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X-Efficiency Evolution: An Old-New Hypothesis about the Sources of Productivity Growth, from an Agent-Based Simulation x -效率演化:一个关于生产率增长来源的新旧假设，来自基于主体的模拟
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1333462
Nathanael C. Smith
{"title":"X-Efficiency Evolution: An Old-New Hypothesis about the Sources of Productivity Growth, from an Agent-Based Simulation","authors":"Nathanael C. Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1333462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333462","url":null,"abstract":"While mainstream economics assumes that firms are always on the production frontier, there is an evolutionary interpretation of competition according to which firms have different degrees of what Leibenstein (1964) called \"X-efficiency,\" and competition selects for higher X-efficiency. This concept of competition is implemented in an \"agent-based simulation.\" Firms producing a generic consumption good are endowed with X-efficiencies, which undergo mutation. Even when mutations are mostly negative, selection effects can make productivity rise over time. There is no logical limit to the increase in productivity due to \"X-efficiency evolution,\" which is thus a potential explanation of long-run productivity (or \"TFP\") growth.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131813994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficient Institutions 高效的机构
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-12-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1335439
Thorsten V. Koeppl, Cyril Monnet, Erwan Quintin
{"title":"Efficient Institutions","authors":"Thorsten V. Koeppl, Cyril Monnet, Erwan Quintin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1335439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1335439","url":null,"abstract":"Are efficiency considerations important for understanding differences in the development of institutions? We model institutional quality as the degree to which obligations associated with exchanging capital can be enforced. Establishing a positive level of enforcement requires an aggregate investment of capital that is no longer available for production. When capital endowments are more unequally distributed, the bigger dispersion in marginal products makes it optimal to invest more resources in enforcement. The optimal allocation of the institutional cost across agents is not monotonic and entails a redistribution of endowments before production begins. Investing in enforcement benefits primarily agents at the bottom of the endowment distribution and leads to a reduction in consumption and income inequality. Efficiency, redistribution and the quality of institutions are thus intricately linked and should be studied jointly.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"237 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113995299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
When Doesn't it Hurt Her to Ask? Framing and Justification Reduce the Social Risks of Initiating Compensation 什么时候开口不会伤害她?框架与正当性降低了发起赔偿的社会风险
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-12-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1316162
H. Bowles, Linda Babcock
{"title":"When Doesn't it Hurt Her to Ask? Framing and Justification Reduce the Social Risks of Initiating Compensation","authors":"H. Bowles, Linda Babcock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1316162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1316162","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research shows that initiating compensation negotiations is socially risky for women (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). The current research investigates whether there are ways women can ask to minimize these social risks. In three studies, we test impressions created by alternative frames and justifications for initiating compensation negotiations. We identify two strategies for reducing the social risks for women of asking for higher compensation: (1) using a communal frame to communicate concern for relationships and (2) justifying the request with external validation (viz., outside offer). However, findings suggest both strategies are vulnerable to negative interpretation when used in combination. In conclusion, we offer principles but no clear-cut solutions for minimizing the social risks to women of asking for higher pay.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127112820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Nesting Booking Limits in Revenue Management: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 收入管理中的嵌套预订限制:好、坏和丑
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1124707
J. Chapuis
{"title":"Nesting Booking Limits in Revenue Management: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly","authors":"J. Chapuis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1124707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124707","url":null,"abstract":"Revenue Managers usually nest the booking limits to avoid the situation in which high-fare bookings are rejected in favour of low-fare class (The Good). To date, there are both threshold nesting (The Bad) and net nesting (The Ugly) methods. However the consequence on revenues of each one is not clearly understood. This research investigates the underlying assumptions of each method and supports that the stationarity of the demand process is the key point. This paper also suggests a cointegration test and an event study methodology to know what is appropriate in practice.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131890297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Share Restrictions, Risk Taking and Hedge Fund Performance 股份限制、风险承担和对冲基金业绩
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1333520
Juha Joenväärä, Pekka Tolonen
{"title":"Share Restrictions, Risk Taking and Hedge Fund Performance","authors":"Juha Joenväärä, Pekka Tolonen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1333520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333520","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of share restrictions on the risk-taking and on the performance of hedge funds using the Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database. Share restrictions, in the form of longer lockup as well as notice and redemption periods, provide flexibility for the managers. Our results suggest that this flexibility allows hedge fund managers with lockup provision to take an excess risk, which is not compensated, when performance is measured as a unit of the risk taken by the manager. Specifically, we find that typical hedge funds with a lockup provision deliver 5.6-6.6% (3.8-5.4%) lower Fung and Hsieh (2004) appraisal ratios (Sharpe ratios) compared to their peers without a lockup provision. The results remain consistent even after controlling for various database biases, alternative risk and performance measures, and non-linearities in hedge fund returns.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114285620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Rethinking Lead Time Reduction Investment: A Real Options Perspective 重新思考提前期减少投资:实物期权的视角
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-11-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1307548
Suzanne de Treville, L. Trigeorgis, Benjamin Avanzi
{"title":"Rethinking Lead Time Reduction Investment: A Real Options Perspective","authors":"Suzanne de Treville, L. Trigeorgis, Benjamin Avanzi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1307548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1307548","url":null,"abstract":"Although it is generally agreed that companies are better off with shorter manufacturing lead times, investment in lead time reduction is often difficult to justify using traditional project valuation techniques such as net present value (NPV). In this article, we suggest that evaluating investment in lead time reduction from a real options perspective facilitates quantification of the value of manufacturing flexibility brought about by lead time reduction, particularly the value of the option to time production commitment based on better demand information. This flexibility is significant when demand is volatile. We also present examples to demonstrate how options inherent in lead time reduction can have synergistic effects with related investments, such that a combination of such investments may have positive value even when the NPV of the individual investments is negative.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121791770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Getting into Networks and Clusters: Evidence from the Mid-Pyrenean GNSS Collaboration Network 进入网络和集群:来自中比利牛斯山脉GNSS协作网络的证据
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-11-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1305868
Jérôme Vicente, P. Balland
{"title":"Getting into Networks and Clusters: Evidence from the Mid-Pyrenean GNSS Collaboration Network","authors":"Jérôme Vicente, P. Balland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1305868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1305868","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to the empirical identification of clusters based on network analysis. We start with the detection of a composite knowledge process rather than a territorial one stricto sensu. Networks and clusters correspond to the complex aggregation process of bi or n-lateral relations in which agents can play heterogeneous structural roles. Their empirical reconstitution requires thus to gather located relational data, whereas their structural properties analysis requires to compute a set of indexes developed in the field of the social network analysis. Our theoretical considerations are tested in the technological field of GNSS (Global Satellite Navigation Systems). We propose a sample of knowledge relations based on collaborative R&D projects and discuss how this sample is shaped and why we can assume its representativeness. Descriptive statistics and structural properties show the influence or the centrality of certain agents in the aggregate structure, and permit to discuss the complementarities between their heterogeneous knowledge profiles.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124087145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Vertical Integration in Sequential Negotiations 顺序谈判中的垂直整合
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-11-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1305664
Sergei Koulayev
{"title":"Vertical Integration in Sequential Negotiations","authors":"Sergei Koulayev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1305664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1305664","url":null,"abstract":"We study vertical integration in the form of financial ownership as a way to improve the bargaining position of a firm in sequential negotiations. In our model an upstream monopolist bargains sequentially with two downstream firms over production agreements. If the bargaining sequence is pre-determined, then integrating with one of the downstream firms helps the monopolist to extract more rents from the other firm, by raising his outside option in negotiations. If, on the other hand, the monopolist can choose his bargaining partner, then integration produces an additional effect: it serves as a commitment device of no return to the non-integrated firm after a breakdown of negotiations. This makes that firm more willing to settle today, and at higher price. These favorable effects, however, only realize if the downstream firms are strategic substitutes, and are reversed if they are complements. In the case when the principal is located downstream, and we find the surprising result that his expected profits are unaffected by vertical integration.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115347276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Cooperative Firm as Monitored Credit 合作公司作为信用监控
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-11-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.991864
Brent Hueth, Philippe Marcoul
{"title":"The Cooperative Firm as Monitored Credit","authors":"Brent Hueth, Philippe Marcoul","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.991864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991864","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a financial-contracting theory of the cooperative fim where production requires three generic tasks: working, managing, and monitoring. Workers provide an intermediate input (or labor directly); managers convert the workers' input into a final output; and directors monitor managers. We model the cooperative firm by letting the workers act also as directors. We show how bundling the labor and monitoring tasks can expand the scope for equilibrium market activity, even when doing so results in a strictly positive deadweight loss. Our theory provides new insight with respect to a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the \"life cycle\" of worker-managed firms, and with respect to a complementary body of anecdotal evidence on the causes of worker buyouts and cooperative \"degeneration\". Our theory is also consistent with differences between the board compensation policies of cooperative firms, where members typically receive little more than travel and per-diem reimbursements, and of investor-owned firms, where members receive substantial pay often based in part on firm financial performance.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"177 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114037660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
The European Union Vis-a-Vis Brazil and India: Future Avenues in Selected Trade Policy Areas 欧洲联盟对巴西和印度:选定贸易政策领域的未来途径
Organizations & Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2008-11-17 DOI: 10.1108/14770020810918165
R. Leal-Arcas
{"title":"The European Union Vis-a-Vis Brazil and India: Future Avenues in Selected Trade Policy Areas","authors":"R. Leal-Arcas","doi":"10.1108/14770020810918165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/14770020810918165","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the potential of partnerships of the European Union (EU) with two of the so-called BRIC countries, i.e., Brazil and India. The scope of analysis will be the EU vis-a-vis these two countries, using two types of trade liberalisation: bilateralism/regionalism and multilateralism. The paper argues that the EU's objective of engaging with Brazil and India is to establish peace, security and prosperity in the 21st century. The paper also argues that there remains substantial scope for Brazil and India to make further commitments towards greater liberalisation within the services sectors and within all modes of supply provided in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. It will also be argued that the attitude of Brazil and India to multilateralism and responsibility in global governance is questionable or unclear. Both countries want to become more important players; yet, they seem to lean against 'old' powers (mainly the US) and tend to focus on South-South regionalism.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"202 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134532569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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