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Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal最新文献

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Incentive Design for Overtime 加班激励设计
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3549028
Charu Agarwal
{"title":"Incentive Design for Overtime","authors":"Charu Agarwal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3549028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3549028","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents an alternative incentive scheme to overcome some of the challenges posed by usual kind of pay-for-performance employee wage contracts offered by the firms.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123648541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Economic Value of Popularity: Evidence from Superstars in the National Basketball Association 人气的经济价值:来自nba超级明星的证据
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3543686
Scott Kaplan
{"title":"The Economic Value of Popularity: Evidence from Superstars in the National Basketball Association","authors":"Scott Kaplan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3543686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543686","url":null,"abstract":"Many industries are impacted by \"superstars,\" where a select few individuals add tremendous economic value. This paper estimates fan willingness-to-pay for superstars in the National Basketball Association, and, in particular, distinguishes between demand for player skill versus player popularity. Using microdata from an online secondary ticket marketplace and plausibly exogenous player absence announcements, I find 4-16% ($7-$42) reductions in prices when superstars are announced to miss games. Additionally, LeBron James and Stephen Curry exhibit even larger impacts when isolating away game absences--21% ($75) per ticket for LeBron and 18% ($55) per ticket for Curry. The results suggest popularity is a more significant determinant of willingness-to-pay than skill, and in line with previous literature on superstars, popularity predicts price impacts convexly. This paper provides a novel methodology to estimate superstar value, and has implications for players, leagues, franchises, and ticket companies.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114931464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams 利用社会激励的力量遏制团队中的逃避行为
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3540218
Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
{"title":"Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams","authors":"Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540218","url":null,"abstract":"We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117087984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Lottery-Based Reward Schemes Improve Worker Motivation and Productivity 以彩票为基础的奖励计划提高了员工的积极性和生产力
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3539871
Adrian R. Camilleri, Katarína Danková, Nano Ortiz Gomez, Ananta Neelim
{"title":"Lottery-Based Reward Schemes Improve Worker Motivation and Productivity","authors":"Adrian R. Camilleri, Katarína Danková, Nano Ortiz Gomez, Ananta Neelim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3539871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3539871","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this research was to investigate the effectiveness of a probabilistic reward scheme to motivate workers and increase their performance. Across three experiments comprising both physical and cognitive tasks, we compared two novel probabilistic with two traditional non-probabilistic reward schemes. In our flagship “single lottery” probabilistic scheme, worker performance was associated with the accumulation of lottery tickets in the worker’s own personal lottery with a moderate jackpot on offer. It was possible for the worker to accumulate all tickets and thus guarantee the jackpot. We found that the single lottery scheme increased motivation and performance relative to a non-probabilistic piece-rate scheme with the same expected value. We argue that the probabilistic scheme benefited from greater excitement, over-optimism, and the goal gradient effect. In light of perceptions of (un)fairness associated with probabilistic reward schemes, we discuss what labor contexts are appropriate for the introduction of a probabilistic reward scheme.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116614489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Information Exchange in Contests 竞赛中的最优信息交换
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3535075
Zhuoqiong Chen
{"title":"Optimal Information Exchange in Contests","authors":"Zhuoqiong Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3535075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3535075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players’ values facilitates the exchange of information by disclosing a signal publicly. The informativeness of the signal determines the monotonicity of the unique symmetric equilibrium and the players’ expected payoff. We characterize the upper bound of players’ expected payoff and the corresponding optimal signals utilizing such a relation between the informativeness and the payoff. When the players are ex ante sufficiently heterogeneous, the optimal signals work through an information-rent channel by inducing allocative efficient contests. When the players are ex ante sufficiently homogeneous, the optimal signals work through an unlevel-playing-field channel by inducing asymmetric contests. In order to guarantee efficient allocation, a regulator can punish any exchange of information when the players are sufficiently homogeneous and impose no restrictions when they are sufficiently heterogeneous.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126009715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Why Are there More Accidents on Mondays? Economic Incentives, Ergonomics or Externalities 为什么星期一事故多?经济激励，人体工程学或外部性
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3527143
M. Poland, Isabelle Sin, S. Stillman
{"title":"Why Are there More Accidents on Mondays? Economic Incentives, Ergonomics or Externalities","authors":"M. Poland, Isabelle Sin, S. Stillman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3527143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527143","url":null,"abstract":"Research consistently finds more workplace injuries occur on Mondays than on other weekdays. One hypothesis is that workers fraudulently claim that off-the-job weekend sprains and strains occurred at work on the Monday in order to receive workers' compensation. We test this using data from New Zealand, where compensation is virtually identical whether or not an injury occurs at work. We still find that work claims, especially sprains and strains, occur disproportionately on Mondays, although less than in other jurisdictions. This suggests fraudulent claims in other countries are just one part of the story. Furthermore, we find work claims remain high on Tuesdays, and that workers' sprains and strains that occur off-the-job also disproportionately fall on Mondays. Sprains and strains treated at hospitals, which are not closed over the weekend, are also elevated on Mondays. However, Monday lost-time injuries are less severe than injuries on other days. Our findings are consistent with a physiological mechanism contributing to elevated Monday injury claims in New Zealand, but do not suggest doctors' offices being closed over the weekend, ergonomic explanations, or work being riskier on Mondays play important roles.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123761808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Analysis of the Job Characteristics Model 工作特征模型分析
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3600844
Tanvi Kamani
{"title":"Analysis of the Job Characteristics Model","authors":"Tanvi Kamani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3600844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3600844","url":null,"abstract":"The Job-Characteristics Model is a concept constructed on the knowledge that a task is itself a key to the motivation of an employee (J. RICHARD HACKMAN, 1976). Precisely saying a repetitious job is very harmful to an employee’s motivation whereas a challenging and interesting job which keeps the employee engaged has a positive effect on the employee’s motivation (LĂZĂROIU, 2015). This theory mentions five job characteristics that are forecast to benefit the psychological state and work-related outcomes. This study also mentions some other factors that may function as mediators to show the relation between job characteristics and work-related outcomes (Syukrina Alini Mat Ali, 2014). The idea of work redesign arose to enrich the jobs in a way such that it would boost motivation and avoid monotonous tasks in a job. Hackman and Oldham’s job characteristics model states that there are five core job characteristics namely skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback (J. RICHARD HACKMAN, 1976). These job characteristics impact the psychological states of an employee that are experienced meaningfulness, experienced responsibility for outcomes and knowledge of outcomes (J. RICHARD HACKMAN, 1976). These in-turn affects the work outcomes that are job satisfaction, performance and work motivation (J. RICHARD HACKMAN, 1976). In addition, it is possible to combine the five core job characteristics to calculate a motivating potential score for a job that can be used as an index of how likely a job is to affect the behavior and attitude of an employee (Syukrina Alini Mat Ali, 2014). Work redesign is becoming increasingly popular as a strategy to simultaneously improve the productivity and quality of employee work experience in contemporary organizations (J. RICHARD HACKMAN, 1976). In this article ahead, the job characteristics, psychological states and work outcomes are explained in detail.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115335746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Job Security and Fertility Decisions 工作保障和生育决定
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3543204
M. Lopes
{"title":"Job Security and Fertility Decisions","authors":"M. Lopes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3543204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543204","url":null,"abstract":"The restrictions on duration and number of allowed renewals implied by fixed- -term contracts generate lower job security. In many countries, these contracts are particularly common among young women. In this paper, I study the impact of job security on fertility decisions. Using a policy reform, which took place in Portugal in 2003, I show that the lower job security associated with fixed-term contracts decreases the likelihood of giving birth. The negative effect is particularly strong for shorter contracts. To identify the different channels that explain these results, I build and estimate a dynamic life-cycle structural model where women decide both labour supply and fertility, conditional on the characteristics of the job contract. I then simulate two different labour market policies that have been discussed in the public debate. Imposing an automatic conversion into permanent contracts, with higher job security, at the end of the fixed-term contract limit, decreases the number of childless women by 8.3%. In contrast, applying contract-specific tax rates, penalising fixed-term contract wages and subsidising permanent contract wages, induces 20% of the women who are already mothers to have their second child. These results corroborate the reduced-form evidence, showing that job security is especially important at first birth and income is relatively more important for subsequent birth decisions.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129950209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Remuneration as a Tool for Increasing Employee Performance in Nigerian 薪酬作为提高尼日利亚员工绩效的工具
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3565079
Onyekwelu, R.U, Dike, E.E, Muogbo, U.S
{"title":"Remuneration as a Tool for Increasing Employee Performance in Nigerian","authors":"Onyekwelu, R.U, Dike, E.E, Muogbo, U.S","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3565079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565079","url":null,"abstract":"This research work assesses fundamentally remuneration as a device for expanding employee performance with specific reference to Bottling Companies in Nigeria. The broad aim of this research is to decide the role of remuneration in expanding workers performance. The population of the study is 200. The study adopt primary and secondary sources to gather information and copies of questionnaire were used also. The research adopted survey and descriptive research technique in analyzing data acquired from Bottling Companies in Nigeria while hypotheses was tested using Regression analysis and ANOVA. It was found that remuneration assumes a significant role in increasing workers performance in an organisation. The study therefore suggests that organisation ought to embrace the right remuneration tool that meets the craving of their workers so as to increase their output.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123476630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
UK Vice Chancellor Compensation: Do They Get What They Deserve? 英国副校长薪酬:他们得到了他们应得的吗?
Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3516675
B. Lucey, Andrew Urquhart, Hanxiong Zhang
{"title":"UK Vice Chancellor Compensation: Do They Get What They Deserve?","authors":"B. Lucey, Andrew Urquhart, Hanxiong Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3516675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3516675","url":null,"abstract":"The compensation received by UK Vice Chancellors (VCs) has been on an upward trend in re- cent years and attracted a lot of negative media attention. In this paper, we examine whether VC compensation is excessive. Using a panel dataset covering the academic years 2007/2008 to 2016/2017, we develop a model to predict expected VC compensation to determine whether VCs are over- or undercompensated. Our model finds that VCs are not overcompensated regarding their base salary, but some are overcompensated in terms of their benefits and pension contributions. However, there is very little difference in terms of characteristics of over- and undercompensated VCs, indicating that on average, UK VCs receive the compensation they deserve. For robustness purposes, we employ a variety of alternative model specifications and subsamples which all support our findings.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115928261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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