Organizations & Markets eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Information Sales and Strategic Trading","authors":"Diego García, F. Sangiorgi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1107330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107330","url":null,"abstract":"We study information sales in financial markets with strategic risk-averse traders. The optimal selling mechanism is one of the following two: (i) sell to as many agents as possible very imprecise information; (ii) sell to a small number of agents information as precise as possible. As risk-sharing considerations prevail over the negative effects of competition, the newsletters or rumors associated with (i) dominate the exclusivity contract in (ii). These allocations of information have implications for price informativeness and trading volume, and thus we suggest a direct link between properties of asset prices and financial intermediation. Moreover, as more information is sold when the externality in its valuation is relatively less intense, we find a ranking reversal of the informational content of prices between (a) market structures (market-orders vs. limit-orders); and (b) models of traders' behavior (imperfect vs. perfect competition). The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131807399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategies for Superior Performance under Adverse Conditions: A Focus on Small and Medium Sized High-Growth Firms","authors":"Vassiliki Bamiatzi, Tom Kirchmaier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1332087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1332087","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study how small and medium sized firms successfully decouple themselves from declining markets. Based on detailed interviews with 20 small business top managers, we observe that most firms employ a multiple-strategy approach, simultaneously pursuing a differentiation and a product-service customization strategy. Most aimed to serve the entire market spectrum but aimed to differentiate themselves through aggressive innovative and product customization. Following this strategy, firms actively search for the high-margin products, avoid aggressive price competition, while at the same time keeping a very tight tab on costs. Most surprisingly, there is agreement that operating in such a market environment is rather ‘exciting’, pointing to the special role the manager plays in identifying the strategies that can alleviate the negative effects of the environment and grow irrespectively.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121165795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction: Evidence from Small Business Debt","authors":"Gavin Cassar, Ken S. Cavalluzzo, C. Ittner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1125146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1125146","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether more sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual accounting) interact with other information sources to reduce information asymmetries between small business borrowers and lenders, thereby lowering borrowers׳ probability of loan denial and cost of debt. We find that higher third party credit scores, but not the use of accrual accounting, decrease the likelihood of loan denial. However, firms using accrual accounting exhibit statistically lower interest rates after controlling for many factors associated with the cost of debt. Further, the interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are greatest when the borrower׳s credit score is low and/or the length of its banking relationship with the lender is short. This evidence indicates that accrual accounting can benefit small business borrowers, but that the information contained in third-party credit scores and obtained through ongoing banking relationships can substitute for the incremental information provided by accrual accounting.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122624554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing","authors":"Amitai Aviram, Avishalom Tor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.435600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.435600","url":null,"abstract":"When deciding whether to share information, firms consider their private welfare. Discrepancies between social and private welfare may lead firms excessively to share information to anti-competitive ends - in facilitating of cartels and other harmful horizontal practices - a problem both antitrust scholarship and case law have paid much attention to. On the other hand, legal scholars have paid far less attention to the opposite type of inefficiency in information sharing among competitors - namely, the problem of sub-optimal information sharing. This phenomenon can generate significant social costs and is of special importance in network industries because the maintenance of compatibility, a key to producing positive network effects, typically requires information sharing. Understanding the hitherto neglected impact of sub-optimal information sharing is important not only for many areas of antitrust law, but also for developing effective policies towards network industries and critical infrastructures more generally, as well as for improving those procedural rules that concern information exchange among litigating parties. This paper therefore advances the legal analysis of impediments to efficient information sharing in a number of significant ways: First, it shows that the strategic behavior of competitors may erect an economic barrier to information sharing that has not been previously addressed in the literature - the fear of degradation. This form of strategic behavior involves the strategic refusal to share information when the refusal inflicts a greater harm on one's rivals than on oneself, and thus generates a competitive advantage. Second, the paper reveals a hitherto unrecognized set of behavioral impediments to information sharing, wherein rivalry norms and managers' risk attitudes bias competitors' judgments of the prospects of information sharing and the status-quo bias and ambiguity aversion lead these decision makers to avoid such arrangements. Third, it integrates these economic and behavioral insights with the findings of the extant literature to create a new framework for predicting when private information sharing will be suboptimal. Finally, we suggest how the alignment of private information sharing with social optimality may be promoted, based on the framework developed here.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125791903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Constructing the Team: Inter-Member Compositional Disagreement and its Effects on Team Dynamics and Performance","authors":"M. Mortensen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1096160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1096160","url":null,"abstract":"The organizational team is ubiquitous and membership therein has far-reaching effects on cognition, dynamics, processes, and performance. Typically considered straightforward and unambiguous, in this study I suggest that team members’ models of team membership are socially-constructed and – due to organizations’ reliance on short-term, fluid, and partially overlapping teams – increasingly disagreed upon. In a study of 38 formally-defined software and product development teams, I identify structural and emergent drivers of inter-member “compositional disagreement” and its effects on team dynamics and outcomes. I compare the effects of inter-member and member-manager compositional disagreement and discuss the implications of compositional disagreement for theory, methods and management practice.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129624761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Independent Directors Should 'Request' of Mutual Fund Advisers","authors":"John A. Haslem","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1302373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1302373","url":null,"abstract":"The background to this study is the failure of mutual fund independent directors to fulfill their obligations as “shareholder watchdogs,” as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940. Normative transparency of information is fund adviser disclosure proactively “requested” by independent directors to enable their fiduciary roles as “shareholder watchdogs.” U.S. District Judge Feess’s opinion in a mutual fund case of excessive fees provides a candid assessment of independent director performance. He supports the view that directors are likely to “go along” with mutual fund adviser plans and actions. This view suggests directors are unlikely to “request” normative information required to serve the “primary interests” of fund shareholders. The judge’s opinion includes numerous revealing insights on the performance [poor] of independent directors. These revelations and other relevant issues in the opinion provide case-based support for independent directors to “request” fund advisers to provide normative transparency of information for their analysis. To achieve normative transparency of information Independent directors and advisers of major funds known for shareholder stewardship must strongly, vigorously, and proactively work together to gain approval in Congress and/or the SEC. The outlook is not bright, but the goal is worthy of the challenge.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127633750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Destabilizing?","authors":"April M. Knill, Bong‐Soo Lee, Nathan Mauck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1328045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1328045","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether accusations by the popular press regarding the potential destabilizing force of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment have merit. SWF investments are associated with a reduction in the compensation of risk over the five-year term examined. Firm volatility decomposition suggests that it is mainly idiosyncratic risk that drives these impacts. Granger causality results suggest that SWFs are poorly informed in their investments (compared to the market) or they have nonfinancial motivations. There is no evidence that the media coverage precedes the poor performance. These findings suggest that SWF investment could be potentially destabilizing.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114462436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Clear Look at Internal Controls: Theory and Concepts","authors":"Babk Jamshidi-Navid, Hamed Arad (Philee)","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1342048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1342048","url":null,"abstract":"Internal control is an accounting procedure or system designed to promote efficiency or assure the implementation of a policy or safeguard assets or avoid fraud and error. Internal Control is a major part of managing an organization. It comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so, support performance-based management. Internal Control which is equal with management control helps managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of resources. Internal controls should reduce the risks associated with undetected errors or irregularities, but designing and establishing effective internal controls is not a simple task and cannot be accomplished through a short set of quick fixes. In this paper the concepts of internal controls and different aspects of internal controls are discussed.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117351258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Career Progression and Comparative Advantage","authors":"Shintaro Yamaguchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1090942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1090942","url":null,"abstract":"This paper constructs and estimates a structural dynamic model of occupational choice in which all occupations are characterized in a skill requirement space using data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the NLSY79. This skill requirement space approach has its merit in computational simplicity as well as ease of interpretation: it allows the model to include hundreds of occupations at the three-digit census classification level without a large number of parameters. Parameter estimates indicate that wages grow with the skill requirements of an occupation and that educated and experienced individuals are better rewarded in a cognitive and interpersonal skill demanding occupation. They also suggest that ignoring self-selection into occupations and individual heterogeneity may result in counter-intuitive and biased estimates of the returns to skill requirements.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125798712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Catalysts Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based Start-Ups","authors":"David S. Evans","doi":"10.4337/9781849803311.00011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849803311.00011","url":null,"abstract":"Entrepreneurs who start multi-sided platforms must secure enough customers on both sides, and in the right proportions, to provide enough value to either group of customers and to achieve sustainable growth. In particular, these entrepreneurs must secure \"critical mass\" to ignite the growth of their platforms; the failure to achieve \"critical mass\" quickly results in the implosion of the platform. There are a number of strategies available to entrepreneurs to reach critical mass. For example, the \"zig-zag\" strategy involves successive accretions of customers on both sides to build up the value to both. The relevant strategies depend in large part on whether the nature of the platform requires securing participation by both platform sides at launch (e.g. dating venues), whether it is possible to acquire one side before approaching the other side (e.g. search engines), and whether it is necessary to make pre-commitments to one side to induce them to make investments (e.g. video games).","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126212730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}