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MARCH 2024 PLACEMENT ADS 2024 年 3 月配售广告
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.b
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引用次数: 0
Editorial Policy 编辑政策
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.e
{"title":"Editorial Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.e","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.e","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"339 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140461349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Real Effects of PCAOB Inspection Reports on the M&A Deals of Non-Big 4 Accounting Firms PCAOB 检查报告对非四大会计师事务所并购交易的实际影响
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0482
Clive Lennox, Xi Wu
{"title":"The Real Effects of PCAOB Inspection Reports on the M&A Deals of Non-Big 4 Accounting Firms","authors":"Clive Lennox, Xi Wu","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0482","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important way for non-Big 4 accounting firms to grow their businesses. Non-Big 4 firms also account for the vast majority of PCAOB inspections. Consistent with negative inspection reports signaling low quality at inspected firms, we find that non-Big 4 accounting firms conduct fewer M&A deals after they receive negative inspection reports. Additional analyses support our hypothesized signaling mechanism: (1) the chilling effect of inspection reports on M&A activity is stronger when the inspected firm’s business is focused on public company audits, (2) the effect is stronger when stakeholders at the target firm know less about the acquirer because the acquirer is located in a different city, and (3) clients at the target firm switch to new firms rather than move over to the acquirer if the acquirer received a negative inspection report prior to the M&A date.\u0000 JEL Classifications: D82; G34; G38; M42; M48.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139966433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Status Equal Substance? The Effects of Specialist Social Status on Auditor Assessments of Complex Estimates 地位等于实质吗？专家社会地位对审计师评估复杂估算的影响
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0298
Anna Gold, Kathryn Kadous, J. Leiby
{"title":"Does Status Equal Substance? The Effects of Specialist Social Status on Auditor Assessments of Complex Estimates","authors":"Anna Gold, Kathryn Kadous, J. Leiby","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0298","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Auditing standards require that auditors’ reliance on a specialist is commensurate with the specialist’s competence. In assessing competence, auditors encounter cues diagnostic of the specialist’s social status but less so of competence. In an experiment, we manipulate specialist status and find that auditors mistake status for competence unless they are prompted to separate the constructs. This raises the possibility that auditors could over-rely on high-status specialists. However, auditors also assess high-status specialists as more influential, and when the specialist disagrees with the client, they rely more on high-status specialists because of this perceived influence. Thus, high-status specialists can increase auditors’ willingness to challenge the client by providing a strong ally. Additional analyses suggest that auditors are aware that they rely on the specialist’s influence rather than competence, indicating that auditors do not use the process that auditing standards envision to evaluate and rely on specialists.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available upon request.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M42.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"335 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140466257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shaping Incentives through Measurement and Contracts 通过衡量和合同形成激励机制
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2019-0248
Jonathan D. Bonham
{"title":"Shaping Incentives through Measurement and Contracts","authors":"Jonathan D. Bonham","doi":"10.2308/tar-2019-0248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2019-0248","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> I study productive activity, measurement, and compensation in a principal agent model that relaxes common restrictions on the action set of the agent, the distribution of performance measures, and the shape of the wage schedule. The solution to this relaxed problem unifies insights from extant theory and shares features with well-known empirical phenomena. In particular, the optimal outcome distribution has a kink, optimal measurement is conservative, and optimal wages ensure congruent incentives and resemble accounting-based bonus plans featuring a floor, hurdle bonus, incentive zone, and ceiling, with thresholds that may reference other performance measures. Beyond these specific insights, the paper provides a flexible framework for studying how incentives are shaped through measurement and contracts.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"295 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Fiscal Monitoring Make Better Governments? Evidence from U.S. Municipalities 财政监督是否能改善政府？来自美国市政当局的证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-01-19 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0251
Anya Nakhmurina
{"title":"Does Fiscal Monitoring Make Better Governments? Evidence from U.S. Municipalities","authors":"Anya Nakhmurina","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0251","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> This paper examines the effect of state-level monitoring on municipal governance, focusing on outcomes in financial reporting quality, local corruption, political entrenchment, and municipal financial soundness. I exploit the staggered adoption of fiscal monitoring policies that entail a regular review of municipal financial reports for signs of fiscal distress. I find that introducing these monitoring policies is associated with an increase in the proxies for reporting quality, a decrease in the number of corruption convictions, and a reduction in re-election likelihood for incumbent politicians. Consistent with the purpose of the policies, my evidence shows that fiscal health ratios of municipalities improve after initiating state monitoring. Collectively, my results are consistent with state fiscal monitoring improving several important aspects of municipal governance. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G18; G38; H1; H11; H7; H83; M4.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Online Conflict Disclosures Support Enforcement? Evidence from Personal Financial Disclosures and Public Corruption 在线冲突披露如何支持执法？来自个人财务披露和公共腐败的证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0402
Alexandra A. Scherf
{"title":"How Do Online Conflict Disclosures Support Enforcement? Evidence from Personal Financial Disclosures and Public Corruption","authors":"Alexandra A. Scherf","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0402","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> Public corruption is a concern for democracies around the world. In the U.S., states have responded to this issue by publishing personal financial disclosures (PFDs) for public officials online. PFDs are a conflict-of-interest disclosure designed to relieve agency conflicts between private citizens and government officials by documenting overlaps between officials’ financial interests and public responsibilities. This paper explores whether and how online PFD supports anticorruption enforcement. I present a stylized model illustrating how online PFD leads investigators to increase case referral volume and quality. Empirically, I find that online PFD for local officials is associated with increased referral rates and greater likelihoods of prosecution conditional on referral. I conduct 126 field interviews of federal prosecutors, journalists, and ethics commissions to understand the mechanisms behind these results. I conclude that online PFD supports the enforcement of local corruption by reducing disclosure acquisition costs for enforcement agents.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141873315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Covers and Front Matter 封面和封头
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.1.i
{"title":"Covers and Front Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.1.i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.1.i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are Private Firms More Aggressive Tax Planners? 私人公司是否更积极地进行税务筹划？
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0499
Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Patrick T. Langetieg, Edward L. Maydew, Michele S. Mullaney
{"title":"Are Private Firms More Aggressive Tax Planners?","authors":"Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Patrick T. Langetieg, Edward L. Maydew, Michele S. Mullaney","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0499","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Drawing on confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, we examine whether privately held corporations are more aggressive tax planners than their publicly held peers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no consistent evidence that private firms are more aggressive tax planners. We then examine whether private firms’ tax planning differs from that of public firms more generally. We find that private firms engage in more conforming tax planning (planning that also reduces pretax accounting income). However, tests of nonconforming tax planning reveal that private firms generally engage in the same or less planning relative to their public peers. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the belief that private firms are generally more aggressive tax planners than are public firms, but confirm that they engage in more of some forms of general (i.e., conforming) planning.\u0000 Data Availability: The IRS provided confidential tax information to Michele S. Mullaney pursuant to an Intragovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) agreement through the Statistics of Income (SOI) Joint Statistical Research Program (JSRP).\u0000 JEL Classifications: H25; H26; K34; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"17 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140522630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial Policy 编辑政策
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.1.e
{"title":"Editorial Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.1.e","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.1.e","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"54 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139183559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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