Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第3页

ROPMEMU: A Framework for the Analysis of Complex Code-Reuse Attacks 复杂代码重用攻击分析框架

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897894

Mariano Graziano, D. Balzarotti, Alain Zidouemba

引用次数: 29

Generic Construction of Publicly Verifiable Predicate Encryption 公开可验证谓词加密的一般构造

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897919

Chuting Tan, Z. L. Jiang, Xuan Wang, S. Yiu, Jun-bin Fang, Jin Li, Yabin Jin, Jiajun Huang

引用次数: 0

revDroid: Code Analysis of the Side Effects after Dynamic Permission Revocation of Android Apps revDroid: Android应用动态撤销权限后副作用的代码分析

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897914

Zheran Fang, Weili Han, Dong Li, Zeqing Guo, Danhao Guo, X. Wang, Zhiyun Qian, Hao Chen

{"title":"revDroid: Code Analysis of the Side Effects after Dynamic Permission Revocation of Android Apps","authors":"Zheran Fang, Weili Han, Dong Li, Zeqing Guo, Danhao Guo, X. Wang, Zhiyun Qian, Hao Chen","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897914","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic revocation of permissions of installed Android applications has been gaining popularity, because of the increasing concern of security and privacy in the Android platform. However, applications often crash or misbehave when their permissions are revoked, rendering applications completely unusable. Even though Google has officially introduced the new permission mechanism in Android 6.0 to explicitly support dynamic permission revocation, the issue still exists. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study to understand the latest application practice post Android 6.0. Specifically, we design a practical tool, referred to as revDroid, to help us to empirically analyze how often the undesirable side effects, especially application crash, can occur in off-the-shelf Android applications. From the analysis of 248 popular applications from Google Play Store, revDroid finds out that 70% applications and 46% permission-relevant calls do not appropriately catch exceptions caused by permission revocation, while third-party libraries pay much more attention to permission revocation. We also use revDroid to analyze 132 recent malware samples. The result shows that only 27% malwares and 36% permission-relevant API calls of malwares fail to consider the permission revocation. In fact, many of them perform specialized handling of permission revocation to keep the core malicious logic running. Finally, revDroid can be used to help developers uncover the unhandled permission revocations during development time and greatly improve the application quality.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128500843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Smartwatch-Based Keystroke Inference Attacks and Context-Aware Protection Mechanisms 基于智能手表的击键推理攻击和上下文感知保护机制

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897905

Anindya Maiti, Oscar Armbruster, Murtuza Jadliwala, Jibo He

{"title":"Smartwatch-Based Keystroke Inference Attacks and Context-Aware Protection Mechanisms","authors":"Anindya Maiti, Oscar Armbruster, Murtuza Jadliwala, Jibo He","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897905","url":null,"abstract":"Wearable devices, such as smartwatches, are furnished with state-of-the-art sensors that enable a range of context-aware applications. However, malicious applications can misuse these sensors, if access is left unaudited. In this paper, we demonstrate how applications that have access to motion or inertial sensor data on a modern smartwatch can recover text typed on an external QWERTY keyboard. Due to the distinct nature of the perceptible motion sensor data, earlier research efforts on emanation based keystroke inference attacks are not readily applicable in this scenario. The proposed novel attack framework characterizes wrist movements (captured by the inertial sensors of the smartwatch worn on the wrist) observed during typing, based on the relative physical position of keys and the direction of transition between pairs of keys. Eavesdropped keystroke characteristics are then matched to candidate words in a dictionary. Multiple evaluations show that our keystroke inference framework has an alarmingly high classification accuracy and word recovery rate. With the information recovered from the wrist movements perceptible by a smartwatch, we exemplify the risks associated with unaudited access to seemingly innocuous sensors (e.g., accelerometers and gyroscopes) of wearable devices. As part of our efforts towards preventing such side-channel attacks, we also develop and evaluate a novel context-aware protection framework which can be used to automatically disable (or downgrade) access to motion sensors, whenever typing activity is detected.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130781053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 65

NFPS: Adding Undetectable Secure Deletion to Flash Translation Layer NFPS:在Flash转换层添加不可检测的安全删除

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897882

Shijie Jia, Luning Xia, Bo Chen, Peng Liu

{"title":"NFPS: Adding Undetectable Secure Deletion to Flash Translation Layer","authors":"Shijie Jia, Luning Xia, Bo Chen, Peng Liu","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897882","url":null,"abstract":"Securely removing data from modern computing systems is challenging, as past existence of the deleted data may leave artifacts in the layout at all layers of a computing system, which can be utilized by the adversary to infer information about the deleted data. Conventional overwriting-based and encryption-based solutions are not sufficient, as they cannot remove these artifacts. In this work, we aim to securely remove data from NAND flash-based block devices. We observed that completely removing the aforementioned artifacts from NAND flash is expensive, as it may require re-organizing the entire flash layout. We thus approach this security goal from a new angle. We investigate undetectable secure deletion, a novel security notion which can 1) remove the deleted data from flash devices, such that the adversary cannot have access to the deleted data once they have been removed, and 2) conceal the deletion history, such that the adversary cannot find out there was a deletion in the past. We design NAND Flash Partial Scrubbing (NFPS), the first undetectable secure deletion scheme for NAND flash-based block devices. We propose partial page reprogramming and partial block erasure methods to sanitize data from NAND flash. In addition, we incorporate NFPS to typical Flash Translation Layer (FTL) algorithms. Finally, we implement NFPS and experimentally evaluate its effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131474242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

Cross Processor Cache Attacks 跨处理器缓存攻击

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897867

Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea, T. Eisenbarth, B. Sunar

{"title":"Cross Processor Cache Attacks","authors":"Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea, T. Eisenbarth, B. Sunar","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897867","url":null,"abstract":"Multi-processor systems are becoming the de-facto standard across different computing domains, ranging from high-end multi-tenant cloud servers to low-power mobile platforms. The denser integration of CPUs creates an opportunity for great economic savings achieved by packing processes of multiple tenants or by bundling all kinds of tasks at various privilege levels to share the same platform. This level of sharing carries with it a serious risk of leaking sensitive information through the shared microarchitectural components. Microarchitectural attacks initially only exploited core-private resources, but were quickly generalized to resources shared within the CPU. We present the first fine grain side channel attack that works across processors. The attack does not require CPU co-location of the attacker and the victim. The novelty of the proposed work is that, for the first time the directory protocol of high efficiency CPU interconnects is targeted. The directory protocol is common to all modern multi-CPU systems. Examples include AMD's HyperTransport, Intel's Quickpath, and ARM's AMBA Coherent Interconnect. The proposed attack does not rely on any specific characteristic of the cache hierarchy, e.g. inclusiveness. Note that inclusiveness was assumed in all earlier works. Furthermore, the viability of the proposed covert channel is demonstrated with two new attacks: by recovering a full AES key in OpenSSL, and a full ElGamal key in libgcrypt within the range of seconds on a shared AMD Opteron server.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130207334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 116

Vehicle Self-Surveillance: Sensor-Enabled Automatic Driver Recognition 车辆自我监视:传感器支持的自动驾驶员识别

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897917

Ian D. Markwood, Yao Liu

引用次数: 9

StormDroid: A Streaminglized Machine Learning-Based System for Detecting Android Malware StormDroid：基于流式机器学习的安卓恶意软件检测系统

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897860

Sen Chen, Minhui Xue, Zhushou Tang, Lihua Xu, Haojin Zhu

引用次数: 162

Efficient Privacy-Preserving Matrix Factorization via Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Extended Abstract 基于全同态加密的高效保密性矩阵分解:扩展摘要

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897875

Sungwook Kim, Jinsu Kim, Dongyoung Koo, Yuna Kim, H. Yoon, Jun-Bum Shin

{"title":"Efficient Privacy-Preserving Matrix Factorization via Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Extended Abstract","authors":"Sungwook Kim, Jinsu Kim, Dongyoung Koo, Yuna Kim, H. Yoon, Jun-Bum Shin","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897875","url":null,"abstract":"Recommendation systems become popular in our daily life. It is well known that the more the release of users' personal data, the better the quality of recommendation. However, such services raise serious privacy concerns for users. In this paper, focusing on matrix factorization-based recommendation systems, we propose the first privacy-preserving matrix factorization using fully homomorphic encryption. On inputs of encrypted users' ratings, our protocol performs matrix factorization over the encrypted data and returns encrypted outputs so that the recommendation system knows nothing on rating values and resulting user/item profiles. It provides a way to obfuscate the number and list of items a user rated without harming the accuracy of recommendation, and additionally protects recommender's tuning parameters for business benefit and allows the recommender to optimize the parameters for quality of service. To overcome performance degradation caused by the use of fully homomorphic encryption, we introduce a novel data structure to perform computations over encrypted vectors, which are essential operations for matrix factorization, through secure 2-party computation in part. With the data structure, the proposed protocol requires dozens of times less computation cost over those of previous works. Our experiments on a personal computer with 3.4 GHz 6-cores 64 GB RAM show that the proposed protocol runs in 1.5 minutes per iteration. It is more efficient than Nikolaenko et al.'s work proposed in CCS 2013, in which it took about 170 minutes on two servers with 1.9 GHz 16-cores 128 GB RAM.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128211358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 34

UC-secure Two-Server Password-Based Authentication Protocol and Its Applications uc安全双服务器密码认证协议及其应用

Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2016-05-30 DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897872

Lin Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Xuexian Hu

{"title":"UC-secure Two-Server Password-Based Authentication Protocol and Its Applications","authors":"Lin Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Xuexian Hu","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897872","url":null,"abstract":"A two-server password-based authentication (2PA) protocol is a special kind of authentication primitive that provides additional protection for the user's password. Through a 2PA protocol, a user can distribute his low-entropy password between two authentication servers in the initialization phase and authenticate himself merely via a matching password in the login phase. No single server can learn any information about the user's password, nor impersonate the legitimate user to authenticate to the honest server. In this paper, we first formulate and realize the security definition of two-server password-based authentication in the well-known universal composability (UC) framework, which thus provides desirable properties such as composable security. We show that our construction is suitable for the asymmetric communication model in which one server acts as the front-end server interacting directly with the user and the other stays backstage. Then, we show that our protocol could be easily extended to more complicate password-based cryptographic protocols such as two-server password-authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) and two-server password-authenticated secret sharing (2PASS), which enjoy stronger security guarantees and better efficiency performances in comparison with the existing schemes.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115576050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1