P. Ager, K. Eriksson, Ezra Karger, Peter Nencka, M. Thomasson
{"title":"School Closures During the 1918 Flu Pandemic","authors":"P. Ager, K. Eriksson, Ezra Karger, Peter Nencka, M. Thomasson","doi":"10.3386/w28246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28246","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 During the 1918–19 influenza pandemic, many local authorities made the controversial decision to close schools. We use newly digitized data from newspaper archives on the length of school closures for 165 large U.S. cities during the 1918–19 flu pandemic to assess the long-run consequences of closing schools on children. We find that the closures had no detectable impact on children's school attendance in 1920, nor on their educational attainment and adult labor market outcomes in 1940. We highlight important differences between the 1918–19 and Covid-19 pandemics and caution against extrapolating from our null effects to modern-day settings.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122358691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"War, Trade, and the Roots of Representative Governance","authors":"M. Dincecco, G. Cox, M. Onorato","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3616438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3616438","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates the historical roots of representative forms of governance. We argue that the two most important representative institutions invented in medieval Europe—communes and parliaments—emerged in a sequenced bargain over war and trade. Communes emerged first, when merchants offered attractive enough sums in exchange for rights of self-government. In the process, communes became important new actors in tax collection (given the absence of tax-collecting bureaucracies). Soon after, monarchs sought to reduce their costs of negotiating the “extraordinary” taxes that financed their wars. Rather than negotiate individually with each of their newly important towns, they summoned urban representatives to their pre-existing noble councils, creating parliaments. Exploiting two new panel datasets, our empirical analyses show how war and trade combined to motivate the formation first of communes and then of parliaments.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131162380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Writing History in the Archive: The Case of fhe Moscow Archive of Foreign College (Late Eighteenth – Early Nineteenth Century)","authors":"Maya B. Lavrinovich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3716942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3716942","url":null,"abstract":"The paper addresses the problem of interacting of visual and written components for creating of historical narrativity, and its impact on the social practices of the archival employees in the late 18th early 19th century. The research is focused on the case of Moscow Archive of Foreign College, where a gallery of those who administered Russian foreign affairs had been collected since 1780s. This gallery was juxtaposed by a voluminous chronicle that united the Archive and the College into an indivisible institution and thus emphasized the role of the archival officials in the state affairs.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123555403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Art of Governing: Nomads, Elites, and the Provision of Public Goods in China, 1738-1820","authors":"Cong Liu, Se Yan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3696307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3696307","url":null,"abstract":"How did eighteenth-century China manage to provide public goods nationwide despite its low tax rate? We construct a prefecture-level panel dataset from 1738 to 1820 and examine the effectiveness of the provision of public goods by the state granary system and elite services in mitigating price volatility. The results show that government intervention effectively smoothed grain price fluctuations in regions with greater military threats, whereas local elites played this role in other regions, suggesting that national defense concerns drove the distribution of state resources. In addition, the ability to collect taxes was not necessary for the provision of public goods.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127836722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution?","authors":"Zhiwu Chen, Chicheng Ma, A. Sinclair","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3671280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671280","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past millennium, China has relied on the Confucian clan to achieve interpersonal cooperation, focusing on kinship and neglecting the development of impersonal institutions needed for external finance. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the Confucian clan and financial markets are competing substitutes. Using the large cross-regional variation in the adoption of modern banks, we find that regions with historically stronger Confucian clans established significantly fewer modern banks in the four decades following the founding of China’s first modern bank in 1897. Our evidence also shows that the clan continues to limit China’s financial development today.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"195 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131771518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collective Defense by Common Property Arrangements: the Rise and Fall of the Kibbutz","authors":"Liang Diao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3707167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3707167","url":null,"abstract":"Common property arrangements have long been considered inefficient and short lived, since they encourage high-productivity individuals to leave and shirking among those who stay. In contrast, kibbutzim | voluntary common property settlements in Israel | have lasted almost a century. Recently, about 75% of kibbutzim abandoned their equal-sharing rule and paid differential salaries to members based on their contributions. To explain the long persistence of the kibbutzim, as well as the recent privatization of income, a model of public defense is developed, which predicts that defense depends on equal sharing, and that income privatization depends on external threats. Using settlement level data, it is shown that kibbutzim made the largest contributions to defending the Jewish territory under the attacks of surrounding Arab countries.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129892131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparing the Covid-19 Recession with the Great Depression","authors":"David C. Wheelock","doi":"10.20955/es.2020.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/es.2020.39","url":null,"abstract":"The 2020 contraction looks to be deep but short.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115572120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Usury Enforcement as an Alternative to Capital Taxation in Pre-Modern States","authors":"Joshua R. Hendrickson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3652489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3652489","url":null,"abstract":"All governments have an obligation to protect their territory and the wealth within that territory from external predation. In fact, since war has historically resulted in the plunder and destruction of wealth, it seems straightforward to suggest that the cost of providing adequate defense of one's territory is a function of the accumulated wealth within the territory. Suppose that all wealth in society is capital. The accumulation of capital conveys a private benefit to its owner, but imposes an external cost on society. As with any externality, the optimal tax policy would be to tax capital. The revenue from capital taxation could then be used to finance defense. Such a taxation scheme, however, requires the state to have an appropriate level of bureaucratic capacity. During the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, this sort of state infrastructure did not exist. Yet the rulers of those states faced the same constraint. In this paper, I argue that the enforcement of usury laws during this period imperfectly replicate the outcome of the optimal capital tax. Lending at interest was prohibited. However, rulers often allowed certain groups to lend in society in exchange for a license fee. This granted monopoly status to lenders. At the same time, rulers imposed binding price ceilings on interest rates. The combination of these three characteristics of enforcement replicate the long-run restriction on capital accumulation of the optimal capital tax whereas the licensing fees allowed the governments to collect as much as half of the revenue that the optimal capital tax would generate. Given that some defense costs were paid in kind, this sort of policy is capable of replicating the optimal capital tax. I support this claim with historical examples of ``lombard'' and Jewish lending in pre-modern England, Italy, and France.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116101518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Telegraph and Modern Banking Development, 1881-1936","authors":"Chen Lin, Chicheng Ma, Yuchen Sun, Yuchen Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3483419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3483419","url":null,"abstract":"The telegraph was introduced to China in the late 19th century, a time when China also saw the rise of modern banks. Based on this historical context, this paper documents the importance of information technology in banking development. We constructed a data set on the distributions of telegraph stations and banks across 287 prefectures between 1881 and 1936. The results show that the telegraph significantly expanded banks’ branch networks in terms of both number and geographic scope. The effect of the telegraph remains robust when we instrument it using proximity to the early military telegraph trunk.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121382098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Mystery of Growth Mechanism in a Centrally Planned Economy: Planning Process and Economics of Shortages","authors":"V. Popov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3632338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3632338","url":null,"abstract":"Since the economic calculation debate of the 1920-30s, it is known that it is impossible to create a coherent balanced plan that equates supply and demand of millions of goods and services in the national economy, not to speak about the optimal plan. It is not well understood, though, how the centrally planned economy (CPE) really functioned and what were the real determinants of their growth rates, if not the planned indicators. It was shown that forecasts of growth rates based on the extrapolation of past trends were better correlated with actual performance than planned indicators, but it is still unclear what was the real mechanism of growth of CPE and what was the role of the planning process in it. The hypothesis in this paper is that the drivers of growth in the CPE were the major investment projects initiated by the planners. They led to shortages of supplies, which triggered creeping price increases for scarce goods, which in turn boosted profitability in respective industries allowing them to increase output. De facto it was a market economy multiplier process – fiscal and monetary expansion leading to the price and output increases that eventually balanced supply and demand.","PeriodicalId":176096,"journal":{"name":"Economic History eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126752756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}