{"title":"CEO Individualism and Corporate Innovation","authors":"Fan Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3945017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3945017","url":null,"abstract":"Using data on birthplaces of 2,065 CEOs and a local measure of cultural individualism based on the pace of westward expansion in American history, I find a robust positive relation between CEO cultural individualism and corporate innovation. Firms with more individualistic CEOs file more patents, have more patent citations and greater patent originality, and generate patents with higher market value. I obtain these results using panel OLS regressions and the difference-in-differences estimation around CEO turnovers. CEO individualism increases innovation through its effect on corporate culture, internal capital reallocation, and the type of M&A deals pursued by the firm.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122848469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Entrepreneur-CEOs on Company Performance","authors":"Muhammad Sheraz Hassan Khan, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3681289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3681289","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between entrepreneur chief executive officers (CEOs) and firm performance. Based on the theoretical argument that microfinance entrepreneur-chief executive officers (CEOs) are “motivated agents” with a unique ability to hire and socialize mission-oriented staff, the paper develops a matched sample of 91 Pakistani firms and compared their performance using both accounting and market-based measures. Independent sample t-tests were used to empirically test the opposing predictions. Data were obtained from the PSX database and companies’ websites of sample firms. The results of the data analysis indicate that there is a statistically significant performance difference between entrepreneur-led and non-entrepreneurs led firms. Such performance difference is especially evident when the paper focusses on the accounting-and market based firm performance measures such as return on assets and Tobin’s q. Surprisingly, non-entrepreneurs led firms performed worse than those led by entrepreneur CEOs. The findings of the study provided empirical support for entrepreneur CEO impact on firm performance. The study makes an original contribution to the on-going research on strategic leadership by exploring the performance effect of entrepreneur CEOs and the corresponding alternative theoretical explanations.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129355744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mu-Jeung Yang, Michael Christensen, N. Bloom, R. Sadun, Jan W. Rivkin
{"title":"How Do CEOS Make Strategy?","authors":"Mu-Jeung Yang, Michael Christensen, N. Bloom, R. Sadun, Jan W. Rivkin","doi":"10.5465/ambpp.2020.20640abstract","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2020.20640abstract","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the critical question of how executives make strategic decisions. Utilizing a new survey of 262 CEO alumni of Harvard Business School, we gather evidence on four aspects of each executive’s business strategy: its overall structure, its formalization, its development, and its implementation. We report three key results. First, different CEOs use markedly different processes to make strategic decisions; some follow highly formalized, rigorous, and deliberate processes, while others rely heavily on instinct and intuition. Second, more structured strategy processes are associated with larger firm size and faster employment growth. Third, using a regression discontinuity centered around a change in the curriculum of Harvard Business School’s required strategy course, we trace differences in strategic decision making back to differences in managerial education.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128962628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO Political Ideology and Management Earnings Forecast","authors":"Md Noman Hossain, A. Elnahas, Lei Gao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3637608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637608","url":null,"abstract":"Republican CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and to issue forecasts that are more accurate and timely. Republican CEOs favor range and less optimistic forecasts, convey more negative news, and have more positive earnings surprises. We address endogeneity using propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimates. Our results are robust to controlling for CEO characteristics, incentives, overconfidence, and managerial ability, and are stronger for firms with a high level of institutional ownership and litigation risk. The preference for threat and ambiguity avoidance of conservative CEOs seem to outweigh the tendency to seize on information associated with their authoritarian personalities.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126875074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A CEO Value Perspective of Corporate Innovation Strategy: Evidence from China","authors":"Qing Zhang, Zhijuan Hong, Xu-Hong Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3611491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611491","url":null,"abstract":"This paper theorizes and tests how chief executive officer (CEO)’s value of self-enhancement and self-transcendence, influence corporate innovation activities. We hypothesize that CEOs’ values of self-enhancement — focusing on the leader’s own benefit — would relate negatively to corporate innovation strategy and outcomes, whereas self-transcendent values — focusing on others’ benefits — would relate positively to corporate innovation. Using a longitudinal archival data of publicly listed companies in China during 2010 — 2014, we tested our hypotheses and found supportive evidences, further analyses show different combination of the two types of fundamental values predicts different corporate innovation activities and outcomes. By addressing the question of why some Chinese companies are lack of innovation and some other are devoted to innovative activities, this paper offers a new lens of corporate leader’s personal characteristics on a firm's business strategy, and explain how CEO’s value orientation of self-transcendence and self-enhancement can be manifested in the corporate innovation strategy and innovation performance.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128946760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO Employee Approval and Firm Value: Evidence from Employees' Choice Awards","authors":"Spencer Barnes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3545481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545481","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of a chief executive officer (CEO) winning an employee opinion award on firm value. Leveraging close employee vote shares in a regression discontinuity specification from Glassdoor's \"Top CEOs Employees' Choice\" award list suggest a causal link of the relationship. Narrowly winning an employees' choice CEO award results in an increase in firm value in following years. An increase in firm efficiency is the likely economic channel that influences an increase in firm value. The findings imply that CEO and employee relationships are an important intangible good for corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121618777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO-CFO Relative Optimism and Firm Mergers and Acquisitions","authors":"Wei Shi, Guoli Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3428760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3428760","url":null,"abstract":"Our paper examines two critical members in the top management “subteam” – CEO and CFO – in firms’ merger and acquisition (M&A) decision. We propose a concept of CEO-CFO relative optimism, measured by CEO’s optimism relative to CFO’s pessimism, to capture the subteam’s collective cognitive schema in attentional focus and information processing, and study their conjoined influence on corporate decisions. We posit that firms with high CEO-CFO relative optimism will undertake more acquisitions than firms with low CEO-CFO relative optimism because optimistic CEOs are less attentive to risk associated with acquisitions in the absence of CFOs high in pessimism. In addition, the role of CEO-CFO relative optimism in affecting M&A intensity is more pronounced when CFOs are board members at focal firms and firms face a dynamic external environment, because CFO’s opinions are more salient in these situations. Furthermore, acquisitions by firms with high CEO-CFO relative optimism will have a more negative influence on firm operating performance than those with low CEO-CFO relative optimism. Using a sample of U.S. public firms over the period of 2002-2013, we find empirical support for our arguments.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121346037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
N. Bloom, Hong Cheng, M. Duggan, Hongbin Li, Franklin Qian
{"title":"Do CEOS Know Best? Evidence from China","authors":"N. Bloom, Hong Cheng, M. Duggan, Hongbin Li, Franklin Qian","doi":"10.3386/w24760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w24760","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a new management survey for around 1,000 firms and 10,000 employees across two large provinces in China. The unique aspect of this survey is it collected management data from the CEO, a random sample of senior managers and workers. We document four main results. First, management scores, much like productivity, have a wide spread with a long left-tail of poorly managed firms. This distribution of management scores is similar for CEOs, senior managers and workers management, and appears broadly reasonably compared to US scores for similar questions. Moreover, for all groups these scores correlate with firm performance, suggesting all employees within the firm are (at least partly) aware of the their firms’ managerial abilities. Second, the scores across the groups are significantly cross-correlated, but far from completely. This suggests that while different levels of the firm have similar views on the firms’ management capabilities, they do not fully agree. Third, we find that the CEO’s management scores are the most predictive of firm performance, followed by the senior managers and then the workers. Hence, CEOs do appear to know best about their firms management strengths and weaknesses. Fourth, within-firm management score dispersion is negatively correlated with investment and R&D intensity, suggesting long-run planning is linked with greater consistency in management across levels in firms.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129102670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO Characteristics and the Amount of Capital Raised in Malaysian IPOs","authors":"B. Badru, Nurwati A. Ahmad-Zaluki, W. Wan-Hussin","doi":"10.1504/IJMP.2017.10005860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJMP.2017.10005860","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of the characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on the amount of capital raised in the Malaysian Initial Public Offering (IPO) market. To have a broader picture of the impact, the current study employs the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and quantile regression techniques, using a sample of 214 IPOs over the period of 2005-2015. The use of the quantile regression technique allows the study to estimate the impact of the CEO's characteristics at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of the capital raised. The results show that companies with a Malay CEO raise more capital than those companies with a non-Malay CEO. In addition, CEO age is significant and negatively associated with capital raised. However, the impact of CEO educational qualification is mixed, while CEO gender is insignificant. Other variables, such as company size and pre-IPO financial health, have significant and positive impact on capital raised. The practical implication of the study is that the characteristics of the CEO play a signalling role in IPO decisions. As such, investors can consider the characteristics of the CEO before making investment decisions.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125209076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are CEO Power and Audit Committee Quality Substitutes or in Conflict?","authors":"Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou, Wei-Yin Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2908146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2908146","url":null,"abstract":"CEO power can influence a CEO’s incentives to disclose information, in turn affecting the information environment. Audit committees can also affect the information environment, because they serve as the watchdog for financial reporting quality and the audit process. Thus, our research explores whether CEO power and the audit committee are substitute or conflicting mechanisms in improving information transparency. Our evidence supports a simultaneous inverse association between CEO power and audit committee quality. In addition, a simultaneous inverse association between CEO power and audit committee quality for firms with more complex accounting policies or in high-tech industries is significantly stronger than that of firms with less complex accounting policies or in other industries. Finally, the evidence shows that firms with more powerful CEOs experience more information transparency. Thus, powerful CEOs and an audit committee with high quality play the same role in improving information transparency. As a result, our evidence indicates that the firm’s CEO and its audit committee are substitutes for each other.","PeriodicalId":157371,"journal":{"name":"CGN: CEOs (Sub-Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126234884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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