Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy最新文献

Deployment-quality and Accessible Solutions for Cryptography Code Development 用于密码学代码开发的部署质量和可访问解决方案

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3379536

Sazzadur Rahaman, Ya Xiao, Sharmin Afrose, K. Tian, Miles Frantz, Na Meng, B. Miller, Fahad Shaon, Murat Kantarcioglu, D. Yao

{"title":"Deployment-quality and Accessible Solutions for Cryptography Code Development","authors":"Sazzadur Rahaman, Ya Xiao, Sharmin Afrose, K. Tian, Miles Frantz, Na Meng, B. Miller, Fahad Shaon, Murat Kantarcioglu, D. Yao","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3379536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3379536","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptographic API misuses seriously threatens software security. Automatic screening of cryptographic misuse vulnerabilities has been a popular and important line of research over the years. However, the vision of producing a scalable detection tool that developers can routinely use to screen millions of line of code has not been achieved yet. Our main technical goal is to attain a high precision and high throughput approach based on specialized program analysis. Specifically, we design inter-procedural program slicing on top of a new on-demand flow-, context- and field- sensitive data flow analysis. Our current prototype named CryptoGuard can detect a wide range of Java cryptographic API misuses with a precision of 98.61%, when evaluated on 46 complex Apache Software Foundation projects (including, Spark, Ranger, and Ofbiz). Our evaluation on 6,181 Android apps also generated many security insights. We created a comprehensive benchmark named CryptoApi-Bench with 40-unit basic cases and 131-unit advanced cases for in-depth comparison with leading solutions (e.g., SpotBugs, CrySL, Coverity). To make CryptoGuard widely accessible, we are in the process of integrating CryptoGuard with the Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP). SWAMP is a popular no-cost service for continuous software assurance and static code analysis.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123154600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

ZeroLender

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375735

Yi Xie, Joshua Holmes, Gaby G. Dagher

引用次数: 8

Can AI be for Good in the Midst of Cyber Attacks and Privacy Violations?: A Position Paper 在网络攻击和侵犯隐私的情况下，人工智能是否会永远存在?立场文件

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3379334

B. Thuraisingham

引用次数: 6

Session details: Session 5: Mobile Security 会议详情:会议5:移动安全

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3388502

Phani Vadrevu

引用次数: 0

A Performance Study on Cryptographic Algorithms for IoT Devices 物联网设备加密算法性能研究

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3379531

Eduardo Anaya, Jimil Patel, Prerak S. Shah, Vrushank Shah, Yuan Cheng

引用次数: 3

CREHMA

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375750

Hoai Viet Nguyen, L. Lo Iacono

{"title":"CREHMA","authors":"Hoai Viet Nguyen, L. Lo Iacono","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375750","url":null,"abstract":"Scalability and security are two important elements of contemporary distributed software systems. The Web vividly shows that while complying with the constraints defined by the architectural style REST, the layered design of software with intermediate systems enables to scale at large. Intermediaries such as caches, however, interfere with the security guarantees of the industry standard for protecting data in transit on the Web, TLS, as in these circumstances the TLS channel already terminates at the intermediate system's server. For more in-depth defense strategies, service providers require message-oriented security means in addition to TLS. These are hardly available and only in the form of HTTP signature schemes that do not take caches into account either. In this paper we introduce CREHMA, a REST-ful HTTP message signature scheme that guarantees the integrity and authenticity of Web assets from end-to-end while simultaneous allowing service providers to enjoy the benefits of Web caches. Decisively, CREHMA achieves these guarantees without having to trust on the integrity of the cache and without requiring making changes to existing Web caching systems. In extensive experiments we evaluated CREHMA and found that it only introduces marginal impacts on metrics such as latency and data expansion while providing integrity protection from end to end. CREHMA thus extends the possibilities of service providers to achieve an appropriate balance between scalability and security.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124875990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

FridgeLock

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375747

Fabian Franzen, Manuel Andreas, Manuel Huber

{"title":"FridgeLock","authors":"Fabian Franzen, Manuel Andreas, Manuel Huber","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375747","url":null,"abstract":"To secure mobile devices, such as laptops and smartphones, against unauthorized physical data access, employing Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is a popular defense. This technique is effective if the device is always shut down when unattended. However, devices are often suspended instead of switched off. This leaves confidential data such as the FDE key, passphrases and user data in RAM which may be read out using cold boot, JTAG or DMA attacks. These attacks can be mitigated by encrypting the main memory during suspend. While this approach seems promising, it is not implemented on Windows or Linux. We present FridgeLock to add memory encryption on suspend to Linux. Our implementation as a Linux Kernel Module (LKM) does not require an admin to recompile the kernel. Using Dynamic Kernel Module Support (DKMS) allows for easy and fast deployment on existing Linux systems, where the distribution provides a prepackaged kernel and kernel updates. We tested our module on a range of 4.19 to 5.3 kernels and experienced a low performance impact, sustaining the system's usability. We hope that our tool leads to a more detailed evaluation of memory encryption in real world usage scenarios.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130123434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

PESC

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375734

Jiadong Sun, Xia Zhou, Wenbo Shen, Yajin Zhou, K. Ren

{"title":"PESC","authors":"Jiadong Sun, Xia Zhou, Wenbo Shen, Yajin Zhou, K. Ren","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375734","url":null,"abstract":"Stack canary is the most widely deployed defense technique against stack buffer overflow attacks. However, since its proposition, the design of stack canary has very few improvements during the past 20 years, making it vulnerable to new and sophisticated attacks. For example, the ARM64 Linux kernel is still adopting the same design with StackGuard, using one global canary for the whole kernel. The x86_64 Linux kernel leverages a better design by using a per-task canary for different threads. Unfortunately, both of them are vulnerable to kernel memory leaks. Using the memory leak bugs or hardware side-channel attacks, e.g., Meltdown or Spectre, attackers can easily peek the kernel stack canary value, thus bypassing the protection. To address this issue, we proposed a fine-grained design of the kernel stack canary named PESC, standing for Per-System-Call Canary, which changes the kernel canary value on the system call basis. With PESC, attackers cannot accumulate any knowledge of prior canary across multiple system calls. In other words, PESC is resilient to memory leaks. Our key observation is that before serving a system call, the kernel stack is empty and there are no residual canary values on the stack. As a result, we can directly change the canary value on system call entry without the burden of tracking and updating old canary values on the kernel stack. Moreover, to balance the performance as well as the security, we proposed two PESC designs: one relies on the performance monitor counter register, termed as PESC-PMC, while the other one uses the kernel random number generator, denoted as PESC-RNG. We implemented both PESC-PMC and PESC-RNG on the real-world hardware, using HiKey960 board for ARM64 and Intel i7-7700 for x86_64. The synthetic benchmark and SPEC CPU2006 experimental results show that the performance overhead introduced by PESC-PMC and PESC-RNG on the whole system is less than 1%.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115310464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

DANdroid

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375746

Stuart Millar, Niall McLaughlin, Jesús Martínez del Rincón, Paul Miller, Ziming Zhao

{"title":"DANdroid","authors":"Stuart Millar, Niall McLaughlin, Jesús Martínez del Rincón, Paul Miller, Ziming Zhao","doi":"10.1145/3374664.3375746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3374664.3375746","url":null,"abstract":"We present DANdroid, a novel Android malware detection model using a deep learning Discriminative Adversarial Network (DAN) that classifies both obfuscated and unobfuscated apps as either malicious or benign. Our method, which we empirically demonstrate is robust against a selection of four prevalent and real-world obfuscation techniques, makes three contributions. Firstly, an innovative application of discriminative adversarial learning results in malware feature representations with a strong degree of resilience to the four obfuscation techniques. Secondly, the use of three feature sets; raw opcodes, permissions and API calls, that are combined in a multi-view deep learning architecture to increase this obfuscation resilience. Thirdly, we demonstrate the potential of our model to generalize over rare and future obfuscation methods not seen in training. With an overall dataset of 68,880 obfuscated and unobfuscated malicious and benign samples, our multi-view DAN model achieves an average F-score of 0.973 that compares favourably with the state-of-the-art, despite being exposed to the selected obfuscation methods applied both individually and in combination.","PeriodicalId":171521,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122794319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 29

A Baseline for Attribute Disclosure Risk in Synthetic Data 综合数据中属性披露风险的基线

Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1145/3374664.3375722

Markus Hittmeir, Rudolf Mayer, Andreas Ekelhart

引用次数: 19