Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第6页

ShowTime: Amplifying Arbitrary CPU Timing Side Channels ShowTime:放大任意CPU时序侧通道

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3590332

Antoon Purnal, Marton Bognar, F. Piessens, I. Verbauwhede

{"title":"ShowTime: Amplifying Arbitrary CPU Timing Side Channels","authors":"Antoon Purnal, Marton Bognar, F. Piessens, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3590332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3590332","url":null,"abstract":"Microarchitectural attacks typically rely on precise timing sources to uncover short-lived secret-dependent activity in the processor. In response, many browsers and even CPU vendors restrict access to fine-grained timers. While some attacks are still possible, several state-of-the-art microarchitectural attack vectors are actively hindered or even eliminated by these restrictions. This paper proposes ShowTime, a general framework to expose arbitrary microarchitectural timing channels to coarse-grained timers. ShowTime consists of Convert routines, transforming microarchitectural leakage from one type to another, and Amplify routines, inflating the timing difference of a single microarchitectural event to make it distinguishable with crude sources of time. We contribute several Convert and Amplify routines and show how to combine them into powerful attack primitives. We demonstrate how a single cache event can be amplified so that even the human eye can classify it with 98% accuracy and how stateless time differences as minuscule as 20 ns can be captured, converted, and amplified in a single observation. Additionally, we generate cache eviction sets, both in real-world restricted browser environments and natively using timers with precisions ranging from microseconds to seconds. Our findings imply that timer restrictions alone, even when ruthlessly implemented beyond practical limits, provide insufficient protection against CPU timing attacks.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126247318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Communication-Efficient Inner Product Private Join and Compute with Cardinality 通信高效内积私有连接与基数计算

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582826

Koji Chida, Koki Hamada, Atsunori Ichikawa, M. Kii, Junichi Tomida

{"title":"Communication-Efficient Inner Product Private Join and Compute with Cardinality","authors":"Koji Chida, Koki Hamada, Atsunori Ichikawa, M. Kii, Junichi Tomida","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3582826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3582826","url":null,"abstract":"Private join and compute (PJC) is a paradigm where two parties owing their private database securely join their databases and compute a function over the combined database. Inner product PJC, introduced by Lepoint et al. (Asiacrypt’21), is a class of PJC that has a wide range of applications such as secure analysis of advertising campaigns. In this computation, two parties, each of which has a set of identifier-value pairs, compute the inner product of the values after the (inner) join of their databases with respect to the identifiers. They proposed inner product PJC protocols that are specialized for the unbalanced setting where the input sizes of both parties are significantly different and not suitable for the balanced setting where the sizes of two inputs are relatively close. We propose an inner product PJC protocol that is much more efficient than that by Lepoint et al. for balanced inputs in the setting where both parties are allowed to learn the intersection size additionally. Our protocol can be seen as an extension of the private intersection-sum protocol based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption by Ion et al. (EuroS&P’20) and is especially communication-efficient as the private intersection-sum protocol. In the case where both input sizes are 216, the communication cost of our inner-product PJC protocol is 46 × less than that of the inner product PJC protocol by Lepoint et al.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126601457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

ZEKRA: Zero-Knowledge Control-Flow Attestation ZEKRA:零知识控制-流程认证

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582833

Heini Bergsson Debes, Edlira Dushku, Thanassis Giannetsos, Ali Marandi

{"title":"ZEKRA: Zero-Knowledge Control-Flow Attestation","authors":"Heini Bergsson Debes, Edlira Dushku, Thanassis Giannetsos, Ali Marandi","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3582833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3582833","url":null,"abstract":"To detect runtime attacks against programs running on a remote computing platform, Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) lets a (trusted) verifier determine the legality of the program’s execution path, as recorded and reported by the remote platform (prover). However, besides complicating scalability due to verifier complexity, this assumption regarding the verifier’s trustworthiness renders existing CFA schemes prone to privacy breaches and implementation disclosure attacks under “honest-but-curious” adversaries. Thus, to suppress sensitive details from the verifier, we propose to have the prover outsource the verification of the attested execution path to an intermediate worker of which the verifier only learns the result. However, since a worker might be dishonest about the outcome of the verification, we propose a purely cryptographical solution of transforming the verification of the attested execution path into a verifiable computational task that can be reliably outsourced to a worker without relying on any trusted execution environment. Specifically, we propose to express a program-agnostic execution path verification task inside an arithmetic circuit whose correct execution can be verified by untrusted verifiers in zero knowledge.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122432981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

SPEAR-V: Secure and Practical Enclave Architecture for RISC-V SPEAR-V:安全实用的RISC-V飞地架构

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3595784

David Schrammel, Moritz Waser, Lukas Lamster, Martin Unterguggenberger, S. Mangard

{"title":"SPEAR-V: Secure and Practical Enclave Architecture for RISC-V","authors":"David Schrammel, Moritz Waser, Lukas Lamster, Martin Unterguggenberger, S. Mangard","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3595784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595784","url":null,"abstract":"Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and enclaves have become increasingly popular and are used from embedded devices to cloud servers. Today, many enclave architectures exist for different ISAs. However, some suffer from performance issues and controlled-channel attacks, while others only support constrained use cases for embedded devices or impose unrealistic constraints on the software. Modern cloud applications require a more flexible architecture that is both secure against such attacks and not constrained by, e.g., a limited number of physical memory ranges. In this paper, we present SPEAR-V, a RISC-V-based enclave that provides a fast and flexible architecture for trusted computing that is compatible with current and future use cases while also aiming at mitigating controlled-channel attacks. With a single hardware primitive, our novel architecture enables two-way sandboxing. Enclaves are protected from hosts and vice versa. Furthermore, we show how shared memory and arbitrary nesting can be achieved without additional performance overheads. Our evaluation shows that, with minimal hardware changes, a flexible, performant, and secure enclave architecture can be constructed, imposing zero overhead on unprotected applications and an average overhead of 1% for protected applications.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132048754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

POSTER: A Cyberspace Study of the Russia-Ukraine War 海报:俄乌战争的网络空间研究

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3592822

Gursimran Singh, H. B. Acharya

引用次数: 0

Rethinking IoT Security: Understanding and Mitigating Out-of-Band Vulnerabilities 重新思考物联网安全:理解和减轻带外漏洞

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3596442

Wenyuan Xu

{"title":"Rethinking IoT Security: Understanding and Mitigating Out-of-Band Vulnerabilities","authors":"Wenyuan Xu","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3596442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3596442","url":null,"abstract":"Vulnerabilities pose a significant challenge in ensuring cyberse-security for information systems. In the past, vulnerabilities were mainly associated with functional defects in system software and hardware, known as \"in-band vulnerabilities,\" whereby \"band\" refers to the functional domain. However, with the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT), new security issues have emerged that traditional vulnerability categorization may not fully cover. IoT devices rely on sensors and actuators to interact with the real world, but this interaction process between physical and digital systems has created defects that are difficult to analyze and detect. These defects include unintentional coupling effects of sensors from ambient analog signals or abnormal channels that were not intentionally designed, collectively known as \"out-of-band vulnerabilities.\" Various security incidents have highlighted the prevalence of out-of-band vulnerabilities in IoT systems, and their activation can result in serious consequences. To address this issue, we propose a vulnerability categorization framework that includes out-of-band vulnerabilities and provides examples for each category. Our talk highlights the need to shift the research paradigm for system security to encompass both in-band and out-of-band vulnerabilities in the intelligence era. Finally, we explore potential solutions for mitigating out-of-band vulnerabilities and securing IoT devices.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"349 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130667269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Overdrive LowGear 2.0: Reduced-Bandwidth MPC without Sacrifice 超速低齿轮2.0:减少带宽的MPC没有牺牲

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582809

Pascal Reisert, Marc Rivinius, Toomas Krips, Ralf Küsters

引用次数: 1

Stairway To Rainbow 通往彩虹的楼梯

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582825

Gildas Avoine, Xavier Carpent, Diane Leblanc-Albarel

引用次数: 0

Arvin: Greybox Fuzzing Using Approximate Dynamic CFG Analysis 使用近似动态CFG分析的灰盒模糊

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3582813

Sirus Shahini, Mu Zhang, Mathias Payer, R. Ricci

{"title":"Arvin: Greybox Fuzzing Using Approximate Dynamic CFG Analysis","authors":"Sirus Shahini, Mu Zhang, Mathias Payer, R. Ricci","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3582813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3582813","url":null,"abstract":"Fuzzing has emerged as the most broadly used testing technique to discover bugs. Effective fuzzers rely on coverage to prioritize inputs that exercise new program areas. Edge-based code coverage of the Program Under Test (PUT) is the most commonly used coverage today. It is cheap to collect—a simple counter per basic block edge suffices. Unfortunately, edge coverage lacks context information: it exclusively records how many times each edge was executed but lacks the information necessary to trace actual paths of execution. Our new fuzzer Arvin gathers probabilistic full traces of PUT executions to construct Dynamic Control Flow Graphs (DCFGs). These DCFGs observe a richer set of program behaviors, such as the \"depth\" of execution, different paths to reach the same basic block, and targeting specific functions and paths. Prioritizing the most promising inputs based on these behaviors improves fuzzing effectiveness by increasing the diversity of explored basic blocks. Designing a DCFG-aware fuzzer raises a key challenge: collecting the required information needs complex instrumentation which results in performance overheads. Our prototype approximates DCFG and enables lightweight, asynchronous coordination between fuzzing processes, making DCFG-based fuzzing practical. By approximating DCFGs, Arvin is fast, resulting in at least an eight-fold increase in fuzzing speed. Because it effectively prioritizes inputs using methods like depth comparison and directed exclusion, which are unavailable to other fuzzers, it finds bugs missed by others. We compare its ability to find bugs using various Linux programs and discover 50 bugs, 23 of which are uniquely found by Arvin.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127860905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

POSTER: Toward Intelligent Cyber Attacks for Moving Target Defense Techniques in Software-Defined Networking 海报:面向软件定义网络中移动目标防御技术的智能网络攻击

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2023-07-10 DOI: 10.1145/3579856.3592825

Tina Moghaddam, Guowei Yang, Chandra Thapa, S. Çamtepe, Dan Dongseong Kim

{"title":"POSTER: Toward Intelligent Cyber Attacks for Moving Target Defense Techniques in Software-Defined Networking","authors":"Tina Moghaddam, Guowei Yang, Chandra Thapa, S. Çamtepe, Dan Dongseong Kim","doi":"10.1145/3579856.3592825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3592825","url":null,"abstract":"Moving Target Defenses (MTD) are proactive security countermeasures that change the attack surface in a system in ways that make it harder for attackers to succeed. These techniques have been shown to be effective, and their application in software-defined networking (SDN) against simple automated attacks is growing in popularity. However, with the increased knowledge of and ease of access to Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques, AI is starting to be used to enhance cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly complex. Hence, the evaluation of MTDs against simple automated attacks is no longer enough to demonstrate their effectiveness in increasing system security. With this in mind, we propose a novel framework to evaluate MTD techniques in SDN. To this end, first, we develop a taxonomy of possible intelligent attacks against MTD techniques. Second, we show how our framework can be used to generate datasets to realize these intelligent attacks for evaluating and enhancing MTD techniques. Third, we experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed machine learning (ML) powered attacks, with an attacker who can determine the MTD trigger time from network traffic using ML, which they can use to maximize their attack window and increase their chances of success.","PeriodicalId":156082,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128763400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0