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The Influence of Labor Market Power in the Audit Profession 劳动力市场力量对审计行业的影响
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0782
Daniel Aobdia, Qin Li, Ke Na, Hong Wu
{"title":"The Influence of Labor Market Power in the Audit Profession","authors":"Daniel Aobdia, Qin Li, Ke Na, Hong Wu","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0782","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> This paper examines the influence of labor market power in the audit profession. Using a dataset of online job postings, we confirm that audit offices in more concentrated labor markets have greater labor market power and exercise it in the form of higher skill requirements and greater required effort from their auditors, at similar or slightly lower wages. We then show that client firms of audit offices in more concentrated labor markets are less likely to restate their earnings and have lower absolute discretionary accruals. These findings are only present when employees have lower mobility across professions and geographies, consistent with audit offices’ power in the local labor market explaining the results. Collectively, our findings highlight the importance of labor market power in understanding audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: J31; J40; J42; M42; M55.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sequential Reporting Bias 顺序报告偏差
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0535
Cyrus Aghamolla, Ilan Guttman, Evgeny Petrov
{"title":"Sequential Reporting Bias","authors":"Cyrus Aghamolla, Ilan Guttman, Evgeny Petrov","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0535","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> Firms with correlated fundamentals often issue reports sequentially, leading to information spillovers. The theoretical literature has investigated multifirm reporting, but only when firms report simultaneously. We examine the implications of sequential reporting, where firms aim to maximize their market price and can manipulate their reports. The introduction of sequentiality significantly alters the biasing behavior of firms and the resulting informational environment relative to simultaneous reporting. In particular, a lead firm always manipulates more when reports are issued sequentially. Moreover, relative to simultaneous reporting, sequential reporting reduces the overall information available to the market about each firm, resulting in less efficient and less volatile prices. Additionally, we find that stronger correlation in firm fundamentals can amplify the lead firm’s incentive for manipulation under sequentiality, in contrast to simultaneous reporting. We offer further results regarding, for example, market response coefficients, and provide a number of empirical implications. JEL Classifications: C72; D82; D83; G14; M41.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Auditors View Off-the-Clock Misbehavior by Company Leadership as a Signal of Tone at the Top? 审计师是否将公司领导层的非正常行为视为高层语气的信号？
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-04-02 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0026
Brant E. Christensen, Brandon N. Cline, Nathan G. Lundstrom, Adam S. Yore
{"title":"Do Auditors View Off-the-Clock Misbehavior by Company Leadership as a Signal of Tone at the Top?","authors":"Brant E. Christensen, Brandon N. Cline, Nathan G. Lundstrom, Adam S. Yore","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0026","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We study off-the-clock indiscretion accusations against corporate officers and directors and examine the extent, effectiveness, and context of auditors’ response. In the year that indiscretion allegations are first publicized, auditors charge higher fees and are more likely to resign. Auditors respond to allegations against both top executives and board members. Further, reactions are strongest when allegations demonstrate a lack of individual integrity and, separately, when the audit office has previously audited other similarly accused clients. Importantly, the resulting increase in auditors’ effort partially negates the association between indiscretions and lower financial reporting quality. However, auditors are primarily reactive, rather than proactive, and their response is stronger when the accused client is less important economically. These results suggest that company leadership’s off-the-clock indiscretions are signals to auditors of poor tone at the top, but the audit response is not uniform across all clients. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48; G34.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Auditing from a Distance: The Impact of Remote Auditing and Supervisor Monitoring on Analytical Procedures Judgments 远程审计：远程审计和监督员监控对分析程序判断的影响
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0565
Sudip Bhattacharjee, Sean M. Hillison, Carissa L. Malone
{"title":"Auditing from a Distance: The Impact of Remote Auditing and Supervisor Monitoring on Analytical Procedures Judgments","authors":"Sudip Bhattacharjee, Sean M. Hillison, Carissa L. Malone","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0565","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> As remote auditing remains widespread, the profession is concerned that decreased auditor-client interactions and remote supervision challenges can reduce audit quality. In response, some firms have increased supervisor monitoring of remote auditors. We experimentally examine how two key remote audit factors, the spatial distance between auditors and clients and the frequency of supervisor monitoring, influence auditors’ judgments in creative tasks. We predict and find that working remotely facilitates auditors’ higher-level cognition that enhances creative hypothesis generation and improves decision quality when uncovering a seeded error if monitored less frequently than more frequently. More frequent monitoring constrains auditors, which squashes effort and creativity, diminishing the benefits of working remotely. Working onsite at the client location reduces the sense of psychological distance, thereby diminishing the difference between monitoring frequencies. These findings have implications for audit practice as working remotely can enhance performance on creative problem-solving tasks, but only when monitored less frequently.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform-Provided Disclosure on Investor Base and Entrepreneurial Success: Evidence from Crowdfunding 平台提供的信息披露对投资者基础和创业成功的影响：来自众筹的证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-03-08 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2023-0060
John Bai, Ting Chen, Xiumin Martin, Chi Wan
{"title":"Platform-Provided Disclosure on Investor Base and Entrepreneurial Success: Evidence from Crowdfunding","authors":"John Bai, Ting Chen, Xiumin Martin, Chi Wan","doi":"10.2308/tar-2023-0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2023-0060","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We employ a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effects of investor-base disclosure (IB DISCLOSE) on funding outcomes and entrepreneurship success. Since February 2016, Kickstarter has disclosed IB information, namely, backer statistics including geographic locations and previous funding experience of the backers, once the number of backers for a project reaches ten. Exploiting this discontinuity, we show the disclosure increases the likelihood of funding success by 10 percent and the amount of funds pledged by 13 percent. The effect is more pronounced when the project quality is high and for projects with less credible creators, high ex ante uncertainty, high information asymmetry between creators and backers, and high financial costs to backers. We also find IB DISCLOSE increases the likelihood of product delivery. Our study highlights the importance of platform-provided disclosure in improving the efficiency of capital allocation. JEL Classifications: M41; G24; L15; O31; D04.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Covers and Front Matter 封面和封头
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.i
{"title":"Covers and Front Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.i","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/0001-4826-99.2.i","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Large Is the Pay Premium from Executive Incentive Compensation? 高管激励性薪酬的薪酬溢价有多大？
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0226
Ana Albuquerque, Rui Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter, Qi Dong
{"title":"How Large Is the Pay Premium from Executive Incentive Compensation?","authors":"Ana Albuquerque, Rui Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter, Qi Dong","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0226","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages receive a premium for pay at risk that represents 13.5 percent of total pay. The premium is positively correlated with proxies for CEO risk aversion, but implied risk aversion values suggest that the premium is economically smaller than suggested by prior studies. We perform our tests using a variety of proxies to measure the variance of pay and find consistent evidence of economically small pay risk premiums. These results are consistent with recent findings suggesting that risk may have a more limited influence over the level of pay than previously thought.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: D81; G30; J33.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140399240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Loan-Level Disclosure and the Convenience Yield of Asset-Backed Securities 贷款层面的信息披露与资产支持证券的便利收益率
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2022-0245
Brent A. Schmidt, Haiwen Zhang
{"title":"Loan-Level Disclosure and the Convenience Yield of Asset-Backed Securities","authors":"Brent A. Schmidt, Haiwen Zhang","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0245","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We examine the impact of transparency on the convenience yield of AAA-rated asset-backed security (ABS) tranches. AAA tranches of ABS are commonly held by investors to manage financial liquidity and therefore enjoy a price premium beyond what is determined solely by the expected monetary payoff (i.e., convenience yield). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires ABS issuers to provide monthly disclosures about the performance of the underlying individual loans for ABS issued after November 23, 2016 to improve transparency. We document that AAA tranches of ABS experience a significant increase in price volatility after the loan-level disclosure mandate. As a result, the use of these tranches as collateral for short-term funding and their convenience yield decrease significantly after the increased disclosure. Our collective evidence highlights an important unintended consequence of increased transparency in the ABS market; it diminishes the pledgeability of long-term safe assets. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G23; M48.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Firms Withhold Loan Covenant Details? 公司是否隐瞒贷款公约细节？
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2020-0445
Edward Xuejun Li, Monica Neamtiu, Zhiyuan Tu
{"title":"Do Firms Withhold Loan Covenant Details?","authors":"Edward Xuejun Li, Monica Neamtiu, Zhiyuan Tu","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0445","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We study firms’ decisions to withhold loan covenant details by focusing on a unique disclosure-related cost. Prior research documents the prevalence of tight initial covenants that are selectively relaxed in future renegotiations. This uncertainty in renegotiation outcomes can generate a disclosure-related cost because disclosing a snapshot of initial covenants with a high likelihood of violation could lead to harmful outsider reactions (e.g., trade credit cuts) to violations that may be eventually cured. We hypothesize and find that, when firms are likely to face tighter initial covenants and more renegotiations, they are more likely to withhold covenant details, particularly when under pressure from trade creditors. Our inference is robust to controlling for firms’ obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality) and future performance. Prior research has found that the precise covenant details of many loans are not publicly available. We are the first to offer a systematic explanation related to disclosure costs. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; G21; L14.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relative Liability Exposure for Negligence and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from the Audit Interference Rule 过失的相对责任风险与财务报告质量：来自审计干预规则的证据
The Accounting Review Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0757
Michael A. Mayberry, Hyun Jong Park, Wei Zhang
{"title":"Relative Liability Exposure for Negligence and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from the Audit Interference Rule","authors":"Michael A. Mayberry, Hyun Jong Park, Wei Zhang","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0757","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title> We examine how the shifting of legal liability between auditors and clients affects financial reporting quality. We exploit the state-level adoption and rejection of a common law doctrine, the Audit Interference Rule (AIR), which shifts legal liability between auditors and clients, while not affecting total legal liability. The likelihood of restatements declines following staggered rejections of the AIR that shift risk to clients. Path analysis indicates that audit fees increase following AIR rejections, suggesting that relatively greater liability exposure for clients leads to a greater demand for assurance services that, in turn, reduces the likelihood of restatements. We further find greater improvements in financial reporting quality following the rejections of the AIR among clients with higher litigation risk and larger clients. Broadly, we provide novel evidence that clients’ incentives relating to increased liability exposure appear to dominate auditors’ disincentives relating to decreased liability exposure on financial reporting quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: K15; M41; M42.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141870405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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