LSN: Payment Systems (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"How Consumers Pay: Adoption and Use of Payments","authors":"Scott D. Schuh, J. Stavins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2564179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2564179","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from a nationally representative survey on consumer payment behavior, we estimate Heckman two-stage regressions on the adoption and use of seven different payment instruments. We find that the characteristics of payments are important in determining consumer payment behavior, even when controlling for demographic and financial attributes: setup and record keeping are especially important in explaining adoption, while security is important in explaining which methods consumers use for transactions. For the first time, we estimate the number of payment methods adopted by consumers conditional on having access to a bank account, as the unbanked consumers’ payment choices are much more limited than those of consumers with bank accounts. This paper follows the analysis in Schuh and Stavins (2010), but with improved data, allowing us to estimate a better model of payment behavior. As in the previous study, cost is found to significantly affect payment use, indicating that the recent increase in the cost of debit cards issued by some banks may lead to a reduction in U.S. consumers’ reliance on debit cards for transactions.","PeriodicalId":175183,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payment Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129659422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Economic Analysis of Claims in Support of the ‘Durbin Amendment’ to Regulate Debit Card Interchange Fees","authors":"David S. Evans, Howard H. Chang, Margaret Morgan Weichert","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1843628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1843628","url":null,"abstract":"Section 1075 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal Reserve Board to regulate the debit card industry including the interchange fee banks and credit unions receive from merchants. This paper reviews the arguments in support of this regulation put forward by Senator Durbin, who proposed the amendment that led to Section 1075, large retailers, and merchant trade associations. Contrary to their claims, the leading government entities that have examined interchange fees specifically reject the approach taken by the Durbin Amendment; no US antitrust authority or court has found that MasterCard or Visa have engaged in price fixing with regard to debit interchange fees; debit card interchange fees have not increased materially over time in the US; Canadians have not benefited from zero debit interchange fees in that country since they pay more for using cards, and retail banking accounts, than Americans and since Canadians cannot use their zero-interchange fee debit cards to pay online or internationally; and consumers and small businesses will not benefit from the planned reductions in interchange fees, in fact they will lose hundreds of millions of dollars a year.","PeriodicalId":175183,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payment Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121532824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public-Private Competition in Payments: The Role of the Federal Reserve","authors":"Adam J. Levitin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1420061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1420061","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay argues for the introduction of public competition in the payment card clearance market as a method of addressing suboptimal competition in an industry with extremely high barriers to entry. The Federal Reserve competes with private parties for check, wire transfer, and ACH clearance, and, through competition, has forced par clearance to become the standard in these markets; only by historical accident is the Fed absent as a competitor for payment cards, which do not clear at par. The Essay sets forth a framework for evaluating whether public competition should be introduced to a private market and argues that the Fed’s provision of a low-cost, par-clearing competitor would improve payment card clearing competition, discourage the consumer overleverage and cross-subsidization that result from the current discounted clearance system, and spur innovation.","PeriodicalId":175183,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payment Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133170086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What's Draining Your Wallet? The Real Cost of Credit Card Cash Advances","authors":"Joshua M. Frank","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1457105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1457105","url":null,"abstract":"Americans have come to rely on their credit cards as both a form of payment for purchases and a flexible way to borrow cash. The total amount of credit card debt is approaching a trillion dollars. Credit cards are a key source of revenue for financial institutions and usually among the most profitable loan products available today.Credit card pricing has become highly complex and increasingly difficult for borrowers to follow. Credit card issuers at one time charged a single fixed interest rate to all customers and now charge individual customers several different varying interest rates at once, some of which expire after a short time period, and some rates suddenly changing to 'penalty rates' under certain conditions. The number and importance of fees charged to consumers has also grown dramatically.While there has been significant public discussion of certain hidden fees that are common on credit cards, manipulating how consumers’ payments are allocated towards a borrower’s balance is another hidden charge that can impose significant costs on the borrower without their knowledge. Borrowers can have balances on the same card at several different rates at once such as a purchase balance, a temporary promotional - or 'teaser' - balance and a high-rate cash advance balance. By putting all of the payment toward the lowest rate balance (typically the purchase balance or teaser balance), issuers can in effect substantially raise the interest rates paid by borrowers.This report demonstrates that this ordering of payments or 'payment allocation' policy can be both expensive and confusing for credit card customers who, as a group, have little knowledge of the mechanics or cost. The data analyzed in this report shows that allocating payments to the lowest rate first is harmful to borrowers, highly deceptive, and inconsistent with risk-based pricing. More specifically the study finds the system is stacked against borrowers in the following ways:Payment allocation forces borrowers to pay the highest prices, as much as 7 percentage points higher. By paying the lower-cost purchase balance first, payment allocation increases the borrower’s other balances and effectively raises the total interest paid by the borrower. As a result of payment allocation abuses, some borrowers with credit card debt pay as much as $700 extra each year. Customers are unaware of the significance and impact of these hidden charges. Only 3% of borrowers surveyed have the knowledge and capacity to evaluate credit card companies’ payment allocation policies.Payment allocation distorts risk-based pricing. When all measures of risk are taken into account, our analysis reveals the opposite of risk-based pricing. Lower risk customers pay significantly higher interest rates compared to high-risk borrowers.","PeriodicalId":175183,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payment Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116075961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Oligopoly Model of a Debit Card Network","authors":"P. Manchev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1513569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1513569","url":null,"abstract":"The paper builds an oligopoly model of a debit card network. It examines the competition between debit card issuers. We show that there is an optimal pricing for the debit card network, which maximizes all issuer's revenues. The paper also shows that establishing a link between debit card networks averages the costs provided that there is no growth in the customer's usage of the networks, resulting from the link.","PeriodicalId":175183,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Payment Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124417712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}