{"title":"Experience and Religious Belief","authors":"Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte, Chon Tejedor","doi":"10.1515/WITT-2019-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/WITT-2019-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we defend the view that, although Wittgenstein does not present an epistemology of religion in the sense of the term most commonly found in traditional philosophical texts, he does explore a different understanding of religious epistemology – one that aligns the religious attitude with a particular form of know-how.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128873587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Special Section: Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology","authors":"Nuno Venturinha","doi":"10.1515/WITT-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/WITT-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this introductory piece I summarize the aims and contents of the special section on Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology, which consists of a selection of papers presented at the 6th Symposium of the International Ludwig Wittgenstein Society that took place at the Nova University of Lisbon in 2017. After explaining the sense in which “applied epistemology” is here employed in connection with Wittgenstein’s thought, brief comments are made on papers by Natalie Alana Ashton, Anna Boncompagni, Marco Brusotti, Michel Le Du, Andrew Lugg, Sofia Miguens, Constantine Sandis, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, and Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte and Chon Tejedor.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126618288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Brief Update on Editions Offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and Licences for their Use (as of June 2018)","authors":"A. Pichler","doi":"10.1515/witt-2019-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper presents the resources offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) on Wittgenstein Source. Moreover, it describes the conditions for their use. Finally, the paper also briefly introduces WAB’s “Nachlass transcriptions” site from which all of WAB’s transcriptions of the Wittgenstein Nachlass can be downloaded, and the tool WiTTFind which permits lemmatized online search in the entire Nachlass and is the result of more than five years of close cooperation between WAB and the Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) at the Ludwig Maximilians Universität München.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133634958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters","authors":"Anna Boncompagni","doi":"10.1515/WITT-2019-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/WITT-2019-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focussing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices. After the introduction, section 1 presents Miranda Fricker’s (2007) seminal work and points out that epistemic injustice typically involves the silence of discriminated groups, an aspect that emerges with most clarity when the figure of the doubter is considered. This is further investigated in section 2 with the examination of the film “Twelve Angry Men”, by Sidney Lumet. Some unsolved problems posed by Lumet’s film, rotating around the notion of reasonable doubt, are addressed in the following section through the Wittgensteinian metaphor of hinges as developed in hinge epistemology. Finally, by bringing together epistemic injustice and hinge epistemology, section 4 puts to the fore the importance of cultivating the capacity of attention towards radical doubters for understanding one’s own prejudices and promoting social transformations.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127264210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making Ourselves Understood","authors":"C. Sandis","doi":"10.1515/witt-2019-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Wittgenstein teaches us that, contrary to current philosophical and scientific trends, the understanding of others is not to be achieved through some kind of emotional tool providing an access-pass to otherwise hidden ‘mental contents’. This insight goes against the popular grain of empathy as a form of informational ‘mindreading’, founded upon John Locke’s assumption that understanding another is a matter of obtaining and decoding the stored in their mind. We would do best to replace this radically distorted account of what it takes to understand others with a stance that places priority on shared aspects of our lives. Only then can we even begin to try and tackle our moral, cultural, religious, and socio-political differences.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132734738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Möchte Chomsky erklären, was Wittgenstein beschreibt?","authors":"M. Uth","doi":"10.1515/witt-2019-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the relation between the philosophy of language proposed by the later Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, and his ambition to cure philosophy from the mapping of linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic entities, on the one hand, and Chomsky's statements regarding language, meaning, and thought, and regarding the sense and non-sense of different fields of linguistic research, on the other. After a brief descriptive comparison of both approaches, it is argued that Chomsky's criticism on Wittgenstein's theory of meaning (Chomsky 1974 – 1996), or on Wittgenstein's basic concepts such as e. g. rule-following (Chomsky 2000 onwards), respectively, is (a) unwarranted and (b) caused by a fundamental misconception. Moreover, it is argued that the hypothesis evoked by Grewendorf (1985: 126), according to which „Chomsky would like to explain what Wittgenstein describes“, is misleading since the objects of investigation of Chomsky and Wittgenstein are in complementary distribution one to the other.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"250 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117193412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wittgenstein on Thinking as a Process or an Activity","authors":"Francis Y. Lin","doi":"10.1515/WITT-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/WITT-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I focus on a major aspect of the later Wittgenstein’s investigation of thinking – his discussion of the idea of thinking as a process or an activity. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remarks, apart from some concerning the methodology and conception of philosophy, are grammatical remarks, meaning that they describe the use of the word “thinking” and can be agreed to by every competent speaker. I thus show that Wittgenstein’s investigation of thinking is a grammatical one, and hence that there is no inconsistency between his conception of philosophy and his philosophical practice. In the process of doing so, I shall also review previous studies on this topic and point out their deficiencies.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"154 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121297992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology","authors":"N. Ashton","doi":"10.1515/WITT-2019-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/WITT-2019-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible (because of important similarities between the two kinds of views) and desirable (because feminist epistemologies have resources which can help hinge epistemologies to avoid the three problems that I have raised).","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123551086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frontverläufe in Wittgensteins Prototractatus","authors":"Martin Pilch","doi":"10.1515/witt-2018-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2018-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Wittgenstein’s finally published version of his Tractatus — his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung — covers material and thoughts from the years 1913 to 1922. What, deeply inspired by Frege’s works, started as collaboration with Russell in Cambridge soon developed into an independent and critical position. Main parts of Wittgenstein’s early logical system were developed during his military service in First World War, so e. g. the formulations of his famous picture theory of proposition arise during his stay in Krakau and his service on the ship “Goplana” in autumn 1914. We partly can follow this development of Wittgenstein’s ideas by reading his war time notebooks. The most important document of this time is manuscript MS 104, which contains the so-called Prototractatus, which normally is seen as an early, but fairly complete version of the Tractatus. But in fact the manuscript contains much more interesting information about the actual formation of the Tractatus itself, when it is read as a kind of log book of the ongoing composition procedure. The actual order of the propositions differs considerably from the published order and enables us to follow the step by step integration of new propositions into the growing structure of the Tractatus. The paper will give a chronological outline and an overview about the surviving pre-Tractarian sources and their setup, and it will argue for a reading of MS 104 allowing a detailed reconstruction of the textual composition as well as serving at the same time as a basis for an interpretation of the war time notebooks.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116705003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Culture as a Monastic Rule","authors":"L. Albinus","doi":"10.1515/witt-2018-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2018-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has taken a considerable interest in Wittgenstein’s concept of culture. The title of his book Du mußt dein Leben ändern, which is a quote from Rilke, also reflects one of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and Sloterdijk devotes a whole chapter to another quote, namely that “Culture is a monastic rule”, as Wittgenstein put it in 1948. Sloterdijk argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy was, from the beginning, irreversibly formed by the secessionist movement in fin-de-siecle Vienna, and that he remained a cultural elitist at heart through his whole life. Thus Sloterdijk regards the concept of “language games” as ascetic instructions en miniature and reads Wittgenstein’s late philosophy as a veiled criticism of the so-called culture of his society, that is, “life forms” among ordinary language users who are blind to their own proclivities. I regard this interpretation as a gross misconception of Wittgenstein’s inclinations but also as a welcome opportunity to make some necessary distinctions between Wittgenstein’s views of culture in different phases of his philosophy.","PeriodicalId":141976,"journal":{"name":"Wittgenstein-Studien","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129051553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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