Abdulrahman Alabduljabbar, Ahmed A. Abusnaina, Ülkü Meteriz-Yildiran, David A. Mohaisen
{"title":"TLDR","authors":"Abdulrahman Alabduljabbar, Ahmed A. Abusnaina, Ülkü Meteriz-Yildiran, David A. Mohaisen","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485608","url":null,"abstract":"[1] Agent image from Wikimedia Commons [2] Henderson et al. \"Deep reinforcement learning that matters\". 2018 [3] Tucker et al. \"The Mirage of Action-Dependent Baselines in Reinforcement Learning\". 2018 [4] Shimon et al. \"Protecting against evaluation overfitting in empirical reinforcement learning.\" 2011. [5] Bellemare et al. \"The arcade learning environment: An evaluation platform for general agents.\" 2013 [6] Riedmiller et al. \"Evaluation of policy gradient methods and variants on the cart-pole benchmark.\" 2007. [7] Zhang et al. \"A Study on Overfitting in Deep Reinforcement Learning.\" 2018 Score / Discounted Return / Reward Inconsistent measures of performance between results. Sample Efficiency Sample efficiency is not a good measure of how good an algorithm performs unless training conditions are constant. Top Seeds / Best Seeds Only reporting the best seeds found can skew results in your favour. [4] Stochasticity of policy Explicitly stating if the policy used was stochastic or not. Environment start states Some labs may not have access to the conditions of the environment that make evaluations unfair. Evaluation Details Training Details","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131121991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sofia Bertmar, Johanna Gerhardsen, Alice Ekblad, Anna Höglund, Julia Mineur, Isabell Öknegård Enavall, Minh-Ha Le, Niklas Carlsson
{"title":"Who's Most Targeted and Does My New Adblocker Really Help: A Profile-based Evaluation of Personalized Advertising","authors":"Sofia Bertmar, Johanna Gerhardsen, Alice Ekblad, Anna Höglund, Julia Mineur, Isabell Öknegård Enavall, Minh-Ha Le, Niklas Carlsson","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485617","url":null,"abstract":"There is limited prior work studying how the ad personalization experienced by different users is impacted by the use of adblockers, geographic location, the user's persona, or what browser they use. To address this void, this paper presents a novel profile-based evaluation of the personalization experienced by carefully crafted user profiles. Our evaluation framework impersonates different users and captures how the personalization changes over time, how it changes when adding or removing an extension, and perhaps most importantly how the results differ depending on the profile's persona (e.g., interest, occupation, age, gender), geographic location (US East, US West, UK), what browser extension they use (none, AdBlock, AdBlock Plus, Ghostery, CatBlock), what browser they use (Chrome, Firefox), and whether they are logged in to their Google account. By comparing and contrasting observed differences we provide insights that help explain why some user groups may feel more targeted than others and why some people may feel even more targeted after having turned on their adblocker.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127414279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do You Feel a Chill?: Using PIR against Chilling Effects for Censorship-resistant Publishing","authors":"Miti Mazmudar, Stan Gurtler, I. Goldberg","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485612","url":null,"abstract":"Peer-to-peer distributed hash tables (DHTs) rely on volunteers to contribute their computational resources, such as disk space and bandwidth. In order to incentivize these node operators of privacy-preserving DHTs, it is important to prevent exposing them to the data that is stored on the DHT and/or queried for. Vasserman et al.'s CROPS aimed at providing plausible deniability to server nodes by encrypting stored content. However, node operators are still exposed to the contents of queries. We provide an architecture that uses information-theoretic private information retrieval to efficiently render a server node incapable of determining what content was retrieved in a given request by a user. We simulate our system and show that it has a small communication and performance overhead over other systems without this privacy guarantee, and significantly smaller overheads than the closest related work.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"228 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130296677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vera Wesselkamp, Imane Fouad, C. Santos, Yanis Boussad, Nataliia Bielova, A. Legout
{"title":"In-Depth Technical and Legal Analysis of Tracking on Health Related Websites with ERNIE Extension","authors":"Vera Wesselkamp, Imane Fouad, C. Santos, Yanis Boussad, Nataliia Bielova, A. Legout","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485603","url":null,"abstract":"Searching the Web to find doctors and make appointments online is a common practice nowadays. However, simply visiting a doctors website might disclose health related information. As the GDPR only allows processing of health data with explicit user consent, health related websites must ask consent before any data processing, in particular when they embed third party trackers.Admittedly, it is very hard for owners of such websites to both detect the complex tracking practices that exist today and to ensure legal compliance. In this paper, we present ERNIE, a browser extension we designed to visualise six state-of-the-art tracking techniques based on cookies. Using ERNIE, we analysed 385 health related websites that users would visit when searching for doctors in Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and Ireland. More specifically, we explored the tracking behavior before any interaction with the consent pop-up and after rejection of cookies on websites of doctors, hospitals, and health related online phone-books. We found that at least one form of tracking occurs on 62% of the websites before interacting with the consent pop-up, and 15% of websites include tracking after rejection. Finally, we performed a detailed technical and legal analysis of three health related websites that demonstrate impactful legal violations. This paper shows that while, from a legal point of view, health related websites are more privacy-sensitive than other kinds of websites, they are exposed to the same technical difficulties to implement a legally compliant website. We believe ERNIE, the browser extension we developed, to be an invaluable tool for policy-makers and regulators to improve detection and visualization of the complex tracking techniques used on these websites.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124097265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Syverson, M. Finkel, Saba Eskandarian, D. Boneh
{"title":"Attacks on Onion Discovery and Remedies via Self-Authenticating Traditional Addresses","authors":"P. Syverson, M. Finkel, Saba Eskandarian, D. Boneh","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485610","url":null,"abstract":"Onion addresses encode their own public key. They are thus self-authenticating, one of the security and privacy advantages of onion services, which are typically accessed via Tor Browser. Because of the mostly random-looking appearance of onion addresses, a number of onion discovery mechanisms have been created to permit routing to an onion address associated with a more meaningful URL, such as a registered domain name. We describe novel vulnerabilities engendered by onion discovery mechanisms recently introduced by Tor Browser that facilitate hijack and tracking of user connections. We also recall previously known hijack and tracking vulnerabilities engendered by use of alternative services that are facilitated and rendered harder to detect if the alternative service is at an onion address. Self-authenticating traditional addresses (SATAs) are valid DNS addresses or URLs that also contain a commitment to an onion public key. We describe how the use of SATAs in onion discovery counters these vulnerabilities. SATAs also expand the value of onion discovery by facilitating self-authenticated access from browsers that do not connect to services via the Tor network.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117148028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cookie Banners, What's the Purpose?: Analyzing Cookie Banner Text Through a Legal Lens","authors":"C. Santos, Arianna Rossi, Lorena Sánchez Chamorro, Kerstin Bongard-Blanchy, Ruba Abu-Salma","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485611","url":null,"abstract":"A cookie banner pops up when a user visits a website for the first time, requesting consent to the use of cookies and other trackers for a variety of purposes. Unlike prior work that has focused on evaluating the user interface (UI) design of cookie banners, this paper presents an in-depth analysis of what cookie banners say to users to get their consent. We took an interdisciplinary approach to determiningwhat cookie banners should say. Following the legal requirements of the ePrivacy Directive (ePD) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), we manually annotated around 400 cookie banners presented on the most popular English-speaking websites visited by users residing in the EU. We focused on analyzing the purposes of cookie banners and how these purposes were expressed (e.g., any misleading or vague language, any use of jargon). We found that 89% of cookie banners violated applicable laws. In particular, 61% of banners violated the purpose specificity requirement by mentioning vague purposes, including \"emphuser experience enhancement ''. Further, 30% of banners used positive framing, breaching the freely given and informed consent requirements. Based on these findings, we provide recommendations that regulators can find useful. We also describe future research directions.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127115848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rex Chen, Fei Fang, Thomas B. Norton, Aleecia M. McDonald, N. Sadeh
{"title":"Fighting the Fog: Evaluating the Clarity of Privacy Disclosures in the Age of CCPA","authors":"Rex Chen, Fei Fang, Thomas B. Norton, Aleecia M. McDonald, N. Sadeh","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485","url":null,"abstract":"Vagueness and ambiguity in privacy policies threaten the ability of consumers to make informed choices about how businesses collect, use, and share their personal information. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2018 was intended to provide Californian consumers with more control by mandating that businesses (1) clearly disclose their data practices and (2) provide choices for consumers to opt out of specific data practices. In this work, we explore to what extent CCPA's disclosure requirements, as implemented in actual privacy policies, can help consumers to answer questions about the data practices of businesses. First, we analyzed 95 privacy policies from popular websites; our findings showed that there is considerable variance in how businesses interpret CCPA's definitions. Then, our user survey of 364 Californian consumers showed that this variance affects the ability of users to understand the data practices of businesses. Our results suggest that CCPA's mandates for privacy disclosures, as currently implemented, have not yet yielded the level of clarity they were designed to deliver, due to both vagueness and ambiguity in CCPA itself as well as potential non-compliance by businesses in their privacy policies.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127845149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Studying the Anonymity Trilemma with a Discrete-event Mix Network Simulator","authors":"Ania M. Piotrowska","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485614","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we present a discrete event mix network simulator, that allows analysing how anonymity, latency, and bandwidth overhead are affected by various design choices (i.e., network topology, mixing technique, volume of traffic, packet size or use of cover traffic). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such simulator as work on it began in 2017 to analyze the Loopix mix network, and the code of our simulator is available under an open-source license. To demonstrate the capabilities of our simulator, we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of core design choices on anonymity, scalability and latency in Elixxir, HOPR and Nym, currently deployed mix network infrastructures that make a variety of different choices in their design.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115360835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Julian Fietkau, Kashjap Thimmaraju, Felix Kybranz, Sebastian Neef, Jean-Pierre Seifert
{"title":"The Elephant in the Background: A Quantitative Approachto Empower Users Against Web Browser Fingerprinting","authors":"Julian Fietkau, Kashjap Thimmaraju, Felix Kybranz, Sebastian Neef, Jean-Pierre Seifert","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485599","url":null,"abstract":"Tracking users is a ubiquitous practice on the web today. User activity is recorded and analyzed on a large scale to create personalized products, forecast future behavior, and prevent online fraud. While HTTP cookies have been the weapon of choice so far, new and more pervasive techniques such as browser fingerprinting are gaining traction. This paper describes how users can be empowered against fingerprinting by showing them when, how, and who is tracking them. To this end, we conduct a systematic analysis of various fingerprinting tools to create FPMON: a browser extension to measure and rate fingerprinting activity on any website in real-time. With FPMON, we evaluate the 10k most popular websites to i) study the pervasiveness of fingerprinting; ii) review the latest countermeasures; and iii) identify the networks that foster the use of fingerprinting. Our evaluations reveal that i) fingerprinters subvert privacy regulations; ii) they are present on privacy-sensitive websites (insurance, finances, NGOs); and iii) current countermeasures cannot sufficiently protect users. Hence, we publish FPMON as a free browser extension to empower users against this growing threat.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116320560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"(Un)clear and (In)conspicuous: The Right to Opt-out of Sale under CCPA","authors":"Sean M. O'Connor, Ryan Nurwono, Eleanor Birrell","doi":"10.1145/3463676.3485598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485598","url":null,"abstract":"The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)---which began enforcement on July 1, 2020---grants California users the right to opt-out of sale of their personal information. In this work, we perform a series of manual observational studies (conducted in July 2020, January 2021, and July 2021) to understand how websites implement this right. We find that the vast majority of sites that implement opt-out mechanisms do so with a Do Not Sell link rather than with a privacy banner, and that many of opt-out controls exhibit features such as nudging and inconvenience factors (e.g., fillable forms). We then perform a pair of user studies with 4357 unique users (recruited from Google Ads and Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which we observe how users interact with different opt-out mechanisms and evaluate how the observed implementation choices---exclusive use of links, nudging, and inconvenience factors---affect the rate at which users exercise their right to opt-out of sale. We find that these design elements significantly deter interactions with opt-out mechanisms---including reducing the opt-out rate for users who are uncomfortable with the sale of their information---and that they reduce users' awareness of their right to opt-out.","PeriodicalId":205601,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127551889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}