Rethinking Liberty before Liberalism最新文献

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Liberty, Death, and Slavery in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions, 1770s–1790s 1770 - 1790年大西洋革命时期的自由、死亡和奴隶制

Rethinking Liberty before Liberalism Pub Date : 2022-02-03 DOI: 10.1017/9781108951722.010

R. Koekkoek

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Neo-Roman Liberty in the Philosophy of Human Rights 人权哲学中的新罗马自由

Rethinking Liberty before Liberalism Pub Date : 2022-02-03 DOI: 10.1017/9781108951722.015

Lena Halldenius

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