Changhai Ou, Zhu Wang, J. Ai, Xinping Zhou, Degang Sun, V. DeBrunner
{"title":"Error Tolerance based Single Interesting Point Side Channel CPA Distinguisher","authors":"Changhai Ou, Zhu Wang, J. Ai, Xinping Zhou, Degang Sun, V. DeBrunner","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897902","url":null,"abstract":"The efficiency can be significantly improved if the attacker uses interesting points to perform Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). The prerequisite for this is that the attacker knows the positions of interesting points. However, it is difficult for the attacker to accurately find the locations of interesting points if he only has a small number of power traces. In this paper, we propose a Frequency based Interesting Points Selection algorithm (FIPS) to select interesting points under the condition that the attacker only has a very small number of power traces. Moreover, an error tolerant Single Interesting Point based CPA (SIP-CPA) is proposed. Experiments on AES algorithm implemented on an AT89S52 single chip and power trace set of DPA contest v1 of DES algorithm implemented on the Side Channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO) show that, our SIP-CPA can significantly improve the efficiency of CPA.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122914776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"StemJail: Dynamic Role Compartmentalization","authors":"Mickaël Salaün, M. Daubignard, Hervé Debar","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897912","url":null,"abstract":"While users tend to indiscriminately use the same device to address every need, exfiltration of information becomes the end game of attackers. Average users need realistic and practical solutions to enable them to mitigate the consequences of a security breach in terms of data leakage. We present StemJail, an open-source security solution to isolate groups of processes pertaining to the same activity into an environment exposing only the relevant subset of user data. At the heart of our solution lies dynamic activity discovery, allowing seamless integration of StemJail into the user workflow. Our userland access control framework only relies on the ability of user to organize data in directories. Thus, it is easily configurable and requires very little user interaction once set up. Moreover, StemJail is designed to run without intrusive changes to the system and to be configured and used by any unprivileged user thanks to the Linux user namespaces.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126600943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W. Susilo, Rongmao Chen, F. Guo, Guomin Yang, Y. Mu, Yang-Wai Chow
{"title":"Recipient Revocable Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption: How to Revoke Some Recipients in IBBE without Knowledge of the Plaintext","authors":"W. Susilo, Rongmao Chen, F. Guo, Guomin Yang, Y. Mu, Yang-Wai Chow","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897848","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present the notion of recipient-revocable identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In this notion, a content provider will produce encrypted content and send them to a third party (which is a broadcaster). This third party will be able to revoke some identities from the ciphertext. We present a security model to capture these requirements, as well as a concrete construction. The ciphertext consists of k+3 group elements, assuming that the maximum number of revocation identities is k. That is, the ciphertext size is linear in the maximal size of R, where R is the revocation identity set. However, we say that the additional elements compared to that from an IBBE scheme are only for the revocation but not for decryption. Therefore, the ciphertext sent to the users for decryption will be of constant size (i.e.,3 group elements). Finally, we present the proof of security of our construction.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130884852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anonymous Identification for Ad Hoc Group","authors":"Xingye Lu, M. Au","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897903","url":null,"abstract":"An anonymous identification scheme for ad hoc group allows a participant to identify himself as a member of a group of users in a way that his actual identity is not revealed. We propose a highly efficient construction of this cryptographic primitive in the symmetric key setting based on the idea of program obfuscation. The salient feature of our scheme is that only hash evaluations are needed. Consequently, our scheme outperforms all existing constructions for a reasonably large ad hoc group size (of around 50000 users) since no exponentiation nor pairing operation is involved. Technically, the participant only needs to evaluate one hash operation to identify himself. While the time complexity of the verifier is linearly in the size of the ad hoc group, the actual running time is rather insignificant since the constant factor of this linear dependence is the time of a single hash evaluation. To analyse the security of our proposal, we develop a security model to capture the security requirements of this primitive and prove that our construction satisfies these requirements in the random oracle model against unbounded attackers. Similar to other identification schemes secure in the random oracle model, our proposed protocol requires only two message flow.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122494157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Checking Intent-based Communication in Android with Intent Space Analysis","authors":"Yiming Jing, Gail-Joon Ahn, Adam Doupé, J. Yi","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897904","url":null,"abstract":"Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130173271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, Melek Önen, Monir Azraoui, R. Molva
{"title":"Efficient Techniques for Publicly Verifiable Delegation of Computation","authors":"Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui, Melek Önen, Monir Azraoui, R. Molva","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897910","url":null,"abstract":"With the advent of cloud computing, individuals and companies alike are looking for opportunities to leverage cloud resources not only for storage but also for computation. Nevertheless, the reliance on the cloud to perform computation raises the unavoidable challenge of how to assure the correctness of the delegated computation. In this regard, we introduce two cryptographic protocols for publicly verifiable computation that allow a lightweight client to securely outsource to a cloud server the evaluation of high-degree univariate polynomials and the multiplication of large matrices. Similarly to existing work, our protocols follow the amortized verifiable computation approach. Furthermore, by exploiting the mathematical properties of polynomials and matrices, they are more efficient and give way to public delegatability. Finally, besides their efficiency, our protocols are provably secure under well-studied assumptions.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116035275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chen Wang, Xiaonan Guo, Yan Wang, Yingying Chen, Bo Liu
{"title":"Friend or Foe?: Your Wearable Devices Reveal Your Personal PIN","authors":"Chen Wang, Xiaonan Guo, Yan Wang, Yingying Chen, Bo Liu","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897847","url":null,"abstract":"The proliferation of wearable devices, e.g., smartwatches and activity trackers, with embedded sensors has already shown its great potential on monitoring and inferring human daily activities. This paper reveals a serious security breach of wearable devices in the context of divulging secret information (i.e., key entries) while people accessing key-based security systems. Existing methods of obtaining such secret information relies on installations of dedicated hardware (e.g., video camera or fake keypad), or training with labeled data from body sensors, which restrict use cases in practical adversary scenarios. In this work, we show that a wearable device can be exploited to discriminate mm-level distances and directions of the user's fine-grained hand movements, which enable attackers to reproduce the trajectories of the user's hand and further to recover the secret key entries. In particular, our system confirms the possibility of using embedded sensors in wearable devices, i.e., accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers, to derive the moving distance of the user's hand between consecutive key entries regardless of the pose of the hand. Our Backward PIN-Sequence Inference algorithm exploits the inherent physical constraints between key entries to infer the complete user key entry sequence. Extensive experiments are conducted with over 5000 key entry traces collected from 20 adults for key-based security systems (i.e. ATM keypads and regular keyboards) through testing on different kinds of wearables. Results demonstrate that such a technique can achieve 80% accuracy with only one try and more than 90% accuracy with three tries, which to our knowledge, is the first technique that reveals personal PINs leveraging wearable devices without the need for labeled training data and contextual information.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129468807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peng Xu, Jun Xu, Wei Wang, Hai Jin, W. Susilo, Deqing Zou
{"title":"Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption: A Secure Data Sharing among Cryptographic Clouds","authors":"Peng Xu, Jun Xu, Wei Wang, Hai Jin, W. Susilo, Deqing Zou","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897923","url":null,"abstract":"Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a favorable primitive to realize a cryptographic cloud with secure and flexible data sharing mechanism. A number of PRE schemes with versatile capabilities have been proposed for different applications. The secure data sharing can be internally achieved in each PRE scheme. But no previous work can guarantee the secure data sharing among different PRE schemes in a general manner. Moreover, it is challenging to solve this problem due to huge differences among the existing PRE schemes in their algebraic systems and public-key types. To solve this problem more generally, this paper uniforms the definitions of the existing PRE and Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes, and further uniforms their security definitions. Then taking any uniformly defined PRE scheme and any uniformly defined PKE scheme as two building blocks, this paper constructs a Generally Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption (GHPRE) scheme with the idea of temporary public and private keys to achieve secure data sharing between these two underlying schemes. Since PKE is a more general definition than PRE, the proposed GHPRE scheme also is workable between any two PRE schemes. Moreover, the proposed GHPRE scheme can be transparently deployed even if the underlying PRE schemes are implementing.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114281940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Shifeng Sun, Dawu Gu, Joseph K. Liu, P. Udaya, Tsz Hon Yuen
{"title":"Efficient Construction of Completely Non-Malleable CCA Secure Public Key Encryption","authors":"Shifeng Sun, Dawu Gu, Joseph K. Liu, P. Udaya, Tsz Hon Yuen","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897921","url":null,"abstract":"Non-malleability is an important and intensively studied security notion for many cryptographic primitives. In the context of public key encryption, this notion means it is infeasible for an adversary to transform an encryption of some message m into one of a related message m' under the given public key. Although it has provided a strong security property for many applications, it still does not suffice for some scenarios like the system where the users could issue keys on-the-fly. In such settings, the adversary may have the power to transform the given public key and the ciphertext. To withstand such attacks, Fischlin introduced a stronger notion, known as complete non-malleability, which requires that the non-malleability property be preserved even for the adversaries attempting to produce a ciphertext of some related message under the transformed public key. To date, many schemes satisfying this stronger security have been proposed, but they are either inefficient or proved secure in the random oracle model. In this work, we put forward a new encryption scheme in the common reference string model. Based on the standard DBDH assumption, the proposed scheme is proved completely non-malleable secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. In our scheme, the well-formed public keys and ciphertexts could be publicly recognized without drawing support from unwieldy techniques like non-interactive zero knowledge proofs or one-time signatures, thus achieving a better performance.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"407 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114936848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Real-Time Detection of Malware Downloads via Large-Scale URL->File->Machine Graph Mining","authors":"Babak Rahbarinia, Marco Balduzzi, R. Perdisci","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897918","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose Mastino, a novel defense system to detect malware download events. A download event is a 3-tuple that identifies the action of downloading a file from a URL that was triggered by a client (machine). Mastino utilizes global situation awareness and continuously monitors various network- and system-level events of the clients' machines across the Internet and provides real time classification of both files and URLs to the clients upon submission of a new, unknown file or URL to the system. To enable detection of the download events, Mastino builds a large download graph that captures the subtle relationships among the entities of download events, i.e. files, URLs, and machines. We implemented a prototype version of Mastino and evaluated it in a large-scale real-world deployment. Our experimental evaluation shows that Mastino can accurately classify malware download events with an average of 95.5% true positive (TP), while incurring less than 0.5% false positives (FP). In addition, we show the Mastino can classify a new download event as either benign or malware in just a fraction of a second, and is therefore suitable as a real time defense system.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127854562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}