CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"CEO Home Bias and Corporate Acquisitions","authors":"Kiseon Chung, T. C. Green, Breno Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2796264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2796264","url":null,"abstract":"We find that CEOs are significantly more likely to purchase cross-state targets from their birth state, consistent with either informational advantages or familiarity bias. Evidence from bidder announcement returns supports the latter view. Acquirer returns are significantly lower for CEO home state acquisitions, and the relation is robust to controls for firm and industry characteristics. The negative announcement effect is stronger for poorly-governed firms, when the target is located further away, and when the CEO has a deeper birth-state connection. CEOs’ post-acquisition trading behavior also supports a familiarity bias interpretation. Our findings suggest CEO home bias influences firm investment.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131857321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Are CEOS Different? Characteristics of Top Managers","authors":"S. Kaplan, M. Sørensen","doi":"10.3386/W23832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W23832","url":null,"abstract":"We use a dataset of over 2,600 executive assessments to study thirty individual characteristics of candidates for top executive positions – CEO, CFO, COO and others. We classify the thirty candidate characteristics with four primary factors: general ability, execution vs. interpersonal, charisma vs. analytic, and strategic vs. managerial. CEO candidates tend to score higher on these factors; CFO candidates score lower. Conditional on being a candidate, executives with greater interpersonal skills are more likely to be hired, suggesting that such skills are important in the selection process. Scores on the four factors also predict future career progression. Non-CEO candidates who score higher on the four factors are subsequently more likely to become CEOs. The patterns are qualitatively similar for public, private equity and venture capital owned companies. We do not find economically large differences in the four factors for men and women. Women, however, are subsequently less likely to become CEOs, holding the four factors constant.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125342329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CEO Overconfidence and the Cost of Private Debt: Evidences from Bank Loan Contracting","authors":"Yeh-ning Chen, Po-Hsin Ho, Chih-Yung Lin, Ju-Fang Yen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2736642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2736642","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm’s CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the predictions of the model. As predicted in the model, with a hedge against the downside risk of the loan payments, banks favor firms with overconfident CEOs such that these firms enjoy lower loan rates and higher loan approval rates, especially when firms have rich firm-specific growth opportunities or during prosperous periods. Furthermore, there is evidence showing that firms with overconfident CEOs bring more future business opportunities to banks than other firms. Hence, this paper implies that banks may prefer high-risk borrowers if the future benefits from doing businesses with these borrowers are sufficiently high.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122538147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Managerial Ability and Credit Risk Assessment","authors":"IV SamuelB.Bonsall, Eric R. Holzman, B. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2649161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2649161","url":null,"abstract":"Research on the credit rating process has primarily focused on how rating agencies incorporate firm characteristics into their rating opinions. We contribute to this literature by examining the impact of managerial ability on the credit rating process. Given debt market participants' interest in assessing default risk, we begin by documenting that higher managerial ability is associated with lower variability in future earnings and stock returns. We then show that higher managerial ability is associated with higher credit ratings i.e., lower assessments of credit risk. To provide more direct identification of the impact of managerial ability, we examine chief executive officer CEO replacements and document that ratings increase decrease when CEOs are replaced with more less able CEOs. Finally, we show that managerial ability also has capital market implications by documenting that managerial ability is associated with bond offering credit spreads. Collectively, our evidence suggests that managerial ability is an important factor that bond market participants impound into their assessments of firm credit risk. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123078840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Australian CEO Outside Directorships","authors":"R. Heaney, Lary Li, M. Tan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2550057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2550057","url":null,"abstract":"In a study of the outside directorships held by CEOs in large Australian companies we find that CEO outside directorships are a function of CEO power and the level of outside directorships held by other members of the board. They are also increasing in CEO relative tenure, CEO duality and board size. Whether the outside directorship is for a private or a public company is also found to have an impact on the results. The outside directorship counts are manually collected from the annual reports of the top 100 listed Australian companies, sampled every three years over the period from 1990 through to 2008.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133566165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Higher-Ambition CEOs Need Higher-Ambition Boards","authors":"E. Ludwig, A. Walton, M. Beer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2539073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2539073","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past years, forward-looking CEOs have adopted a higher-ambition approach to strategy and leadership. These \"higher-ambition CEOs\" are driven by a sense of purpose that goes beyond achieving financial success. They aspire to build organizations that succeed in the marketplace by earning the respect, trust, and, commitment of their people, customers, communities, and investors. Higher-ambition leaders commit to simultaneously meeting financial targets and fulfilling broader needs in society. They are also realistic about the challenges.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133312827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Projecting Different Identities: A Longitudinal Study of the 'Whipsaw' Effects of Changing Leadership Discourse About the Triple Bottom Line","authors":"Julie Bayle-Cordier, P. Mirvis, Bertrand Moingeon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2496804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496804","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on changes in leadership’s discourse about the \"triple bottom line\" in Ben & Jerry’s ice cream from its founding days through to its acquisition by and integration into Unilever. For this study, the authors analyzed CEO claims about \"who we are\" from their letters in annual reports (what they label projected identity). A sample of employees (both long-service and relative newcomers) were interviewed about their perceptions of B&J’s over the thirty years covered. Findings reveal that successive CEO’s stressed different \"logics\" about the business and what would make it successful over the years with the founders emphasizing a strong linkage between the economic, product, and social components of the company’s triple bottom line and their next three successors decoupling these components and pushing, each in different ways, for stronger financial returns. As a result, organization members were \"whipsawed\" between their CEOs’ different logics and identity claims. The CEO letters exhibit a progression over time from a more normative to utilitarian tone familiar in the organizational identity literature. The messaging shifts, however, when a fifth CEO takes charge and re-integrates the firm’s triple bottom line. Thus the firm’s projected identity evolved in a U pattern starting with an integrated triple bottom line logic, shifting to a more linear logic where the economic mission dominates, and then reintegration where multiple bottom lines are embraced once again. Here the authors explore both the strategic (external) and personal (internal) challenges informing the different CEOs’ messages over years, the whipsaw effect on staff, and the longer term evolution of projected identity in the company and reemergence of its integrated triple bottom line. This study contributes to the CSR and organization identity literatures by documenting how CEO’s (and their company) must struggle with maintaining an integrated triple bottom line in the context of commercial challenges and major changes involved in M&A. It also speaks to the practical matters of keeping normative traditions alive amidst competing pressures for change.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122455248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dark Side of CEO Ability: CEO General Managerial Skills and Cost of Equity Capital","authors":"Dev R. Mishra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464705","url":null,"abstract":"CEOs with substantial general managerial ability (generalist CEOs) possess a substantial share of organization (human) capital and have different risk-taking incentives than do their counterpart specialist CEOs. Using an index increasing in CEO general managerial skills as a proxy for general managerial ability, we find that investors require higher returns from firms featuring CEOs who have profuse general managerial ability. Furthermore, expected returns are significantly increasing with CEO general managerial ability in firms with high organization capital, that belong to M&A-intensive industries and that have complex operations, high agency problems and high anti-takeover provisions. These findings are consistent with arguments that organization (human) capital has significant expected return implications and that CEOs with higher general managerial skills may lead to higher agency problems, feature different risk-taking incentives and be more costly to retain in times of need.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125783788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Board Dynamics: A Structural Investigation","authors":"Wei-Ming Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2487823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2487823","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how board structure changes with CEO characteristics. I estimate a structural model that endogenizes board structure, CEO firing, and firm performance. Adopting such an approach mitigates endogeneity concerns and allows for the exploration of some within-firm results that are difficult to document using regressions. I find a negative relation between board independence and CEO ability. This relation is strong when CEO ability is low, but it is weak on average. Further, when I restrict CEO ability to be the only CEO characteristic that can cause variation in board independence, the standard deviation of board independence in the simulated sample is less than 50% of its empirical counterpart. These results explain why the relation between board independence and CEO ability becomes insignificant in regression framework. Additionally, I find that appointing more outsiders only moderately improves the board's monitoring performance. The directors are unwilling to fire some low-ability CEOs because their private firing cost can be as large as $116 million on average. An outsider-dominated board reduces such a cost by less than 20%. Some low-ability CEOs are therefore able to keep their jobs even when the board comprises mostly of outsiders and board members hold a significant proportion of equity.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134646181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Board Leadership Structure of Publicly‐Traded Insurance Companies","authors":"Steve Miller, Tina Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2641417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2641417","url":null,"abstract":"CEO duality is a contentious issue driving much debate amongst regulators and business leaders. It is also an aspect of corporate governance, to which insurance companies have made significant changes in recent years. Despite its significance, we know little about the determinants of CEO duality in the insurance industry and its impact on firm performance. This paper addresses these research questions. We find strong evidence that CEO duality is a complex decision, which insurance firms fine-tune in response to their individual circumstances. Compared to other industries, the insurance industry is unique in that the costs and benefits of CEO duality vary more with firm size. We find no evidence that CEO duality is detrimental to firm performance. If anything, the valuation impact of CEO duality appears to be positive for large insurers. Our results have important policy implications. Evidence suggests that regulatory initiatives targeting CEO duality of insurance firms should pay close attention to the role of firm size. It may also be desirable to promote regulations that can provide insurance companies decision flexibility in adjusting their leadership structures to competitive environments.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123637889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}