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Under the Hood of Activist Fraud Campaigns: Private Information Quality, Disclosure Incentives, and Stock Lending Dynamics 积极欺诈运动的秘密:私人信息质量、披露激励和股票借贷动态
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-07-16 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2023-0392
Byung Hyun Ahn, Robert M. Bushman, Panos N. Patatoukas
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引用次数: 0
Supervisor Impact on Employee Careers: The Role of Rating Differentiation 主管对员工职业生涯的影响:评级差异的作用
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0289
Judith Künneke
{"title":"Supervisor Impact on Employee Careers: The Role of Rating Differentiation","authors":"Judith Künneke","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0289","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> Organizations invest heavily in supervision to increase the competitive advantage of their human capital. Although recent studies show that supervisors add value in general, it is not well understood what specific supervisory behaviors are relevant for employee career outcomes. To that end, this study explores the performance evaluation process and focuses on supervisors’ evaluation behavior. Interpreting a supervisor’s tendency to differentiate as a way of advancing employee development, I provide theory-consistent evidence revealing the relevance of differentiation for employee career outcomes. Using proprietary archival data, I demonstrate that differentiation relates positively to employees (1) performing more successfully in a new position upon promotion, (2) receiving a promotion to the next position, and (3) remaining in the organization. Therefore, this study presents novel and relevant evidence on the importance of specific supervisory behaviors in establishing effective human capital management practices.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Individual Auditor Turnover and Audit Quality—Large Sample Evidence from U.S. Audit Offices 审计师个人流动与审计质量--来自美国审计署的大样本证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0862
Tao Ma, Chi Wan, Yakun Wang, Yuping Zhao
{"title":"Individual Auditor Turnover and Audit Quality—Large Sample Evidence from U.S. Audit Offices","authors":"Tao Ma, Chi Wan, Yakun Wang, Yuping Zhao","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0862","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We examine the relationship between audit quality and office-level auditor turnover. Using resumes of over 106,000 Big 4 auditors, we find that audit offices with higher turnover have a greater likelihood of client annual report restatements. This detrimental effect is more pronounced when the departing auditors are more experienced and when the office faces tighter human capital constraints and is primarily attributable to voluntary turnover. Further, such negative effect is borne mostly by complex clients and intangible-intensive clients but is weakened for clients with greater product similarity to the client portfolio of the audit office. Last, the impact of office-level turnover on audit quality persists after controlling for firm-level turnover. Our findings inform the current policy debate on whether and to what extent audit firms should disclose auditor turnover as a potential indicator of audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Covers and Front Matter 封面和封头
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.i
{"title":"Covers and Front Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
JULY 2024 PLACEMENT ADS 2024 年 7 月配售广告
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.b
{"title":"JULY 2024 PLACEMENT ADS","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.b","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.b","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial Policy 编辑政策
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.e
{"title":"Editorial Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.e","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.4.e","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"151 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unintended Real Effects of EDGAR: Evidence from Corporate Innovation EDGAR 意外的实际效果:来自公司创新的证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2023-0310
Michael Dambra, Atanas Mihov, Leandro Sanz
{"title":"Unintended Real Effects of EDGAR: Evidence from Corporate Innovation","authors":"Michael Dambra, Atanas Mihov, Leandro Sanz","doi":"10.2308/tar-2023-0310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2023-0310","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We study the real effects on innovation of a transformative change in corporate disclosure dissemination, the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system. On the one hand, increased disclosure dissemination can lower firms’ cost of capital, thereby stimulating innovative activity. On the other hand, increased dissemination can exacerbate proprietary disclosure costs, reducing firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that treated firms reduce innovation investment following EDGAR’s implementation. In contrast, EDGAR reporting firms’ innovation investment cuts are met with an increase in innovation investment by their technology rivals. Consistent with an increase in proprietary costs, EDGAR-filers disclose less about their innovation activities. We also find evidence of a redistribution of innovative activity from public to private firms not subject to EDGAR disclosure requirements. Overall, our results are consistent with increased disclosure dissemination crowding out investment in innovative projects, whose returns negatively depend on information spillovers. JEL Classifications: D23; L86; M40; M41; O30; O31; O32; O34.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Algorithmic Trading on Management Guidance 算法交易对管理指导的影响
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0080
Andrew Stephan
{"title":"The Effect of Algorithmic Trading on Management Guidance","authors":"Andrew Stephan","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0080","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> I investigate whether algorithmic trading (AT) affects the provision of management guidance. Existing research finds that AT decreases fundamental information acquisition before earnings announcements and consequently reduces the informativeness of prices. To compensate for reduced information acquisition, I predict and find that managers at firms with more AT activity increase the quantity and quality of guidance issued at earnings announcements. Evidence is consistent with managers responding to reduced information acquisition, as opposed to changes in liquidity, and results suggest guidance in response to AT is effective at reducing information asymmetry. These findings identify a new channel through which AT affects stock price informativeness by documenting a link to managers’ disclosure decisions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G19; G10.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"106 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cash versus Share Payouts in Relative Performance Plans 相对绩效计划中的现金支付与股票支付
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0167
Oscar Timmermans
{"title":"Cash versus Share Payouts in Relative Performance Plans","authors":"Oscar Timmermans","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0167","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> This study examines the risk taking properties associated with incentive plans that use relative performance evaluation, with a focus on the form of payout, whether in cash or shares. By analyzing determinants and consequences of payout form choice, I find that share-based plans offer risk-averse managers weaker incentives to pursue projects with idiosyncratic risk compared with cash plans. This occurs because share plans—unlike cash plans—expose managers to systematic performance trends, as payout values are linked to stock prices. Additionally, I document that the variation in risk taking incentives depends on expected relative performance and the strength of the incentives. Overall, this study’s findings suggest that commonly used share-based relative performance plans might not always motivate managers to pursue innovative projects with high idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available. Data Availability: All data are available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G30; J33; J41; M12; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-GAAP EPS Denominator Choices 非美国通用会计准则每股盈利分母选择
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0554
Kurt H. Gee, Thomas J. Linsmeier, Clay Partridge
{"title":"Non-GAAP EPS Denominator Choices","authors":"Kurt H. Gee, Thomas J. Linsmeier, Clay Partridge","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0554","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We provide the first evidence after Regulation G on firms’ non-GAAP EPS denominator choices and whether they are informative or opportunistic. From 2013 to 2019, 17 percent of annual non-GAAP EPS numbers use denominators different from that of GAAP diluted EPS, which makes denominator adjustments among the most prevalent individual types of non-GAAP adjustments. For firms reporting GAAP and non-GAAP profits or GAAP losses and non-GAAP profits, we provide evidence consistent with denominator adjustments increasing non-GAAP EPS informativeness. Our evidence also suggests that opportunism in denominator choices is concentrated in firms reporting GAAP losses and non-GAAP profits and failing to adjust the denominator. Such nonadjustment is inconsistent with SEC requirements to report non-GAAP EPS “on a diluted basis” because the EPS denominator for a GAAP loss excludes dilutive claims. Although the SEC largely overlooks such firms, they are more likely, on average, to report non-GAAP EPS that analysts consider inflated. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M48.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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