By Executive OrderPub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0001
Andrew Rudalevige
{"title":"“On My Own”?","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter gives a brief background of how executive orders have been used by US presidents. As a way of implementing statute in ways that hew to presidential preference, executive orders have been utilized from the Washington administration forward as an implication of the constitutional “executive power” vested in the president. Any issued order reflects presidential preferences, more or less purely enacted into action. The chapter seeks to unpack this view substantively and theoretically. Presidential action can be bound not just by legislators or judges but also by actors within the executive branch itself. The ultimate form of a given executive order may reflect agency needs, or the outcome of intrabranch negotiation, rather than pure ex ante presidential preferences.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116852658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By Executive OrderPub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0007
Andrew Rudalevige
{"title":"“Dear John”","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a new data set of more than two hundred executive orders never signed by the president. However that is interpreted — as good management or as gridlock — something that could have been done “with the stroke of a pen” was not. Here, too, quantitative and archival analysis pair to help us understand why. The results highlight the fact that unilateral action has costs, which at some point outweigh the benefits. Those costs may be rung up in Congress, or the courts, or by public opinion. But as the exploration here shows, they may also be imposed by the executive branch.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128442661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By Executive OrderPub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0004
Andrew Rudalevige
{"title":"Executive Orders","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter lays out the data set of executive orders created for this book, drawn from archival sources spanning the Roosevelt to George W. Bush administrations. It provides comprehensive data regarding the making of those orders and a scheme coding their relative centralization. In so doing it answers a basic empirical question: How are executive orders actually formulated? The most frequent answer is, with lots of participation by different agencies.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115057060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By Executive OrderPub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0002
Andrew Rudalevige
{"title":"Bargaining with the Bureaucracy","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter builds on the brief discussion from the previous chapter to explore the strands of public administration scholarship stressing the organizational complexity of the executive branch and the difficulty of imposing centralized leadership upon it. It considers the transaction costs involved in managing the executive branch — and seeks to situate presidents as they both respond to the administrative products of the agencies and create their own within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The notion of contingent centralization, used in other research on policy formulation, is adapted here to the president's decision to “make or buy” a given executive order. What characteristics of an order, or an agency, shape presidential decisions about where to formulate an executive order? When will EOP intervention be most required; when will agencies be given freer rein? The vantage is largely presidential here in asking how presidents can lower their managerial transaction costs. But that frame allows for agencies to have influence over the provision of information and thus scope to shape presidents' cost-benefit analysis.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122501656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By Executive OrderPub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0008
Andrew Rudalevige
{"title":"Incorrigibly Plural","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The concluding chapter summarizes the overall findings and pushes them toward related topics in sore need of additional study. It examines what happens before an executive order is issued, but we know little about what happens afterward. The conclusion is also a chance to explore the question of bureaucratic capacity and autonomy as it runs up against presidential desires to control that bureaucracy — a claim bolstered by electoral legitimacy. Presidential hostility to the permanent government is hardly new, of course. But the Trump administration's amplification of that contention — with frequent, personal attacks on agencies and even individual civil servants on the one hand, and “resistance” to presidential preferences on the other — raised its salience, and its stakes. The argument of this book rests in part on the value presidents derive — substantively but also politically — from astute management of a bureaucracy that can provide expert advice on solving pressing national problems. Undermining its ability to do so is therefore counterproductive.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123024651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By Executive OrderPub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0005
Andrew Rudalevige
{"title":"Testing Presidential Management","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194363.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter returns to the question of the conditions that underly decisions to use a centralized executive order versus a decentralized one. For presidents seeking to minimize their managerial transaction costs, what matters in that calculation? Do the same factors that influence the decision to issue an executive order (the focus of the literature in this area to date) affect the manner in which that order is formulated? According to the approach taken here, characteristics specific to individual orders and the agencies linked to them should instead be the primary influences over how presidents manage the process of policy development.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132905456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Brief History of Time (to Issuance)","authors":"Andrew Rudalevige","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv17nmzjz.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv17nmzjz.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines to another aspect of executive order management. It turns out that the average executive order takes some seventy-five days to move from draft proposal to the Federal Register, with huge variation around that figure. What affects that timing? What makes an executive order take longer to issue? What characteristics of orders and agencies, of interagency interaction and requirements of the management process itself, are associated with delay? Quantitative analysis, elaborated by case studies, helps us explore these questions for the first time as the duration of the formulation process is tested as a proxy for executive collective action problems.","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133924044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A NOTE ON SOURCES","authors":"J. Young","doi":"10.1515/9781400868698-023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400868698-023","url":null,"abstract":"Although historians have for a long time known about the existence of lunacy investigation law, the sources relating to the law’s use have remained elusive and underappreciated. Specifically, while there are many sources about the functioning of lunacy investigation law, the trial testimony, judges’ statements, lawyers’ interventions, appeals and witness statements have been difficult to locate for most jurisdictions in which this trial process took place. In order to write a history of lunacy investigation law in transatlantic perspective, this book has exploited two major sources: reports on lunacy trials that are found in the English Reports (see below), and a largely intact set of lunacy trial manuscripts found in the New Jersey State Archives. The most comprehensive published interpretation of English lunacy trials for the early nineteenth-century period is Akihito Suzuki’s Madness at Home: The Psychiatrist, the Patient, and the Family in England, 1820–1860. Suzuki’s analysis is based on 196 commissions of lunacy that were published in The Times newspaper. Finding the original manuscript sources for these and earlier commissions of lunacy has so far proved next to impossible. However, case reports of many lunacy trials are now available online. The English Reports is a 179-volume compilation of case reports dating from 1220 to 1866. As Peter Bartlett notes, ‘the vast bulk of the cases date from the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries’. A convenient way to access English Reports relating to lunacy trials is through the search engine Justis, which, among other resources, provides an extensive online library of legal sources for the United Kingdom. Using the Justis search engine, I have collected case reports for over two hundred cases in lunacy, dating from Beverley’s landmark case in 1598 to the beginning of the period covered by Akihito Suzuki’s","PeriodicalId":158335,"journal":{"name":"By Executive Order","volume":"242 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116874242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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