Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第6页

ShowTime: Amplifying Arbitrary CPU Timing Side Channels ShowTime:放大任意CPU时序侧通道

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3590332

Antoon Purnal, Marton Bognar, F. Piessens, I. Verbauwhede

{"title":"ShowTime: Amplifying Arbitrary CPU Timing Side Channels","authors":"Antoon Purnal, Marton Bognar, F. Piessens, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3590332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3590332","url":null,"abstract":"Microarchitectural attacks typically rely on precise timing sources to uncover short-lived secret-dependent activity in the processor. In response, many browsers and even CPU vendors restrict access to fine-grained timers. While some attacks are still possible, several state-of-the-art microarchitectural attack vectors are actively hindered or even eliminated by these restrictions. This paper proposes ShowTime, a general framework to expose arbitrary microarchitectural timing channels to coarse-grained timers. ShowTime consists of Convert routines, transforming microarchitectural leakage from one type to another, and Amplify routines, inflating the timing difference of a single microarchitectural event to make it distinguishable with crude sources of time. We contribute several Convert and Amplify routines and show how to combine them into powerful attack primitives. We demonstrate how a single cache event can be amplified so that even the human eye can classify it with 98% accuracy and how stateless time differences as minuscule as 20 ns can be captured, converted, and amplified in a single observation. Additionally, we generate cache eviction sets, both in real-world restricted browser environments and natively using timers with precisions ranging from microseconds to seconds. Our findings imply that timer restrictions alone, even when ruthlessly implemented beyond practical limits, provide insufficient protection against CPU timing attacks.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126247318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Communication-Efficient Inner Product Private Join and Compute with Cardinality 通信高效内积私有连接与基数计算

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582826

Koji Chida, Koki Hamada, Atsunori Ichikawa, M. Kii, Junichi Tomida

{"title":"Communication-Efficient Inner Product Private Join and Compute with Cardinality","authors":"Koji Chida, Koki Hamada, Atsunori Ichikawa, M. Kii, Junichi Tomida","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3582826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3582826","url":null,"abstract":"Private join and compute (PJC) is a paradigm where two parties owing their private database securely join their databases and compute a function over the combined database. Inner product PJC, introduced by Lepoint et al. (Asiacrypt’21), is a class of PJC that has a wide range of applications such as secure analysis of advertising campaigns. In this computation, two parties, each of which has a set of identifier-value pairs, compute the inner product of the values after the (inner) join of their databases with respect to the identifiers. They proposed inner product PJC protocols that are specialized for the unbalanced setting where the input sizes of both parties are significantly different and not suitable for the balanced setting where the sizes of two inputs are relatively close. We propose an inner product PJC protocol that is much more efficient than that by Lepoint et al. for balanced inputs in the setting where both parties are allowed to learn the intersection size additionally. Our protocol can be seen as an extension of the private intersection-sum protocol based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption by Ion et al. (EuroS&P’20) and is especially communication-efficient as the private intersection-sum protocol. In the case where both input sizes are 216, the communication cost of our inner-product PJC protocol is 46 × less than that of the inner product PJC protocol by Lepoint et al.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126601457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

On the Cryptographic Fragility of the Telegram Ecosystem 论电报生态系统的密码脆弱性

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582811

Theo von Arx, K. Paterson

{"title":"On the Cryptographic Fragility of the Telegram Ecosystem","authors":"Theo von Arx, K. Paterson","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3582811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3582811","url":null,"abstract":"Telegram is a popular messenger with more than 550 million active users per month and with a large ecosystem of different clients. The wide adoption of Telegram by protestors relying on private and secure messaging provides motivation for developing a profound understanding of its cryptographic design and how this influences its security properties. Telegram has its own bespoke transport layer security protocol, MTProto 2.0. This protocol was recently subjected to a detailed study by Albrecht et al. (IEEE S&P 2022). They gave attacks on the protocol and its implementations, along with a security proof for a modified version of the protocol. We complement that study by analysing a range of third-party client implementations of MTProto 2.0. We report practical replay attacks for the Pyrogram, Telethon and GramJS clients, and a more theoretical timing attack against the MadelineProto client. We show how vulnerable third-party clients can affect the security of the entire ecosystem, including official clients. Our analysis reveals that many third-party clients fail to securely implement MTProto 2.0. We discuss the reasons for these failures, focussing on complications in the design of MTProto 2.0 that lead developers to omit security-critical features or to implement the protocol in an insecure manner. We also discuss changes that could be made to MTProto 2.0 to remedy this situation. Overall, our work highlights the cryptographic fragility of the Telegram ecosystem.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126625350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Rethinking IoT Security: Understanding and Mitigating Out-of-Band Vulnerabilities 重新思考物联网安全:理解和减轻带外漏洞

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3596442

Wenyuan Xu

{"title":"Rethinking IoT Security: Understanding and Mitigating Out-of-Band Vulnerabilities","authors":"Wenyuan Xu","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3596442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3596442","url":null,"abstract":"Vulnerabilities pose a significant challenge in ensuring cyberse-security for information systems. In the past, vulnerabilities were mainly associated with functional defects in system software and hardware, known as \"in-band vulnerabilities,\" whereby \"band\" refers to the functional domain. However, with the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT), new security issues have emerged that traditional vulnerability categorization may not fully cover. IoT devices rely on sensors and actuators to interact with the real world, but this interaction process between physical and digital systems has created defects that are difficult to analyze and detect. These defects include unintentional coupling effects of sensors from ambient analog signals or abnormal channels that were not intentionally designed, collectively known as \"out-of-band vulnerabilities.\" Various security incidents have highlighted the prevalence of out-of-band vulnerabilities in IoT systems, and their activation can result in serious consequences. To address this issue, we propose a vulnerability categorization framework that includes out-of-band vulnerabilities and provides examples for each category. Our talk highlights the need to shift the research paradigm for system security to encompass both in-band and out-of-band vulnerabilities in the intelligence era. Finally, we explore potential solutions for mitigating out-of-band vulnerabilities and securing IoT devices.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"349 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130667269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

SPEAR-V: Secure and Practical Enclave Architecture for RISC-V SPEAR-V:安全实用的RISC-V飞地架构

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3595784

David Schrammel, Moritz Waser, Lukas Lamster, Martin Unterguggenberger, S. Mangard

{"title":"SPEAR-V: Secure and Practical Enclave Architecture for RISC-V","authors":"David Schrammel, Moritz Waser, Lukas Lamster, Martin Unterguggenberger, S. Mangard","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3595784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595784","url":null,"abstract":"Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and enclaves have become increasingly popular and are used from embedded devices to cloud servers. Today, many enclave architectures exist for different ISAs. However, some suffer from performance issues and controlled-channel attacks, while others only support constrained use cases for embedded devices or impose unrealistic constraints on the software. Modern cloud applications require a more flexible architecture that is both secure against such attacks and not constrained by, e.g., a limited number of physical memory ranges. In this paper, we present SPEAR-V, a RISC-V-based enclave that provides a fast and flexible architecture for trusted computing that is compatible with current and future use cases while also aiming at mitigating controlled-channel attacks. With a single hardware primitive, our novel architecture enables two-way sandboxing. Enclaves are protected from hosts and vice versa. Furthermore, we show how shared memory and arbitrary nesting can be achieved without additional performance overheads. Our evaluation shows that, with minimal hardware changes, a flexible, performant, and secure enclave architecture can be constructed, imposing zero overhead on unprotected applications and an average overhead of 1% for protected applications.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132048754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

POSTER: A Cyberspace Study of the Russia-Ukraine War 海报:俄乌战争的网络空间研究

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3592822

Gursimran Singh, H. B. Acharya

引用次数: 0

Stairway To Rainbow 通往彩虹的楼梯

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582825

Gildas Avoine, Xavier Carpent, Diane Leblanc-Albarel

引用次数: 0

Overdrive LowGear 2.0: Reduced-Bandwidth MPC without Sacrifice 超速低齿轮2.0:减少带宽的MPC没有牺牲

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582809

Pascal Reisert, Marc Rivinius, Toomas Krips, Ralf Küsters

引用次数: 1

Uncovering Vulnerabilities of Bluetooth Low Energy IoT from Companion Mobile Apps with Ble-Guuide 利用ble - guide从移动应用程序中发现蓝牙低功耗物联网的漏洞

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3595806

P. Sivakumaran, Chaoshun Zuo, Zhiqiang Lin, Jorge Blasco

{"title":"Uncovering Vulnerabilities of Bluetooth Low Energy IoT from Companion Mobile Apps with Ble-Guuide","authors":"P. Sivakumaran, Chaoshun Zuo, Zhiqiang Lin, Jorge Blasco","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3595806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595806","url":null,"abstract":"Increasingly, with embedded intelligence and control, IoT devices are being adopted faster than ever. However, the IoT landscape and its security implications are not yet fully understood. This paper seeks to shed light on this by focusing on a particular type of IoT devices, namely the ones using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Our contributions are two-fold: First, we present Ble-Guuide, a framework for performing mobile app-centric security issue identification. We exploit Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs), which underpin data transmissions in BLE, to glean rich information regarding device functionality and the underlying security issues. We combine this with information from app descriptions and BLE libraries, to identify the corresponding security vulnerabilities in BLE devices and determine the security or privacy impact they could have depending on the device functionality. Second, we present a large-scale analysis of 17,243 free, BLE-enabled Android APKs, systematically crawled from the official Google Play store. By applying Ble-Guuide to this dataset, we uncover that more than 70% of these APKs contain at least one security vulnerability. We also obtain insights into the identified security vulnerabilities and their impact.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116841443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

ThreadLock: Native Principal Isolation Through Memory Protection Keys 线程锁:本机主体隔离通过内存保护键

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3595797

William Blair, Wil Robertson, Manuel Egele

{"title":"ThreadLock: Native Principal Isolation Through Memory Protection Keys","authors":"William Blair, Wil Robertson, Manuel Egele","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3595797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595797","url":null,"abstract":"Inter-process isolation has been deployed in operating systems for decades, but secure intra-process isolation remains an active research topic. Achieving secure intra-process isolation within an operating system process is notoriously difficult. However, viable solutions that securely consolidate workloads into the same process have the potential to be extremely valuable. In this work, we present native principal isolation, a technique to restrict threads’ access to process memory by enforcing intra-process security policies defined over a program’s application binary interface (ABI). A separate memory protection mechanism then enforces these policies. We present ThreadLock, a system that enforces native principal isolation policies using memory protection keys (MPKs) present on recent Intel CPUs. We demonstrate that ThreadLock efficiently restricts access to both thread-local data and sensitive information present in real workloads. We show how ThreadLock protects data within 3 real world applications, including the Apache web server, Redis in-memory data store, and MySQL relational database management system (RDBMS) with little performance overhead (+1.06% in the worst case). Furthermore, we show ThreadLock stops real world attacks against these popular programs. Our results show that native principal isolation is expressive enough to define effective intra-process security policies for real programs and that these policies may be enforced using MPKs without requiring any change to a program’s source or binary.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126907816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0