{"title":"Interview: Richard Walker, Human Brain Project","authors":"Ivana Greguric","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v27i2.66","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v27i2.66","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"299 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116577475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book review: Nietzsche and Transhumanism: Precursor or Enemy?, ed. Yunus Tuncel","authors":"Roberto Manzocco","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v27i2.62","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v27i2.62","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124317237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editing the Genome of Human Being","authors":"Marcelo De Araujo","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v27i1.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v27i1.65","url":null,"abstract":"In 2015 a team of scientists used a new gene-editing technique called CRISPR-Cas9 to edit the genome of 86 non-viable human embryos. The experiment sparked a global debate on the ethics of gene editing. In this paper, I first review the key ethical issues that have been addressed in this debate. Although there is an emerging consensus now that research on the editing of human somatic cells for therapeutic purpose should be pursued further, the prospect of using gene-editing techniques for the purpose of human enhancement has been met with strong criticism. The main thesis that I defend in this paper is that some of the most vocal objections recently raised against the prospect of genetic human enhancement are not justified. I put forward two arguments for the morality of genetic human enhancement. The first argument shows how the moral and legal framework within which we currently claim our procreative rights, especially in the context of IVF procedures, could be deployed in the assessment of the morality and legality of genetic human enhancement. The second argument calls into question the assumption that the average level of human cognitive performance should have a normative character.","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"8 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132089605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Superintelligent AI and Skepticism","authors":"Joseph A. Corabi","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v27i1.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v27i1.63","url":null,"abstract":"It has become fashionable to worry about the development of superintelligent AI that results in the destruction of humanity. This worry is not without merit, but it may be overstated. This paper explores some previously undiscussed reasons to be optimistic that, even if superintelligent AI does arise, it will not destroy us. These have to do with the possibility that a superintelligent AI will become mired in skeptical worries that its superintelligence cannot help it to solve. I argue that superintelligent AIs may lack the psychological idiosyncracies that allow humans to act in the face of skeptical problems, and so as a result they may become paralyzed in the face of these problems in a way that humans are not.","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"44 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115547338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book review: Stefan Lorenz Sorgner’s Transhumanismus:“Die gefährlichste Idee der Welt”!? (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 2016)","authors":"Thomas Damberger, Estella Hebert","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v26i2.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v26i2.61","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129324259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Future of Brain-Computer Interfaces","authors":"M. Swan","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v26i2.60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v26i2.60","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to explore the development of brain-computer interfacing and cloudminds as possible future scenarios. I describe potential applications such as selling unused brain processing cycles and the blockchaining of personality functions. The possibility of ubiquitous brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) that are continuously connected to the Internet suggests interesting options for our future selves. Questions about what it is to be human, the nature of our current existence and interaction with reality, and how things might be different could become more prominent. I examine speculative future scenarios such as digital selves and cloudmind collaborations. Applications could be adopted in tiers of advancing complexity and risk, starting with health tracking, followed by information seeking and entertainment, and finally, self-actualization. By linking brains to the Internet, BCIs could allow individuals to be more highly connectable not just to communications networks but also to other minds, and thus could enable participation in new kinds of collective applications such as a cloudmind. A cloudmind (or crowdmind) is the concept of multiple individual minds (human or machine) joined together to pursue a collaborative goal such as problem solving, idea generation, creative expression, or entertainment. The prospect of cloudminds raises questions about individual versus collective personhood. Some of the necessary conditions for individuals to feel comfortable in joining a cloudmind include privacy, security, reversibility, and retention of personal identity. Blockchain technology might be employed to orchestrate the security, automation, coordination, and credit-assignation requirements of cloudmind collaborations.","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126108442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Confronting Existential Risks With Voluntary Moral Bioenhancement","authors":"V. Rakić, M. Ćirković","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v26i2.59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v26i2.59","url":null,"abstract":"We outline an argument favoring voluntary moral bioenhancement as a response to existential risks humanity exposes itself to. We consider this type of enhancement a solution to the antithesis between the extinction of humanity and the imperative of humanity to survive at any cost (e.g., by adopting illiberal strategies). By opting for voluntary moral bioenhancement, we refrain from advocating illiberal or even totalitarian strategies that would allegedly help humanity preserve itself. We argue that such strategies, by encroaching upon the freedom of individuals, already inflict a degree of existential harm on human beings. We also give some pointers as to the desirable direction for morally enhanced post-personhood.","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125639193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Agential Risks","authors":"Phil Torres","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v26i2.58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v26i2.58","url":null,"abstract":"The greatest existential threats to humanity stem from increasingly powerful advanced technologies. Yet the “risk potential” of such tools can only be realized when coupled with a suitable agent who, through error or terror, could use the tool to bring about an existential catastrophe. While the existential risk literature has provided many accounts of how advanced technologies might be misused and abused to cause unprecedented harm, no scholar has yet explored the other half of the agent-tool coupling, namely the agent. This paper aims to correct this failure by offering a comprehensive overview of what we could call “agential riskology.” Only by studying the unique properties of different agential risk types can one acquire an accurate picture of the existential danger before us.","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133599893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Embodiment in Whole-Brain Emulation and its Implications for Death Anxiety","authors":"C. Linssen, P. Lemmens","doi":"10.55613/jeet.v26i2.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55613/jeet.v26i2.56","url":null,"abstract":"The awareness of death is a central motivating force behind human activity. Their capacities for abstract and symbolic reasoning give human beings a unique foresight of their finite lifetime and forthcoming demise. Because of the overwhelming nature of this realization, we try to cope with the ensuing anxieties by means of various cognitive and existential strategies. One such strategy is to create a meaningful legacy during one’s lifetime that will outlive the single individual. Whole-brain emulation (WBE) is another approach, but is unusual because of its literal promise to abolish death. Starting from the premise that WBE is feasible and will advance to such a level that we can speak of uploaded minds, we explore the implications of an allegedly immortal existence in a computational substrate: for our embodiment in the first place, and for death anxiety in the second. We argue that uploading would change the nature of, but could ultimately never abolish, embodiment. Instead, the defining characteristic of all brains are their vital links to the bodies that contain them and their interactions with the environment that are mediated by the body. In this light, we discuss the limits of WBE’s potential to mitigate death anxieties: limits related to the (objective) probability of ceasing to exist, but also those that stem from the perception of the body as a proxy for death.","PeriodicalId":157018,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125369377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}