R. D. Pietro, L. Mancini, A. Mei, A. Panconesi, J. Radhakrishnan
{"title":"Sensor Networks that Are Provably Resilient","authors":"R. D. Pietro, L. Mancini, A. Mei, A. Panconesi, J. Radhakrishnan","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359569","url":null,"abstract":"We give, for the first time, a precise mathematical analysis of the connectivity and security properties of sensor networks that make use of the random pre-distribution of keys. We also show how to set the parameters - pool and key-ring size - in such a way that the network is not only connected with high probability via secure links, but also provably resilient, in the following sense: we formally show that any attacker that captures sensors at random with the aim of compromising a constant fraction of the secure links, must capture at least a constant fraction of the nodes of the network. In the context of wireless sensor networks where random pre-distribution of keys is employed, we are the first to provide a mathematically precise proof, with a clear indication of parameter choice, that two crucial properties connectivity via secure links and resilience against malicious attacks - can be obtained simultaneously. Our theoretical results are complemented by extensive simulations that reinforce our main conclusions","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125270963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exploiting MMS Vulnerabilities to Stealthily Exhaust Mobile Phone's Battery","authors":"Radmilo Racic, Denys Ma, Hao Chen","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359550","url":null,"abstract":"As cellular data services and applications are being widely deployed, they become attractive targets for attackers, who could exploit unique vulnerabilities in cellular networks, mobile devices, and the interaction between cellular data networks and the Internet. In this paper, we demonstrate such an attack, which surreptitiously drains mobile devices' battery power up to 22 times faster and therefore could render these devices useless before the end of business hours. This attack targets a unique resource bottleneck in mobile devices (the battery power) by exploiting an insecure cellular data service (MMS) and the insecure interaction between cellular data networks and the Internet (PDP context retention and the paging channel). The attack proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the attacker compiles a hit list of mobile devices - including their cellular numbers, IP addresses, and model information - by exploiting MMS notification messages. In the second stage, the attacker drains mobile devices' battery power by sending periodical UDP packets and exploiting PDP context retention and the paging channel. This attack is unique not only because it exploits vulnerable cellular services to target mobile devices hut also because the victim mobile users are unaware when their batteries are being drained. Furthermore, we identify two key vulnerable components in cellular networks and propose mitigation strategies for protecting cellular devices from such attacks from the Internet","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126123461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards Cooperative Self-Protecting Mobile Devices using Trustful Relationships","authors":"S. Grob","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359542","url":null,"abstract":"Security remains a major topic in today's networks. Especially in the mobile area there are many security issues that have not yet been satisfactorily addressed, let alone been solved. Most of the security mechanisms and techniques used in wired networks tend to rely upon a fixed network topology. For example, firewalls and intrusion detection systems are placed at central points of a network and configured with a model of the network's structure to control and analyse the data flows transferred for harmful content. If at all, adopting these measures for the mobile world is not easy due to its dynamically changing environments and the mobile device's resource constraints that do not allow demanding analyse tasks. In this paper, we present our work in progress of developing a system architecture for cooperative and self-protecting mobile devices. Our approach is based on the assumption that a mobile network can be protected by securing all participating devices or at least all honest participating devices. Thus, we no longer insist on a global view of the network but on several local views. To make these views as precise as possible and to avoid serious performance bottlenecks on a single device we propose a strategy for coupling trusted mobile devices together into a cooperating group","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129641638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Discount Anonymous On Demand Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks","authors":"Liu Yang, M. Jakobsson, S. Wetzel","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359533","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a large number of proposals for anonymity mechanisms operating on the application layer. Given that anonymity is no stronger than its weakest link, such proposals are only meaningful if one can offer anonymity guarantees on the communication layer as well. ANODR - or anonymous on demand routing - is one of the leading proposals to deal with this issue. In this paper, we propose a novel technique to address the same problem, but at a lower cost. Our proposal, which we dub discount-ANODR, is built around the same set of techniques as ANODR is. Our proposal has the benefit of achieving substantially lower computation and communication complexities at the cost of a slight reduction of privacy guarantees. In particular, discount-ANODR achieves source anonymity and routing privacy. A route is \"blindly generated\" by the intermediaries on the path between an anonymous source and an identified destination. Route requests in discount-ANODR bear strong similarities to route requests in existing source routing protocols, with the limitation that intermediaries only know the destination of the request and the identity of the previous intermediary - but not whether the latter was the originator of the request. The response to a route request protects the compiled route by means of iterated symmetric encryption, drawing on how messages are prepared before being submitted to a typical synchronous mix network (or onion router). The communication of data subsequently uses such \"route onions\" to channel the packet to the intended destination. We do not use any key exchange, nor do we utilize public key operations at any time; consequently, we do not need to rely on any PKI, CRL or related constructions","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130895181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computing with Trust: Definition, Properties, and Algorithms","authors":"J. Golbeck","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359579","url":null,"abstract":"Trust is an important facet of relationships in social networks. Whether it is for use in security, determining data access, or recommender systems, the definition of trust guides the development of algorithms to make computations over the trust relationships. In this paper, we present a definition of trust based on sociological foundations. We then describe several properties of trust, including transitivity and composability, that follow from the definition and research in the social sciences, to help guide the methods used for computing with trust, and we discuss the range of values used for expressing trust. We then present a review of algorithms that compute trust in social networks","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131231425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Flexible Approach to Intrusion Alert Anonymization and Correlation","authors":"Dingbang Xu, P. Ning","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359544","url":null,"abstract":"Intrusion alert data sets are critical for security research such as alert correlation. However, privacy concerns about the data sets from different data owners may prevent data sharing and investigation. It is always desirable and sometimes mandatory to anonymize sensitive data in alert sets before they are shared and analyzed. To address privacy concerns, in this paper we propose three schemes to flexibly perform alert anonymization. These schemes are closely related but can also be applied independently. In Scheme I, we generate artificial alerts and mix them with original alerts to help hide original attribute values. In Scheme II, we further map sensitive attributes to random values based on concept hierarchies. In Scheme III, we propose to partition an alert set into multiple subsets and apply Scheme II in each subset independently. To evaluate privacy protection and guide alert anonymization, we define local privacy and global privacy, and use entropy to compute their values. Though we emphasize alert anonymization techniques in this paper, to examine the utility of data, we further perform correlation analysis for anonymized data sets. We focus on estimating similarity values between anonymized attributes and building attack scenarios from anonymized data sets. Our experimental results demonstrated the effectiveness of our techniques","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127873116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Babakhouya, Y. Challal, A. Bouabdallah, S. Gharout
{"title":"S-DV: A new approach to Secure Distance Vector routing protocols","authors":"A. Babakhouya, Y. Challal, A. Bouabdallah, S. Gharout","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359578","url":null,"abstract":"The distance vector (DV) routing protocols (e.g., RIP) have been widely used in the Internet. These protocols are vulnerable to a variety of attacks since they were designed without security aware. In this paper, we propose a new approach called S-DV to secure distance vector routing protocols. The main idea is to designate some trusted routers, which we called S-DV routers, which collaborate in consistency checking of routing update messages. These routers maintain also a security metric which is used to forward data traffic through a secure route. Our threats analysis and comparison show that S-DV offers a deterministic detection of malicious routing updates with reduced overhead compared to S-RIP","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128599633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Double Horizon Defense Design for Robust Regulation of Malicious Traffic","authors":"Ying Xu, R. Guérin","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359585","url":null,"abstract":"Deploying defense mechanisms in routers holds promises for protecting infrastructure resources such as link bandwidth or router buffers against network denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. However, in spite of their efficacy against brute-force flooding attacks, existing router-based defenses often perform poorly when confronted to more sophisticated attack strategies. This paper presents the design and evaluation of a system aimed at identifying and containing a broad range of malicious traffic patterns. Its main feature is a double time horizon architecture, designed for effective regulation of attacking traffic at both short and long time scales. The short horizon component responds quickly to transient traffic surges that deviate significantly from regular (TCP) traffic, i.e., attackers that generate sporadic short bursts. Conversely, the long horizon mechanism enforces strict conformance with normal TCP behavior, but does so by considering traffic over longer time periods, and is therefore aimed at attackers that attempt to capture a significant amount of link bandwidth. The performance of the proposed system was tested extensively. Our findings suggest that the implementation cost of the system is reasonable, and that it is indeed efficient against various types of attacks while remaining transparent to normal TCP users","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127937212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Detecting the Sybil Attack in Mobile Ad hoc Networks","authors":"Chris Piro, C. Shields, B. Levine","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359558","url":null,"abstract":"Mobility is often a problem for providing security services in ad hoc networks. In this paper, we show that mobility can be used to enhance security. Specifically, we show that nodes that passively monitor traffic in the network can detect a Sybil attacker that uses a number of network identities simultaneously. We show through simulation that this detection can be done by a single node, or that multiple trusted nodes can join to improve the accuracy of detection. We then show that although the detection mechanism will falsely identify groups of nodes traveling together as a Sybil attacker, we can extend the protocol to monitor collisions at the MAC level to differentiate between a single attacker spoofing many addresses and a group of nodes traveling in close proximity","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115025346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effective Detection of Active Worms with Varying Scan Rate","authors":"Wei Yu, Xun Wang, D. Xuan, David Lee","doi":"10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359549","url":null,"abstract":"Active worms have been posing a major security threat to today's Internet. It is widely believed that active worms continue their evolutions. In this paper, we model a new form of active worms called varying scan rate worm (the VSR worm in short). The VSR worm deliberately varies its scan rate and is able to avoid being effectively detected by existing worm detection schemes. The emerging \"Atak\" worm belongs to this category of worms. To countermeasure the VSR worm, we design a new worm detection scheme called attack target distribution entropy based dynamic detection scheme (DEC detection in short). DEC detection utilizes the attack target distribution and its statistical entropy in conjunction with dynamic decision rules to distinguish worm scan traffic from non-worm scan traffic. We conduct extensive performance evaluations on the DEC detection scheme, using real-world traces as background scan traffic. Our data clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of the DEC detection scheme in detecting VSR worms as well as traditional worms","PeriodicalId":156828,"journal":{"name":"2006 Securecomm and Workshops","volume":"349 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134482543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}