Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy最新文献_第5页

MOSE: Practical Multi-User Oblivious Storage via Secure Enclaves MOSE:通过安全飞地的实用多用户遗忘存储

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375749

Thang Hoang, R. Behnia, Yeongjin Jang, A. Yavuz

{"title":"MOSE: Practical Multi-User Oblivious Storage via Secure Enclaves","authors":"Thang Hoang, R. Behnia, Yeongjin Jang, A. Yavuz","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375749","url":null,"abstract":"Multi-user oblivious storage allows users to access their shared data on the cloud while retaining access pattern obliviousness and data confidentiality simultaneously. Most secure and efficient oblivious storage systems focus on the utilization of the maximum network bandwidth in serving concurrent accesses via a trusted proxy. How- ever, since the proxy executes a standard ORAM protocol over the network, the performance is capped by the network bandwidth and latency. Moreover, some important features such as access control and security against active adversaries have not been thoroughly explored in such proxy settings. In this paper, we propose MOSE, a multi-user oblivious storage system that is efficient and enjoys from some desirable security properties. Our main idea is to harness a secure enclave, namely Intel SGX, residing on the untrusted storage server to execute proxy logic, thereby, minimizing the network bottleneck of proxy-based designs. In this regard, we address various technical design chal- lenges such as memory constraints, side-channel attacks and scala- bility issues when enabling proxy logic in the secure enclave. We present a formal security model and analysis for secure enclave multi-user ORAM with access control. We optimize MOSE to boost its throughput in serving concurrent requests. We implemented MOSE and evaluated its performance on commodity hardware. Our evaluation confirmed the efficiency of MOSE, where it achieves approximately two orders of magnitudes higher throughput than the state-of-the-art proxy-based design, and also, its performance is scalable proportional to the available system resources.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124748003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Evaluation of Secure Remote Offering Service for Information Bank 信息库安全远程提供服务的评价

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3379526

Keita Kayaba, Hidenobu Oguri, Yuji Yamaoka

引用次数: 1

Explore the Transformation Space for Adversarial Images 探索对抗性图像的转换空间

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375728

Jiyu Chen, David Wang, Hao Chen

{"title":"Explore the Transformation Space for Adversarial Images","authors":"Jiyu Chen, David Wang, Hao Chen","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375728","url":null,"abstract":"Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Most of current adversarial attacks add pixel-wise perturbations restricted to some (L^p)-norm, and defense models are evaluated also on adversarial examples restricted inside (L^p)-norm balls. However, we wish to explore adversarial examples exist beyond (L^p)-norm balls and their implications for attacks and defenses. In this paper, we focus on adversarial images generated by transformations. We start with color transformation and propose two gradient-based attacks. Since (L^p)-norm is inappropriate for measuring image quality in the transformation space, we use the similarity between transformations and the Structural Similarity Index. Next, we explore a larger transformation space consisting of combinations of color and affine transformations. We evaluate our transformation attacks on three data sets --- CIFAR10, SVHN, and ImageNet --- and their corresponding models. Finally, we perform retraining defenses to evaluate the strength of our attacks. The results show that transformation attacks are powerful. They find high-quality adversarial images that have higher transferability and misclassification rates than C&W's (L^p ) attacks, especially at high confidence levels. They are also significantly harder to defend against by retraining than C&W's (L^p ) attacks. More importantly, exploring different attack spaces makes it more challenging to train a universally robust model.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"912 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126987587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Session details: Session 6: System Security 会话详细信息:会话6:系统安全

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3388504

Murat Kantarcioglu

引用次数: 0

Session details: Panel: A Vision for Winning the Cybersecurity Arms Race 小组讨论:赢得网络安全军备竞赛的愿景

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3388503

Rakesh M. Verma

引用次数: 0

TrustAV

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375748

Dimitris Deyannis, Eva Papadogiannaki, Giorgos Kalivianakis, G. Vasiliadis, S. Ioannidis

{"title":"TrustAV","authors":"Dimitris Deyannis, Eva Papadogiannaki, Giorgos Kalivianakis, G. Vasiliadis, S. Ioannidis","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375748","url":null,"abstract":"While the number of connected devices is constantly growing, we observe an increased incident rate of cyber attacks that target user data. Typically, personal devices contain the most sensitive information regarding their users, so there is no doubt that they can be a very valuable target for adversaries. Typical defense solution to safeguard user devices and data, are based in malware analysis mechanisms. To amortize the processing and maintenance overheads, the outsourcing of network inspection mechanisms to the cloud has become very popular recently. However, the majority of such cloud-based applications usually offers limited privacy preserving guarantees for data processing in third-party environments. In this work, we propose TrustAV, a practical cloud-based malware detection solution destined for a plethora of device types. TrustAV is able to offload the processing of malware analysis to a remote server, where it is executed entirely inside, hardware supported, secure enclaves. By doing so, TrustAV is capable to shield the transfer and processing of user data even in untrusted environments with tolerable performance overheads, ensuring that private user data are never exposed to malicious entities or honest-but-curious providers. TrustAV also utilizes various techniques in order to overcome performance overheads, introduced by the Intel SGX technology, and reduce the required enclave memory --a limiting factor for malware analysis executed in secure enclave environments-- offering up to 3x better performance.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114682809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 23

Session details: Session 2: Access Control and Authentication 会话详细信息:会话2:访问控制和认证

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3388498

Yuan Cheng

引用次数: 0

IoT Expunge: Implementing Verifiable Retention of IoT Data 物联网删除:实现物联网数据的可验证保留

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-10 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375737

Nisha Panwar, Shantanu Sharma, Peeyush Gupta, Dhrubajyoti Ghosh, S. Mehrotra, N. Venkatasubramanian

引用次数: 0

n-m-Variant Systems: Adversarial-Resistant Software Rejuvenation for Cloud-Based Web Applications n-m变体系统:基于云的Web应用程序的抗对抗软件复兴

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2019-10-18 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375745

Isaac Polinsky, Kyle Martin, W. Enck, M. Reiter

{"title":"n-m-Variant Systems: Adversarial-Resistant Software Rejuvenation for Cloud-Based Web Applications","authors":"Isaac Polinsky, Kyle Martin, W. Enck, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375745","url":null,"abstract":"Web servers are a popular target for adversaries as they are publicly accessible and often vulnerable to compromise. Compromises can go unnoticed for months, if not years, and recovery often involves a complete system rebuild. In this paper, we propose n-m-Variant Systems, an adversarial-resistant software rejuvenation framework for cloud-based web applications. We improve the state-of-the-art by introducing a variable m that provides a knob for administrators to tune an environment to balance resource usage, performance overhead, and security guarantees. Using m, security guarantees can be tuned for seconds, minutes, days, or complete resistance. We design and implement an n-m-Variant System prototype to protect a Mediawiki PHP application serving dynamic content from an external SQL persistent storage. Our performance evaluation shows a throughput reduction of 65% for 108 seconds of resistance and 83% for 12 days of resistance to sophisticated adversaries, given appropriate resource allocation. Furthermore, we use theoretical analysis and simulation to characterize the impact of system parameters on resilience to adversaries. Through these efforts, our work demonstrates how properties of cloud-based servers can enhance the integrity of Web servers.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126698787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Rényi Differentially Private ADMM for Non-Smooth Regularized Optimization 非光滑正则化优化的差分私有ADMM

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2019-09-18 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375733

Chen Chen, Jaewoo Lee

引用次数: 3