The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure Dissemination on Information Asymmetry among Investors: Evidence from the Implementation of the EDGAR System

Abstract

I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidence that EDGAR increased information asymmetries among investors. This result is more pronounced for firms with higher integration costs—i.e., those with more complex filings and filings that have higher information content—as well as for firms with lower analyst coverage. Overall, my results suggest that, although EDGAR lowered acquisition costs for all investors, it also benefited some investors at the expense of others. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M21; M41; G00; G12; G18; O33.