Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal最新文献

{"title":"The Impact of Financial Inclusion on Minorities: Evidence from the Freedman's Savings Bank","authors":"Claire Célérier, Purnoor Tak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3825143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3825143","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether minorities always benefit from financial inclusion. We show that the Freedman's Savings Bank, established in 1865 after the Civil War, collected deposits from recently freed enslaved people through an intensive marketing campaign based on coercive language and false claims. The advertising intensified when the bank started offering fraudulent loans to white businessmen, contributing to the bank failure in 1874. Our findings support a predatory view of financial inclusion: the negative effects of the large fraud and abuse of trust at the bank led to significant losses for Black depositors.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88789018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"La portabilità dei dati in ambito finanziario (Data Portability in the Financial Sector)","authors":"A. Genovese, V. Falce, Simone Alvaro, Lucia Marzialetti, Davide Tuzzolino, Marco Cassese, G. Colangelo, Oscar Borgogno, A. Manganelli, M. ManzI, Cecilia Sertoli, andrea colaruotolo, Matteo Siragusa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850553","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Italian Abstract:</b> Le interferenze e reciproche intersezioni fra regolazione, innovazione finanziaria e innovazione tecnologica si inquadrano a pieno titolo nella quarta rivoluzione digitale. La disruption a cui si assiste è di tipo intersettoriale, si caratterizza per processi di “contaminazione” tra soggetti e mercati, modelli e categorie, architetture e geometrie.<br><br>Nella nuova era disintermediata e decentralizzata, operatori, banche, intermediari e soggetti terzi elaborano, definiscono, personalizzano e offrono prodotti e servizi, ricorrendo a tecniche predittive ed intelligenti che usano e riusano dati personali, anonimizzati e commerciali, abbinando quelli “esterni”, estratti dal magma della rete, con quelli propri del patrimonio aziendale, e come tali “interni” all’impresa, in un ciclo continuo.<br><br>Muovendo da queste premesse, il Quaderno si propone di analizzare il Data space sotto il profilo dell’oggetto (i dati), dei soggetti (vecchi e nuovi), delle responsabilità e dei diritti, ma solo dopo aver messo a fuoco la cornice regolamentare rilevante, che costituisce il perno essenziale e imprescindibile per mappare e di qui esprimere linee di policy anche in tema di portabilità di dati.<br>Seguendo la predetta linea, nella Prima Parte, il Quaderno si concentra sul quadro normativo. Dall’assunto secondo cui la rapidità della diffusione delle nuove tecnologie, oltre i confini territoriali ed economici, impone un ripensamento delle tradizionali tecniche di regolamentazione, si affrontano i limiti della matrice regolatoria disegnata negli anni‘ 90 e i profili di tecnologia regolatoria necessari per cogliere i cambiamenti e ripensare il quadro normativo in un’ottica di cooperazione tra Autorità nazionali e coordinamento fra i diversi ordinamenti nazionali, e con l’obiettivo chiaro di contemperare gli interessi in gioco e tutelare i diritti fondamentali. <br><br>Nella Seconda Parte, invece, le questioni della portabilità e della condivisione dei dati sono analizzate con riferimento ai flussi informativi e ai soggetti coinvolti, sotto il duplice aspetto degli ambiti di responsabilità degli attori e delle ricadute in punto di tutela dei clienti e degli investitori. L’emersione di Third Party Providers insieme al rafforzamento di costitutori di banche dati e titolari dei software getta le basi per una rinnovata competizione incentrata sull’uso delle Smart Technologies nello scenario dell’Open Banking e impone una attenta riflessione su ruoli e funzioni, nonché sulla catena delle eventuali responsabilità.<br><br>Attraverso i predetti snodi, il Quaderno propone un solido approccio ricostruttivo e sistematico per inquadrare le nuove sfide e intercettare i rischi associati alla trasformazione digitale con particolare riferimento alla disciplina inerente ai flussi di dati. In tal ambito, infatti, la migrazione dei servizi finanziari verso ambienti sempre più digitali e caratterizzati da una normativa frammentaria e settoriale, rischia di sf","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90814766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who Regulates the Regulators? The Financial Ombudsman Service","authors":"Institute of Economic Affairs Submitter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850606","url":null,"abstract":"While not formally a regulator in the strict sense, the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) exercises de facto regulatory powers in retail financial services, as its rules and determinations direct the behaviours of firms. While intended to be independent, the FOS has a close relationship with the Financial Conduct Authority. Ombudsmen, however, have considerable discretion to make determinations of complaints brought to them based on what they consider fair and reasonable in the circumstances and are not bound to follow law, regulation, and good industry practice. This has been described as a disapplication of the rule of law. The FOS has expanded its role from resolving complaints to \"preventing detriment\", which seems to overstep its statutory function. The formal expansion of its jurisdiction into small- and medium-sized business complaints and the increase in the limit of the amount of compensation it can award seem likely to further increase the complexity of its cases, calling into question the fairness of decisions and highlighting the need for greater transparency on internal decision-making policies. Increasing complexity and the higher amounts of financial compensation that may be awarded in some cases also suggest that there should be a review of the charging structure for FOS cases. While some form of alternative dispute resolution is necessary for consumers in dispute with financial service providers, there are signs that the way the FOS operates has introduced unfairness and uncertainty for firms. There is evidence of anti-competitive effects in lending and advice markets, and limited evidence of improvements in consumer outcomes in financial services generally. The FCA should undertake an investigation into the effect on competition of the FOS and its decisions. A more formal channel for dispute resolution in financial cases involving small and medium sized businesses (previously recommended by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons) should be considered.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85141645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Capital Requirements, Mortgage Rates and House Prices","authors":"S. Damen, Stef Schildermans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3829680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3829680","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of an increase in capital requirements for residential mortgages on mortgage rates and house prices. We exploit a unique quasi-experiment in which affected banks faced an increase in risk weights of five percentage points. Using a difference-in-difference estimator we find that treated banks increase their mortgage rates by 18 basis points. Houses near affected banks have a 2.34% lower sale price after the increase in capital requirements. Our results imply a semi-elasticity of house prices to changes in mortgage rates of 13, in line with predictions from a user cost model.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"89 10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87707001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"ESMA Fines for Moody’s: A Symptom of 'Big Business'","authors":"D. Cash","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3815691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3815691","url":null,"abstract":"A short paper that reviews the recent regulatory action taken against Moody's by ESMA.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"263 1-2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78447795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"라임과 옵티머스 이후 사모펀드 시장 개선 방안 (Hedge Fund Regulatory Change Proposals after Lime and Optimus)","authors":"Myung Suk Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3814488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3814488","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Korean Abstract:</b> 최근 DLF, 라임 및 옵티머스 사태 이후, 금융위와 금감원은 사모 집합투자시장에 제도적 미비점이 있다고 판단하고, 사모펀드의 유동성, 실질적 공모펀드의 형식적 사모펀드로의 탈바꿈 및 기타 투자자의 보호 개선안들을 제안하였다. 그러나 금융감독기관의 이러한 개선안만으로는 사모펀드사태의 재발을 방지할 수 있을지에 대한 의문이 있으며, 좀 더 근본적인 개선책이 필요하다고 보여진다. 추가 개선안으로 펀드의 마감일과 투자자산의 마감일의 미스매치 방지안, 펀드 목표수익율을 펀드광고물에 포함금지, 운용사로부터의 집중투자기구, 특히 일반투자자비율이 높은 사모펀드의 독립성 향상, 금융투자업자의 펀드와 투자자에 대한 주의의무와 충실의무의 정의 및 규제, 금융사기에 대한 금융투자업자의 책임강화, 투자권유자문인력의 실질적 투자적합성 검토 및 판단의무 이행 감독 및 금융사기 사건에서 과실상계원칙 배제 등을 제안한다.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The Korean financial regulators identified, in the wake of the recent hedge fund industry scandals of DLF, Lime Asset Management, and Optimus Asset Management, certain systemic gaps in the market oversight regime and proposed changes to reduce redemption and cash/maturity mismatchs, prevent abuse of private offering exemptions, and provide additional investor protection measures. In spite of the breadth of those policy changes, more fundamental changes may be needed to prevent the recurrence of the recent market misbehaviors – such additional changes may include prohibition of marketing funds with mismatching redemption schedules to the maturity or marketability of their investment assets; prohibition of including target yield rates in marketing; greater fund independence from investment advisors, especially for highly retailized hedge funds; stricter definition of the fiduciary duties of the advisers and sales companies with respect to the funds and investors; stricter reading of the securities fraud section in the Financial Services and Capital Markets Act (§178); stricter enforcement of the investment adviser rules and regulations; and exclusion of the comparative negligence rules in securities fraud cases for the benefit of the investors.<br>","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86573935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rescuing Rational Expectations from Undeserved Ridicule","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493043","url":null,"abstract":"Heterogeneity of risk aversion parameters of economic agents facilitates risk sharing, as such, is a necessary condition for economic viability of stock markets. This study finds price equilibriums that are outcome of conditioning of homogeneously received information on heterogeneous realizations of risk preferences Pareto dominate alternate comparable equilibriums that are conditioned on the `common' component of heterogeneously received information. Necessity of an information source that is not either of stock prices or stock returns, and that equally is visible to all for feasibility of homogeneously received information establishes necessity of a `market procedural mechanism' for conditioning of rational expectations equilibriums (REE). While stock return volatility has, in context of the `Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM)', structure that is amenable to its characterization as a market procedural mechanism, expectations that are conditioned on stock return volatility explicitly are shown to have character of uninformed gambles. Implicitness of adoption of return volatility as market mechanism suffices then, for inducement of stock markets that are characterized by, `gambles over lotteries'; the `investors trade too much' phenomenon; and intermittency of market correction events. We arrive then at a rational explanation for seeming irrationality or proneness to bias of actions of investors in stock markets, namely absence of a robustly formulated market procedural mechanism for formation of rational expectations equilibriums. In aggregate, we arrive at rescue of concept of REE from undeserved ridicule, that is, infer failings of mechanism design as bane of current workings of stock markets.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85620807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Time Inconsistency in Stress Test Design","authors":"Markus Parlasca","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3803876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3803876","url":null,"abstract":"We show that central banks face a time inconsistency problem when publishing bank stress test results. Before a stress test, they want to appear tough as the threat of letting banks fail the stress test incentivizes prudent behaviour. After the stress test, they want to act soft by releasing only partial information in order to reassure financial markets about bank health. We characterize an institutional design solution to this commitment problem: a social planner sets the framework within which the central bank communicates. We find that a hurdle rate framework, where all banks are judged to pass or fail relative to a common threshold, is optimal in many settings as it generates intermediate levels of both incentives and reassurance. With a hurdle rate framework, stress tests become an informational contagion channel, as changes in the health of one bank affect beliefs about the health of other banks. Thus, informational contagion can be a feature of a socially optimal institutional design in the presence of a time inconsistency problem.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83929856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price of Regulations: Regulatory Costs and the Cross-section of Stock Returns","authors":"Barış Ince, H. Ozsoylev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3655823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655823","url":null,"abstract":"Regulations introduce significant fixed costs and add to operating leverage. Fixed regulatory costs that contribute to operating leverage should generate a risk premium. To explore whether such a premium exists, we introduce a measure of \"regulatory operating leverage\" that reflects the importance of fixed regulatory costs in a firm's cost structure. Regulatory operating leverage predicts stock returns in the cross-section, and a zero-cost high-low equal (value)-weighted regulatory operating leverage strategy generates 5.64% (5.28%) annualized risk-adjusted return. Finally, the impact of regulatory operating leverage on returns is due to the (systematic) risk contribution of fixed regulatory costs.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79819335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regulatory Sandboxes and Fintech Funding: Evidence from the UK","authors":"Giulio Cornelli, S. Doerr, L. Gambacorta, Ouarda Merrouche","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727816","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Over 50 countries have introduced regulatory sandboxes to foster financial innovation. This paper conducts the first evaluation of their ability to improve fintechs’ access to capital and attendant real effects. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the UK sandbox, we establish that firms entering the sandbox see an increase of 15% in capital raised post-entry. Their probability of raising capital increases by 50%. Sandbox entry also has a significant positive effect on survival rates and patenting. Investigating the mechanism, we present evidence consistent with lower asymmetric information and regulatory costs.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81756644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}