{"title":"Not With my Own: Long-term Effects of Cross-country Collaboration on Subsidiary Innovation in Emerging Economies","authors":"Tufool Alnuaimi, Jasjit Singh, G. George","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2029608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029608","url":null,"abstract":"Prior literature has established that international collaboration on R&D is an important means for generating new and impactful ideas through the cross-border integration of knowledge. We show that cross-country collaboration improves not just the resulting inventions, but also has a long-term benefit for the involved inventors in terms of continuing to generate higher-impact patents in the future. However, our results also show that the improved performance of specific inventors in an MNC subsidiary does not translate to broader subsidiary-level capabilities at innovation. One possible explanation might be that inventors obtaining international exposure often do not develop collaborative ties with other inventors in the subsidiary, favoring instead to collaborate internationally on subsequent R&D projects.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130486959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collisions of Societal Constitutions: Hierarchical Power Arrangements and Horizontal Effects in the Management of Human Rights Regimes","authors":"L. Backer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2050180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2050180","url":null,"abstract":"Societal constitutionalism presents us with alternatives to state-centered constitutional theory. But this alternative does not so much displace as extend conventional constitutional theory as a set of static premises that structure the organization of legitimate governance units. Constitutional theory, in either its conventional or societal forms, engages in both a descriptive and a normative project — the former looking to the incarnation of an abstraction and the later to the development of a set of presumptions and principles through which this incarnation can be judged. Constitutional theory is conventionally applied to states — that is, to those manifestations of organized power constituted by a group of individuals, bounded by a territory, and evidenced by the institution of government. But today a certain measure of disaggregation has managed to manifest a constituting power. Globalization has opened holes in the walls that used to serve to police and protect states and their power authority. Societal aggregations can exist now between borders. Groups of individuals (and not just natural persons) incarnate abstractions of governance and then judge them in ways that are consonant with constitutional theory. These emerging realities have produced societal constitutionalism. But like conventional constitutionalism, societal constitutionalism seeks the comfort of equilibrium and stasis as the basic operating premises of self-constituting governance systems. This paper considers societal constitutionalism in its dynamic element — as a system structures constant adjustment among the constituting elements of a governance unit (whether state, corporation, religion, etc.). After an Introduction, Section I engages in framework setting, focusing on the structures of societal constitutionalism within the logic of globalization. This consideration necessarily frames societies and their constitution from a spatially static and inward looking perspective. That investigation is divided into two parts; first a consideration of societal constitutionalism as a set of parameters for the ordering system of states and non-state actors, and second a brief consideration of the organization of corporate actors within this framework, specifically Apple, Inc. Section II provides an illustration of a societally constituted enterprise operating in three dimensional dynamic governance space. The focus is Apple, Inc.; the context is the enforcement of international human rights norms through the governance activities of Apple Inc. and its supply chain, and the focus are the spaces where systems converge, harmonize and collide; the object is to consider a societally constituted governance unit operating in three dimensional space that is in constant motion, but within which the entity remains stable. Section III then develops the more important characteristics of this new dynamic and permeable constitutional framework. If societies can be understood as subject to certai","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116598613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sectorization & L3C Regulatory Arbitrage of Joint Ventures with Nonprofits","authors":"C. Bishop","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2045034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2045034","url":null,"abstract":"The raison d’etre for the nascent low-profit limited liability company (L3C) is to stimulate collaboration (“sectorization”) among government, private and charitable sectors in order to redirect for-profit capital models into the nonprofit sector. The hope is that the L3C will not only generate additional resources for charitable purposes, but also fundamentally transform business culture by signaling a more efficient way to “do good while doing well.” The L3C has been criticized for targeting only private foundation program related investments, a capital pipeline already exhausted by existing profit entity models. When compared to the existing nonprofit joint venture, the L3C emerges as a less efficient arbitrage model for stimulating profit sector investment in charitable enterprises. A comparative analysis yields instructive lessons regarding deficiencies in federal tax regulation of program related investments and joint ventures. In both cases, the federal tax rules utilize a differing “control test” to assure the exempt entity directs assets toward its charitable mission and away from private benefit to profit sector participants. This Article provides the first comprehensive comparative theory that the existing nonprofit-profit joint venture model is a more efficient solution to assuring compliance with the charitable mission when blending market returns to market capital investors. This theoretical framework exposes why L3C statutory operating procedures unnecessarily cripple profit efforts, undermine its effectiveness, and present policy dilemmas less prevalent in joint ventures where the nonprofit must exercise control over the business entity rather than simply an investment in the entity. As a result, program related investments should be scaled back and limited to determining only whether an investment jeopardizes a foundation’s exempt mission where the scale of the investment has a self-limiting role.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130825625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paradox in Technology Ecosystem Governance","authors":"J. Wareham, Paul B. Fox, Josep Lluís Cano Giner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2037815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2037815","url":null,"abstract":"Technology platform strategies offer a novel way to orchestrate a rich portfolio of contributions made by the many independent actors who form an ecosystem of heterogeneous complementors around a stable platform core. This form of organising has been successfully used in the smartphone, gaming, social-networking, and commercial software industries, amongst others. Technology ecosystems require stability and control to leverage common investments in standard components, yet also need creativity and variety to meet heterogeneous market demand. While this control-creativity tension has been addressed conceptually in the literature, additional empirical analysis can deepen our understanding of this tension, and identify additional tensions common in technology ecosystems. Tensions may manifest as dualisms, where actors are faced with contradictory, either/or decisions. Alternatively, they can manifest as dualities, where tensions are framed as complementary and mutually-enabling. We explore these issues through an extensive case study of a business software ecosystem consisting of a major multinational software manufacturer at the core, and a system of independent implementation partners and solution developers on the periphery. Our research analyses three primary tensions: control-creativity, standardisation-variety, and individual-collective. We explore the mechanisms of the ecosystem governance that accommodate these tensions, and highlight the specific properties that can be generalizable to other technology ecosystems. Finally, we identify triggers in the case data where latent, mutually enabling tensions become manifest as salient, disabling tensions. By identifying transitions between the complementary and contradictory logics, our study contributes to the understanding of both the design of the ecosystem governance, but also the constant managerial finesse needed to achieve equilibrium and avoid problems of \"market failure\" in technology ecosystems that function as semi-regulated marketplaces.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"463 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123098443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intellectual Property and Licensing Strategies in Open Collaborative Innovation","authors":"M. Bogers, Rudi Bekkers, O. Granstrand","doi":"10.4018/978-1-61350-341-6.CH003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-61350-341-6.CH003","url":null,"abstract":"Protecting intellectual property and controlling the use of their inventions is key to the strategy of many firms. At the same time, in order to be successful in open collaborative innovation, firms need to share their knowledge with others. This chapter presents, for moderate specialists, some strategic considerations with respect to managing intellectual property in open collaborative innovation. The chapter discusses how licensing strategies can be employed to balance various goals in collaborative efforts to innovate. In particular, licensing of intellectual property is presented as a way to manage protected knowledge that is developed and shared in collaborative innovation. Different elementary licensing schemes are presented. Open collaborative innovation can then consist of various \"modules\" of elementary licenses. The chapter finally proposes a few distinct strategies for governing knowledge exchange in collaborative innovation, including open exchange and layered schemes, thereby outlining some conditions for successful open collaborative innovation.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126239785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Theory of the Firm Revisited from a Power Perspective","authors":"Virgile Chassagnon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2112893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2112893","url":null,"abstract":"Economists have traditionally repudiated power from the theorization of the firm, shedding light on the amorphous and tautological character of this concept. Therefore, power could not contribute to the productive efficiency of an economic organization. Power is supposed to result exclusively from contract failures. On the contrary, we think that economists have to revisit the theory of the firm from a power perspective. In this article, the objective is triple. First of all, an original theoretical framework of power relationships, which takes into account organization theory, is proposed in order to fill the conceptual vacuum left by the theorists of the firm. Then, it is argued that power represents the methodological key needed by economists to analyze the emergence of intra-firm cooperation and collective social identity. Lastly, the focus is on the analysis of inter-firm cooperation to put forward the cohesive role of power in the genesis of the network-firm.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"15 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121011218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Paradox of Tie Strength in Customer Relationships for Innovation: A Longitudinal Case Study in the Sports Industry","authors":"Tobias Fredberg, F. Piller","doi":"10.1111/J.1467-9310.2011.00659.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-9310.2011.00659.X","url":null,"abstract":"Current literature argues that firms should have strong ties to customers to benefit from increased customer retention and loyalty. Strong ties, however, have also shown to prevent innovation, suggesting that firms should also develop weak ties to other customer groups. This paper focuses on the potential for strong ties to facilitate, rather than prohibit, innovation. It is based in a 7-year longitudinal research project with Adidas, a global sporting goods company. From the case, we find that the paradox of tie strength results from an overly simplified view of the nature of company-customer relationships. Contrary to the established literature, we find that strong ties in the Adidas case supported significant innovation. In fact, the involvement resulted in the development of a new product with a radically different product architecture and led to one of the most successful product launches in the company's history. To explain these findings, we introduce the nature of customer participation in a firm's value creation processes as a new dimension of the constitution of firm-customer ties and discuss how such a kind of relationship can develop.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128362669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Infrastructure Vulnerability and the Coordination of Government Responses","authors":"Tim Legrand","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2057314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2057314","url":null,"abstract":"Shortly after hosting the October 2010 workshop on Aviation and Maritime Security, Australia and its region faced some major challenges to its infrastructure. 2011 began with a series of natural events and human catastrophes that tested the resilience of government, frontline agencies and citizens in Australia and its close neighbors, New Zealand and Japan. In this briefing paper, Dr. Tim Legrand profiles the CEPS research project on infrastructure vulnerability and government coordination. The method of drawing out the critical policy issues, from academic, policy and industry perspectives, directly shapes the direction of research. Government coordination in a federal system such as Australia is requires coordination between the multiple and overlapping tiers of government - federal, state and territory, as well as local government - is essential for good legislation and regulation The tests to our community’s resilience demonstrate that cooperative federalism involves requires a strong bipartisan political commitment to an intergovernmental partnership. But more than this, as this workshop series continues to reveal, we must acknowledge and give serious attention to the central roles played by the private and non-government sectors, which share the responsibility and costs for securing a significant portion of Australia’s critical infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127564663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practicing Uncertainty in R&D Networks – Explorative Evidence from a Semiconductor Industry Network","authors":"Gordon Müller-Seitz, Joerg Sydow","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1903776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1903776","url":null,"abstract":"Highly volatile industries are often confronted with a paradox: while exploiting existing technological paths by means of well-established practices, novel and yet unknown future technological landscapes need to be screened and opened up in parallel even though the necessary expertise is still lacking. Based upon a longitudinal case study that is informed by structuration theory, we reveal how the SEMATECH semiconductor network reconciles this paradox via the “stretching practice” of partnering; that is, selectively engaging with different present and potentially in the future relevant organizational actors to manage uncertainty. By identifying a set of practices that serves to selectively engage with different partners, we contribute to the debate on how to practice uncertainty in and with interorganizational networks.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122455959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Use of Relational Discrimination to Manage Market Entry: When Do Social Status and Structural Holes Work Against You?","authors":"M. Jensen","doi":"10.5465/AMR.2008.33665259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2008.33665259","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how incumbent firms use relational discrimination to manage threats from market entry. The use of relationships to manage market entry implies that incumbent firms decide to collaborate with entering firms instead of incumbent firms based on the extent to which entering firms threaten their own market positions. I argue that incumbent firms seeking collaborators switch between favoring and disfavoring entering firms compared to incumbent firms depending on their social status and brokerage opportunities. A comprehensive dataset on commercial banks' entry into investment banking in the period 1991 to 1997 provides empirical support for my arguments.","PeriodicalId":154248,"journal":{"name":"Interorganizational Networks & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122595973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}