Process Safety Progress最新文献_第10页

Analyzing organizational gaps in process accidents with FRAM: The case of the Imperial Sugar refinery explosion (2008) 用FRAM分析过程事故中的组织缺口:以帝国糖厂爆炸为例(2008)

4区工程技术

Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12545

Josué Eduardo Maia França, Maria Inês Vaz, Brenda Rodrigues Coutinho, Luís Pina

{"title":"Analyzing organizational gaps in process accidents with <scp>FRAM</scp>: The case of the Imperial Sugar refinery explosion (2008)","authors":"Josué Eduardo Maia França, Maria Inês Vaz, Brenda Rodrigues Coutinho, Luís Pina","doi":"10.1002/prs.12545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12545","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study presents a reanalysis of the Imperial Sugar refinery accident that occurred in February 2008, in Georgia, USA, using functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) and based on technical‐scientific materials and the official reports. This explosion was fueled by sugar dust in the packaging building of the refinery, causing 14 fatalities and injuring 38 workers. The purpose of this reanalysis is to seek factors and interactions that could not be well analyzed or evidenced using traditional accident investigation techniques, which are primally designed to analyze linear systems. This reanalysis with FRAM allowed us to perceive the influence of organizational elements, such as culture, in the accidental chain of the event, highlighting the need of a broader approach for accidents involving high‐tech process industries. In this sense, FRAM enabled a more comprehensive analysis of the complex functioning of process plants, for both normal operation and in emergency. It was noticed that the greater the complexity of work systems, the greater the interaction and variability between personnel, equipment, and systems, requiring analysis techniques and methodologies capable of recognizing the real complexities that take place in these sociotechnical systems, especially in high‐tech process plants, such as the sugar refinery in this case.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135322547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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What is in a name? 名字里有什么?

4区工程技术

Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12547

Jerry Forest, Lisa Long

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Safety and Health News 安全及健康新闻

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Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12546

John F. Murphy

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Maturity model approach for building effective process safety management systems 建立有效过程安全管理体系的成熟度模型方法

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Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12543

Tekin Kunt, Madonna Breen, Seçkin Gökçe, Mike Munsil

引用次数: 1

Introduction to grid‐scale battery energy storage system concepts and fire hazards 介绍电网规模电池储能系统的概念和火灾隐患

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Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-14 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12541

Veronica Goldsmith

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Consequence analysis, layer of protection analysis, and bow‐tie as strategies to prevent accidents 后果分析、防护层分析、领结分析作为预防事故的策略

4区工程技术

Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12542

Elisio Carvalho Silva

{"title":"Consequence analysis, layer of protection analysis, and bow‐tie as strategies to prevent accidents","authors":"Elisio Carvalho Silva","doi":"10.1002/prs.12542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12542","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article discusses some accidents and uses consequence analysis as well as layer of protection analysis (LOPA) and bow‐tie to establish the best approach for safely controlling the process to avoid loss of containment due to overfilling. Four accidents and their aftermaths are examined, considering current investigations. Consequence analysis was used with 12 products to demonstrate how to determine the level of protection of the systems to reduce the likelihood of containment loss due to overflow. Finally, LOPA and bow‐tie were used to ensure that the systems have adequate protection at an acceptable level of risk tolerance and will be correctly maintained throughout their life cycle. The analyses indicated that an independent layer of protection with safety integrity level 2 was required to achieve the risk tolerance requirement of <10 −4 /year, which is a known and widely accepted frequency when an accident has the potential to result in a fatality. Furthermore, a study of degradation factors and controls was performed to enhance the reliability of all the components that interfere with the frequency of the top event. This will improve process safety throughout the system's lifecycle, and the results will also be input for safeguards audits.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135917857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Retrospective on the risk matrix, part 1 回顾风险矩阵，第1部分

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Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12540

James A. Moseman

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Human factors analysis of a fatal gas explosion on June 13, 2021 in Shiyan City, China 2021年6月13日中国十堰市致命瓦斯爆炸人为因素分析

4区工程技术

Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12538

Ling Yang, Mengmeng Chen, Weisong Fan

{"title":"Human factors analysis of a fatal gas explosion on June 13, 2021 in Shiyan City, China","authors":"Ling Yang, Mengmeng Chen, Weisong Fan","doi":"10.1002/prs.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12538","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Human factors are considered the main cause of accidents involving pipeline explosionf. In order to identify the path of human‐induced explosion accidents, a gas pipeline explosion that occurred in Shiyan city of China is investigated thoroughly in this study. Applying the 24Model, the causes of the accident are classified into two levels: organizational and individual. The organizational level causes are further categorized into two elements, namely safety culture and safety management system. The individual level causes are further categorized into personal abilities and safety behaviors—both unsafe actions and unsafe conditions. The 24Model methodology further refines unsafe actions and unsafe conditions into subcategories for increased clarity. Based on the 24Model, it was determined that the Shinyan City incident was caused by gaps in personal abilities, which included insufficient safety knowledge, low safety awareness, and bad safety habits. Causes related to ability factors, safety management system, and safety culture were also identified. In addition, the relationship between the identified factors was developed according to the roles played by the accident causes, and the propagation path of the accident was established. This clarity helps to strengthen safety measures related to human factors.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135925719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Application of quantitative risk analysis to fireproofing 定量风险分析在防火中的应用

4区工程技术

Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12539

Jeffrey D. Marx, Benjamin Ishii

{"title":"Application of quantitative risk analysis to fireproofing","authors":"Jeffrey D. Marx, Benjamin Ishii","doi":"10.1002/prs.12539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12539","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the core elements of fire protection for petrochemical processing plants is the consideration of passive fire protection (PFP). This general category, often referred to as fireproofing, is addressed in the American Petroleum Institute (API)‐recommended practice (RP) 2218. This RP provides guidelines for the selection and application of fireproofing with what is mostly a qualitative risk assessment approach. The logic focuses on predicting pool fires based on rough characterizations of system properties combined with equipment layout. Although pool fire impacts are often localized, jet fires can affect larger areas. API RP 2218 addresses jet fires in an appendix because of their unpredictable nature, leaving pool fire exposures as the default basis for structural fireproofing. To properly account for both fire types, fire exposure can be evaluated with quantitative risk analysis (QRA) tools that incorporate both jet and pool fire impacts for a wide variety of accident scenarios, weather conditions, and release orientations. By evaluating the thermal radiation impacts of fires in relation to the vulnerability of steel structural elements, a QRA‐based approach to placement of PFP can be achieved. This approach has the benefit of applying PFP where it is needed the most, to best protect a company's infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Environmental, social, governance: The future of process safety management or repeat of the past? 环境、社会、治理:过程安全管理的未来还是过去的重复?

4区工程技术

Process Safety Progress Pub Date : 2023-09-16 DOI: 10.1002/prs.12535

Rainer Hoff, Kathy Shell

{"title":"<scp>Environmental, social, governance</scp>: The future of <scp>process safety management</scp> or repeat of the past?","authors":"Rainer Hoff, Kathy Shell","doi":"10.1002/prs.12535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12535","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Sites have implemented process safety management (PSM) systems, initially for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) PSM and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk management program (RMP) compliance. Then later, they adapted those systems for risk‐based process safety (RBPS). They discovered the power of leveraging these foundational systems of procedures, tools, and practices for numerous follow‐on initiatives: for example, action management, API‐1173, SIS/IEC‐61511; cybersecurity/IEC 62443; API‐754/Vision 2020 metrics; ISO 14001. Today, companies are increasingly serious about environmental, social, governance (ESG) issues, and demonstrate progress by leveraging the S&P global corporate sustainability assessment (CSA). Interestingly, 63% of the CSA elements rely on information directly or indirectly produced by PSM systems. The existing PSM systems may require additional data collection, or additional lifecycles, in their business processes to satisfy the ESG/CSA requirements. Process safety professionals have a critically important role in supporting local and corporate ESG initiatives. ESG initiatives are indeed the “new game in town” to promote continuous improvement in process safety.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135305848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0