Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献

{"title":"Binary Analysis for Autonomous Hacking: Invited Abstract","authors":"G. Vigna","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2901788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2901788","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the rise of interpreted languages and the World Wide Web, binary analysis has remained the focus of much research in computer security. There are several reasons for this. First, interpreted languages are either interpreted by binary programs or Just-In-Time compiled down to binary code. Second, \"core\" OSconstructs and performance-critical applications are still writtenin languages (usually, C or C++) that compile down to binary code. Third, the rise of the Internet of Things is powered by devices that are, in general, very resource-constrained. Without cycles to waste on interpretation or Just-In-Time compilation, the firmware of these devices tends to be written in languages (again, usually C) that compile to binary. Unfortunately, many of these languages provide few security guarantees, often leading to vulnerabilities. For example, buffer overflows stubbornly remain as one of the most common discovered software flaws despite efforts to develop technologies to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Worse, the wider class of memory corruption vulnerabilities\", the vast majority of which also stem from the use of unsafe languages, make up a substantial portion of the most common vulnerabilities. This problem is not limited to software on general-purpose computing devices: remotely exploitable vulnerabilities have been discovered in devices ranging from smart locks, to pacemakers, to automobiles. However, finding vulnerabilities in binaries and generating patches that fix exploitable flaws is challenging because of the lack of high-level abstractions, such as type information and control ow constructs. Current approaches provide tools to support the manual analysis of binaries, but are far from being completely automated solutions to the vulnerability analysis of binary programs. To foster research in automated binary analysis, in October of 2013, DARPA announced the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC). Like DARPA Grand Challenges in other fields (such as robotics and autonomous vehicles), the CGC pits teams from around the world against each other in a competition in which the participants are autonomous systems. During the CGC competition, these systems must identify, exploit, and patch vulnerabilities in binary programs, without any human in the loop. Millions of dollars in prize money were announced: the top 7 teams to complete the CGC Qualifying Event (held in June, 2015) received 750,000 USD, and the top 3 teams in the CGC Final Event (held in August, 2016) will receive 2,000,000 USD, 1,000,000 USD, and 750,000 USD, respectively. The Shellphish hacking team is one of the qualified teams. This talk presents some insights into the field of automated binary analysis exploitation and patching, gained through the participation in the CGC competition. In addition, the talk provides a discussion of the use of competitions to foster both research and education, based on the experience in designing and running a large-scale live security hacking compe","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127342318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CICADAS: Congesting the Internet with Coordinated and Decentralized Pulsating Attacks","authors":"Yu-Ming Ke, Chih-Wei Chen, H. Hsiao, A. Perrig, V. Sekar","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897866","url":null,"abstract":"This study stems from the premise that we need to break away from the \"reactive\" cycle of developing defenses against new DDoS attacks (e.g., amplification) by proactively investigating the potential for new types of DDoS attacks. Our specific focus is on pulsating attacks, a particularly debilitating type that has been hypothesized in the literature. In a pulsating attack, bots coordinate to generate intermittent pulses at target links to significantly reduce the throughput of TCP connections traversing the target. With pulsating attacks, attackers can cause significantly greater damage to legitimate users than traditional link flooding attacks. To date, however, pulsating attacks have been either deemed ineffective or easily defendable for two reasons: (1) they require a central coordinator and can thus be tracked; and (2) they require tight synchronization of pulses, which is difficult even in normal non-congestion scenarios. This paper argues that, in fact, the perceived drawbacks of pulsating attacks are in fact not fundamental. We develop a practical pulsating attack called CICADAS using two key ideas: using both (1) congestion as an implicit signal for decentralized implementation, and (2) a Kalman-filter-based approach to achieve tight synchronization. We validate CICADAS using simulations and wide-area experiments. We also discuss possible countermeasures against this attack.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122100026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Data Exfiltration in the Face of CSP","authors":"S. Acker, Daniel Hausknecht, A. Sabelfeld","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897899","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks keep plaguing the Web. Supported by most modern browsers, Content Security Policy (CSP) prescribes the browser to restrict the features and communication capabilities of code on a web page, mitigating the effects of XSS. This paper puts a spotlight on the problem of data exfiltration in the face of CSP. We bring attention to the unsettling discord in the security community about the very goals of CSP when it comes to preventing data leaks. As consequences of this discord, we report on insecurities in the known protection mechanisms that are based on assumptions about CSP that turn out not to hold in practice. To illustrate the practical impact of the discord, we perform a systematic case study of data exfiltration via DNS prefetching and resource prefetching in the face of CSP. Our study of the popular browsers demonstrates that it is often possible to exfiltrate data by both resource prefetching and DNS prefetching in the face of CSP. Further, we perform a crawl of the top 10,000 Alexa domains to report on the cohabitance of CSP and prefetching in practice. Finally, we discuss directions to control data exfiltration and, for the case study, propose measures ranging from immediate fixes for the clients to prefetching-aware extensions of CSP.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114639606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Publicly Verifiable Secure Cloud Storage for Dynamic Data Using Secure Network Coding","authors":"Binanda Sengupta, S. Ruj","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897915","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud service providers offer storage outsourcing facility to their clients. In a secure cloud storage (SCS) protocol, the integrity of the client's data is maintained. In this work, we construct a publicly verifiable secure cloud storage protocol based on a secure network coding (SNC) protocol where the client can update the outsourced data as needed. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first SNC-based SCS protocol for dynamic data that is secure in the standard model and provides privacy-preserving audits in a publicly verifiable setting. Furthermore, we discuss, in details, about the (im)possibility of providing a general construction of an efficient SCS protocol for dynamic data (DSCS protocol) from an arbitrary SNC protocol. In addition, we modify an existing DSCS scheme (DPDP I) in order to support privacy-preserving audits. We also compare our DSCS protocol with other SCS schemes (including the modified DPDP I scheme). Finally, we figure out some limitations of an SCS scheme constructed using an SNC protocol.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126837352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dealerless Corporate Key Generation for Identity-Based Encryption Schemes","authors":"Z. Liu, D. Wong, Jack Poon","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897849","url":null,"abstract":"In Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) system, the Private Key Generator (PKG) holds the master secret key and is responsible for generating private keys for the users. This incurs the key-escrow problem, i.e. the PKG can decrypt any user' any ciphertexts without any possible detection. Also, compromising the master secret key will enable an adversary to do anything to the whole system, and having the master secret key be unavailable implies that new users cannot obtain private keys from the PKG, and existing users cannot get their private keys back from the PKG when they lost them. To address the key-escrow problem and protect the master secret key as much as possible with strong security and availability, distributed PKG protocols supporting threshold policy have been adopted in some IBE schemes. In this paper, we propose a distributed PKG protocol that supports the policy to be any monotonic access structures. Also, we propose the first distributed PKG protocol that supports the dynamic changes of the PKGs and the policy, while remaining the master secret key unchanged. The two protocols do not need any third party acting as a trusted dealer to present, and the master secret key should never be generated or resided in any one single site. The protocols are applicable to a generic IBE template, which covers many existing important IBE schemes. When applied to this generic type of IBE schemes, the two distributed PKG protocols do not affect the encryption and decryption algorithms, and only each user knows his own private key.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126780070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Attestation Transparency: Building secure Internet services for legacy clients","authors":"J. Beekman, John Manferdelli, D. Wagner","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897895","url":null,"abstract":"Internet services can provide a wealth of functionality, yet their usage raises privacy, security and integrity concerns for users. This is caused by a lack of guarantees about what is happening on the server side. As a worst case scenario, the service might be subjected to an insider attack. We use remote attestation of the server to obtain guarantees about the programming of the service. On top of that, we augment Certificate Transparency to distribute information about which services exist and what they do. Combined, this creates a platform that allows legacy clients to obtain security guarantees about Internet services.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131872923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bilateral-secure Signature by Key Evolving","authors":"Tao Xiang, Xiaoguo Li, Fei Chen, Y. Mu","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897864","url":null,"abstract":"In practice, the greatest threat against the security of a digital signature scheme is the exposure of signing key, since the forward security of past signatures and the backward security of future signatures could be compromised. There are some attempts in the literature, addressing forward-secure signature for preventing forgeries of signatures in the past time; however, few studies addressed the backward-security of signatures, which prevents forgeries in the future time. In this paper, we introduce the concept of key-evolving signature with bilateral security, i.e., both forward security and backward security. We first define the bilateral security formally for preventing the adversaries from forging a valid signature of the past and the future time periods in the case of key exposure. We then provide a novel construction based on hub-and-spoke updating structure and the random oracle model, and show that the construction achieves bilateral security and unbounded number of time periods. Finally, we compare our scheme with the existing work by rigorous analysis and experimental evaluation, and demonstrate that our construction is more secure and efficient for practical applications.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130491894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Smart Locks: Lessons for Securing Commodity Internet of Things Devices","authors":"Grant Ho, Derek Leung, Pratyush Mishra, Ashkan Hosseini, D. Song, D. Wagner","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897886","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the security of home smart locks: cyber-physical devices that replace traditional door locks with deadbolts that can be electronically controlled by mobile devices or the lock manufacturer's remote servers. We present two categories of attacks against smart locks and analyze the security of five commercially-available locks with respect to these attacks. Our security analysis reveals that flaws in the design, implementation, and interaction models of existing locks can be exploited by several classes of adversaries, allowing them to learn private information about users and gain unauthorized home access. To guide future development of smart locks and similar Internet of Things devices, we propose several defenses that mitigate the attacks we present. One of these defenses is a novel approach to securely and usably communicate a user's intended actions to smart locks, which we prototype and evaluate. Ultimately, our work takes a first step towards illuminating security challenges in the system design and novel functionality introduced by emerging IoT systems.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126496863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Homomorphic Linear Authentication Schemes from (ε)-Authentication Codes","authors":"Shuai Han, Shengli Liu, Fangguo Zhang, Kefei Chen","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897859","url":null,"abstract":"Proofs of Data Possession/Retrievability (PoDP/PoR) schemes are essential to cloud storage services, since they can increase clients' confidence on the integrity and availability of their data. The majority of PoDP/PoR schemes are constructed from homomorphic linear authentication (HLA) schemes, which decrease the price of communication between the client and the server. In this paper, a new subclass of authentication codes, named ε-authentication codes, is proposed, and a modular construction of HLA schemes from ε-authentication codes is presented. We prove that the security notions of HLA schemes are closely related to the size of the authenticator/tag space and the successful probability of impersonation attacks (with non-zero source states) of the underlying ε-authentication codes. We show that most of HLA schemes used for the PoDP/PoR schemes are instantiations of our modular construction from some ε-authentication codes. Following this line, an algebraic-curves-based ε-authentication code yields a new HLA scheme.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121341872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","authors":"Xiaofeng Chen, Xiaofeng Wang, Xinyi Huang","doi":"10.1145/2897845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845","url":null,"abstract":"It is our great pleasure to present you the proceedings of the 11th Asia CCS (held in Xi'an, China), an ACM SIGSAC venue just renamed ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security to reflect its leadership stance in the Asia security community and world-wide impact on security research. This name change also comes with a new high in the conference's academic excellence, thanks to the unprecedented number of high-quality submissions. \u0000 \u0000This year, we received 350 submissions from 34 countries, a new record in the conference's decade-long history. These papers were reviewed by 104 security researchers from 17 countries, assisted by 218 external reviewers, based upon their novelty, technical quality and presentation. First time in the conference's history, we adopted a two-round review mechanism with early notifications, together with a three-week online discussion. This thoughtful and rigorous review process has led to 73 full papers selected for the program, representing an acceptance rate of 20.8%, and additional 8 short papers. \u0000 \u0000This wonderful program was made possible by a team effort. Most important here are the authors, to whom we are grateful for submitting their best research outcomes to the conference. Also, we thank the Program Committee and external reviewers who worked very hard to provide valuable feedbacks to the authors. On average, each PC member reviewed 11 papers and actively participated in the discussion and some also volunteered to shepherd accepted papers to ensure their qualities. Their professionalism exemplifies the volunteer peer-review process that is so important to moving the security science forward. \u0000 \u0000This year's technical program comes together with 5 workshops: CPSS'16, AsiaPKC'16, SCC'16, WTMC'16 and IoTPTS'16, also a new record. We thank the workshop organizers for their hard work for building up their individual programs. Also, we are so fortunate to have three distinguished speakers, Giovanni Vigna, Michael Backes and Yang Xiang, from three continents, to share with us their visions of security and privacy research.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"465 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125852109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}