ERN: Firm (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Kinky Tax Policy and Abnormal Investment Behavior","authors":"Qiping Xu, Eric Zwick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3002942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3002942","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents tax-minimizing investment, in which firms accelerate capital purchases near fiscal year-end to reduce taxes. Between 1984 and 2013, average investment in fiscal Q4 exceeds the average of fiscal Q1 through Q3 by 37%. Q4 spikes occur in the U.S. and internationally. Research designs using variation in firm tax positions and the 1986 Tax Reform Act show that tax minimization causes spikes. Spikes increase when firms face financial constraints or higher option values of waiting. We develop an investment model with tax asymmetries to rationalize these patterns. Models without purchase-year, tax-minimization motives are unlikely to fit the data.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134045678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Indebtedness and Low Productivity Growth of Italian Firms","authors":"G. Anderson, M. Raissi","doi":"10.5089/9781484343265.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484343265.001","url":null,"abstract":"Productivity growth in Italy has been persistently anemic and has lagged that of the euro area over the period 1999-2015, while the indebtedness of its corporate sector has increased. Using the ORBIS firm-level database, this paper studies the long-term impact of persistent corporate-debt accumulation on the productivity growth of Italian firms and investigates whether total factor productivity growth varies with the level of corporate indebtedness. We employ a novel estimation technique proposed by Chudik, Mohaddes, Pesaran, and Raissi (2017) to account for dynamics, bi-directional feedback effects, cross-firm heterogeneity, and cross-sectional dependence arising from unobserved common factors (for example, oil price shocks, labor and product market frictions, and stance of global financial cycle). Filtering out the effects of unobserved common factors and controlling for firmspecific characteristics, we find significant negative effects of persistent corporate debt build-up on total factor productivity growth, and weak evidence of a threshold level of corporate debt, beyond which productivity growth drops off significantly. Our results have strong policy implications, for example the design of the tax system should discourage persistent corporate debt accumulation, and effective and timely frameworks to reduce corporate debt overhangs are essential.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131488360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local Tax Incentives and Behavior of Foreign Enterprises: Evidence from a Large Developing Country","authors":"Jing Xing, W. Cui, X. Qu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3104973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3104973","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how profit reporting and investment behavior of foreign enterprises respond to local tax incentives in China, a large developing country. Using firm-level data between 2000 and 2013 from China’s industrial enterprise survey, we first provide strong evidence for tax competition among Chinese cities (especially cities within the same province) over the average effective income tax rate. We then find that, despite stringent capital controls, both reported pre-tax profits and investment of foreign firms respond strongly to local tax incentives, suggesting that subnational tax competition in China is oriented towards both mobile profits and real resources.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115412987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Where Does Multinational Investment Go with Territorial Taxation? Evidence from the UK","authors":"L. Liu","doi":"10.5089/9781484337493.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484337493.001","url":null,"abstract":"In 2009, the United Kingdom changed from a worldwide to a territorial tax system, abolishing dividend taxes on foreign repatriation from many low-tax countries. This paper assesses the causal effect of territorial taxation on real investments, using a unique dataset for multinational affiliates in 27 European countries and employing the difference-in-difference approach. It finds that the territorial reform has increased the investment rate of UK multinationals by 15.7 percentage points in low-tax countries. In the absence of any significant investment reduction elsewhere, the findings represent a likely increase in total outbound investment by UK multinationals.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117292605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tax-Induced Fiscal Year Extension and Earnings Management","authors":"Dennis Sundvik","doi":"10.1108/JAAR-06-2015-0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/JAAR-06-2015-0051","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine three different responses to the Finnish 2005 tax reform that, among other things, reduced the corporate tax rate and hiked dividend taxation. Focus lies on the factors influencing the decision to change the fiscal year-end and whether earnings management is more prevalent when the decision is not taken. Design/methodology/approach - This study uses the financial statement data of Finnish private firms and studies 350 fiscal year-end changing firms and 700 non-changing firms with logistic and linear regression analysis. Discretionary accruals are the proxy for earnings management. Findings - The results suggest that firms seize the window of opportunity and extend fiscal years depending on the magnitude of the expected tax savings. Firms that do not change their fiscal year-end engage in more tax-induced earnings management. In terms of economic consequences, the earnings management approach is less economically significant. Research limitations/implications - This study only examines a limited number of firms that change their fiscal year-end, hence, care has been exercised in generalising the findings. Practical implications - The findings may be considered when structuring future tax reforms, particularly when considering transition rules relating to changes in fiscal year-ends. The study may also have implications beyond tax reforms since the evidence of opportunistic changes in the fiscal year-end can be informative for tax authorities, independent auditors and creditors. Originality/value - This study contributes to the relatively scarce literature on private firm responses to tax policy changes by analysing both upward and downward earnings management, as well as changes in the fiscal year-end. This is in contrast to previous research that mainly focusses on listed firms and absolute earnings management or earnings management in one direction.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133650796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public Bail-Out Projects and Moral Hazard","authors":"Yang-Seung Lee","doi":"10.16980/jitc.13.3.201706.145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.16980/jitc.13.3.201706.145","url":null,"abstract":"It often happens that a public bail-out project ends up with ineffective spending. In our opinion, most problems relating to public spending stem from moral hazard or hidden action. Depending on the incentive scheme, the problem can be either exacerbated or reduced. In this paper, we will suggest an incentive scheme for resolving the moral hazard problem from the perspective of strategic information transmission. Prior to the decision of a bail-out project, a government and firms play a game of communication using messages. That is, a firm signals its own capabilities and the government updates its belief of the firm’s true capabilities after receiving the signal. According to our analysis, the game leads to a paradox such that, when a firm is allowed to indirectly indicate its own capability rather than be forced to tell the truth (i.e. confess), total payoffs for both players can be increased in preventing serious moral hazard.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"348 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115282761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Tax Aggressiveness, Firm Size, and Foreign Ownership to Social Responsibility","authors":"Winny Grandis, R. Panggabean","doi":"10.32493/JIAUP.V6I2.1738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32493/JIAUP.V6I2.1738","url":null,"abstract":"Mining companies in Indonesia are companies that explore naturalresources as a source of income for the company. The use of mining companies for this study is because the activities undertaken by these companies related to waste and environmental pollution so that the level of industrial risk and environmental damage becomes high. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of the tax aggressiveness (ETR), firm size (SIZE), and foreign ownership (FOCI) to corporate social responsibility (CSR) of the mining companies. The population in this study are the mining companies which were listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from year 2010 to 2015. This study uses tax aggressiveness, firm size, and foreign ownership as independent variables; profitability, leverage, and market-to-book ratio as control variables; and also corporate social responsibility as dependent variable. There are 9 samples of mining companies which produced 54 data using purposive sampling technique. This study uselogistic regression method. This study uses Eviews 9 and Microsoft Excel 2007 for data processing. The results showed that the firm size (SIZE) has a significant effect on the company's CSR, while tax aggressiveness and foreign ownership have no significant effect on company’s CSR. This results indicate that the bigger the size of a company will cause greater activities and influences in the society, which make companies pay more attention to social programs and social responsibility disclosures.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125455159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Business Tax Burdens in Canada's Major Cities: The 2016 Report Card","authors":"Adam Found, P. Tomlinson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2888889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2888889","url":null,"abstract":"Calgary is increasingly lagging behind Saskatoon, which has the most competitive overall business tax environment among the largest cities in each Canadian province, according to a new C.D. Howe Institute report. In “Business Tax Burdens in Canada’s Major Cities: The 2016 Report Card,” authors Adam Found and Peter Tomlinson rate the largest cities in each province for their business tax competitiveness using a comprehensive measurement tool.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131100778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role of Toeholds and Capital Gains Taxes for Corporate Acquisition Strategies","authors":"Federica Liberini, António Russo, M. Stimmelmayr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2877625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877625","url":null,"abstract":"Ownership takeovers often follow complex strategies where the control of the target firm is acquired through a sequence of independent contracts. Based on this observation, we develop a novel theoretical model wherein the acquiring firm decides on the number of steps towards the full ownership of the target (the acquisition structure) and on the combination of cash and stock used to finance the takeover (the method of payment). Within this framework, we analyze the effect of the capital gains tax on these two decision margins and test our theoretical prediction using a bivariate probit model on a sample of acquisition contracts between 2002 and 2014, collected from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database. Our estimates confirm the lock-in-effect and indicate a larger discouraging effect of rising capital gains taxes (+10%-points increase) on one-shot full acquisition (-6.0%-points) versus on sequential acquisitions (-5.2%-points). Further, we provide evidence that an increase in the capital gains tax (+10%-points) raises the probability of choosing one-shot full acquisition (+5.5%-points) instead of sequential acquisitions.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122605283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privatization, State Capitalism, and State Ownership of Business in the 21st Century","authors":"W. Megginson","doi":"10.1561/0500000053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/0500000053","url":null,"abstract":"This study summarizes the economic and political developments relating to privatization, state capitalism, and state ownership of business since 2000 and then surveys the extensive recent research examining these issues empirically. Through the early 21st century, there was an unambiguous global trend towards reducing government ownership of business enterprise, but this trend has since at least been slowed, and perhaps even reversed. We discuss the factors that have promoted a global resurgence of state ownership, then define and analyze the new ideology labeled “state capitalism.†Recent research examines whether privatization improves the operating and financial performance of divested companies, as well as when, where and how governments decide to privatize individual companies and how these sales are priced. All the performance studies surveyed document significant improvements after companies are divested. Recent academic and professional research categorizes and evaluates various types of state owners; examines determinants of the level of state ownership; studies how state ownership impacts the valuation of corporate assets and examines the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership; and assesses how state ownership impacts corporate financial policies, especially capital investment. This research highlights that different types of state owners have very different impacts on corporate value and performance, and that state ownership generally has a significant, and mostly pernicious, impact on corporate investment and financial policies. The separate effect of state ownership on corporate valuation is less clear-cut. This survey also summarizes recent empirical research examining the relationship between state ownership of business assets and financial markets and institutions, and also surveys the literature examining political connections between politicians and corporate managers. Sovereign wealth fund research yields essentially benign findings, but almost all studies examining state-owned banking show that state ownership reduces banks’ efficiency. All the financial markets and institutions studies examined highlight the distortive effects and economic costs of bailouts and guarantees, and almost all the political connections studies find that these connections are privately beneficial but socially costly. Finally, the research surveyed here convinces the author that “state capitalism†is an essentially failed model.","PeriodicalId":161200,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131050615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}