649","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms’ use of revenue-based pay. Using both associative analyses and an event study difference-in-differences design based on plausibly exogenous institutional mergers, we find no evidence of a negative relation between common ownership and the use of revenue-based pay, except in an economically small subsample of extremely concentrated owners. Results involving relative performance incentives are similar. Collectively, our results provide no support for the notion that cross-owning blockholders in general influence compensation contracts in order to soften executives’ incentives to compete aggressively. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D43; G30; L13; M12; M40; M52.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135248446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
International Financial Reporting Standards and the Macroeconomy 国际财务报告准则与宏观经济
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0459
Asad Kausar, You-il Park
{"title":"International Financial Reporting Standards and the Macroeconomy","authors":"Asad Kausar, You-il Park","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0459","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Using a generalized aggregate-level difference-in-differences analysis across 32 countries over the 1991–2017 period, we find that the ability of aggregate earnings to predict one-year ahead GDP growth is greater for countries that adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) than those that did not. IFRS adoption also enables aggregate earnings to better predict growth in GDP components and related factors. We show that aggregate accruals drive this effect, not aggregate cash flows. The mechanism for the enhanced predictive ability of IFRS-based aggregate earnings for future GDP growth is due to fair value-based accruals, which we proxy with IFRS-driven special items. In additional analyses, we find that our main results are stronger for adopting countries with greater differences between local accounting standards and IFRS and robust to controls for enforcement. Our findings suggest that IFRS adoption improves aggregate earnings’ ability to reflect fundamental economic news in a timely manner. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: E01; F00; M41; O50.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136310112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Connectors: A Catalyst for Team Creativity 连接器:团队创造力的催化剂
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0671
Romana L. Autrey, Kevin E. Jackson, Elena Klevsky, Fritz Drasgow
{"title":"Connectors: A Catalyst for Team Creativity","authors":"Romana L. Autrey, Kevin E. Jackson, Elena Klevsky, Fritz Drasgow","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0671","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Creativity drives profit in an idea economy, and many companies organize teams to facilitate creativity. This paper investigates the strategic deployment of individuals to boost a team’s creativity. More individualistic team members tend to generate highly original ideas yet are less likely to share these ideas. We theorize that adding a connector—an individual strongly predisposed to form and foster relationships—to a team will enable more idea sharing among individualistic team members, thus increasing the likelihood that the team’s creative potential will be realized. We leverage a new conceptualization of the “connector” construct to identify connectors and then use an experiment to study the impact of their presence or absence on team creative performance. Our results support these predictions and suggest that connectors improve team creativity by enabling others to share in the creative process and not because connectors themselves exhibit greater creative performance than their average peer. Data Availability: The data reported in the paper are available from the authors.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136236536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure Dissemination on Information Asymmetry among Investors: Evidence from the Implementation of the EDGAR System 强制性信息披露对投资者信息不对称的影响:来自EDGAR制度实施的证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0602
Enrique A. Gomez
{"title":"The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure Dissemination on Information Asymmetry among Investors: Evidence from the Implementation of the EDGAR System","authors":"Enrique A. Gomez","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0602","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidence that EDGAR increased information asymmetries among investors. This result is more pronounced for firms with higher integration costs—i.e., those with more complex filings and filings that have higher information content—as well as for firms with lower analyst coverage. Overall, my results suggest that, although EDGAR lowered acquisition costs for all investors, it also benefited some investors at the expense of others.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M21; M41; G00; G12; G18; O33.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81938693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Crowdsourced Forecasts and the Market Reaction to Earnings Announcement News 众包预测和市场对收益公告新闻的反应
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0055
Sandra G. Schafhäutle, David Veenman
{"title":"Crowdsourced Forecasts and the Market Reaction to Earnings Announcement News","authors":"Sandra G. Schafhäutle, David Veenman","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0055","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study examines whether crowdsourced forecasts of earnings and revenues help investors unravel bias in earnings announcement news, which is commonly derived from analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that investors, on average, understand and price the predictive signals reflected in crowdsourced forecasts about the bias in analyst-based earnings and revenue surprises. Using the staggered addition of firms to the Estimize platform, we find that crowdsourced coverage is associated with reductions in the mispricing of forecast bias and declines in earnings announcement premia. We further find some evidence that managers use income-increasing accruals to meet the crowdsourced forecast benchmark and that they respond to crowdsourced coverage through increased downward earnings and revenue guidance. Overall, we conclude that user-generated content on crowdsourced financial information platforms helps investors discount biases in traditional equity research and thereby better process the news in earnings announcements. JEL Classifications: G14; G20; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135248447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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