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International Journal of Game Theory最新文献

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A note on the per capita Shapley support levels value 关于人均沙普利支助水平值的说明
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00885-4
Manfred Besner
{"title":"A note on the per capita Shapley support levels value","authors":"Manfred Besner","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00885-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00885-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a level structure. This value prevents symmetrical groups of players of different sizes from being treated equally. We use efficiency, additivity, the null player property, and two new properties to give an axiomatic characterization. The first property, called joint productivity, is a fairness property within components and makes the difference to the Shapley levels value. If all players of two components are only jointly productive, they should receive the same payoff. Our second axiom, called neutral collusions, is a fairness axiom for players outside a component. Regardless of how players of a component organize their power, as long as the power of the coalitions that include all players of the component remains the same, the payoff to players outside the component does not change.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140156660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games 共同利益投票博弈中的有效均衡
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00886-3
Kohei Kawamura, Vasileios Vlaseros
{"title":"Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games","authors":"Kohei Kawamura, Vasileios Vlaseros","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00886-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00886-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a unified derivation of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and their optimality in the canonical common interest voting model of Austen-Smith and Banks (Am Polit Sci Rev 90(1):34–45, 1996). We also study the relationship between the most efficient equilibria, which have a remarkably simple and intuitive structure, and the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that has been commonly studied in the literature. In particular, while the efficiency in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium under unanimity rule is known to be decreasing in the number of voters, the efficiency does not depend on the number of voters above a threshold in the most efficient equilibria.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
One-bound core games 一键式核心游戏
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00889-0
Doudou Gong, Bas Dietzenbacher, Hans Peters
{"title":"One-bound core games","authors":"Doudou Gong, Bas Dietzenbacher, Hans Peters","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00889-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00889-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces the new class of one-bound core games, where the core can be described by either a lower bound or an upper bound on the payoffs of the players, named lower bound core games and upper bound core games, respectively. We study the relation of the class of one-bound core games with several other classes of games and characterize the new class by the structure of the core and in terms of Davis-Maschler reduced games. We also provide explicit expressions and axiomatic characterizations of the nucleolus for one-bound core games, and show that the nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value and the <span>(tau)</span>-value when these games are convex.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"115 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140099031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Minimal farsighted instability 远视不稳定性最小
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2
Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"Minimal farsighted instability","authors":"Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose the notion of minimal farsighted instability to determine the states that are more likely to emerge in the long run when agents are farsighted. A state is minimally farsighted unstable if there is no other state which is more farsightedly stable. To formulate what it means to be more farsightedly stable, we compare states by comparing (in the set inclusion or cardinal sense) their sets of farsighted defeating states. We next compare states in terms of their absorbtiveness by comparing both their sets of farsighted defeating states (i.e. in terms of their stability) and their sets of farsighted defeated states (i.e. in terms of their reachability). A state is maximally farsighted absorbing if there is no other state which is more farsightedly absorbing. We provide general results for characterizing minimally farsighted unstable states and maximally farsighted absorbing states, and we study their relationships with alternative notions of farsightedness. Finally, we use experimental data to show the relevance of the new solution concepts.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140098904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nash implementation of supermajority rules 纳什实施超级多数规则
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00888-1
{"title":"Nash implementation of supermajority rules","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00182-024-00888-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00888-1","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>A committee of <em>n</em> experts from a university department must choose whom to hire from a set of <em>m</em> candidates. Their honest judgments about the best candidate must be aggregated to determine the socially optimal candidates. However, experts’ judgments are not verifiable. Furthermore, the judgment of each expert does not necessarily determine his preferences over candidates. To solve this problem, a mechanism that implements the socially optimal aggregation rule must be designed. We show that the smallest quota <em>q</em> compatible with the existence of a <em>q</em>-supermajoritarian and Nash implementable aggregation rule is <span> <span>(q=n-leftlfloor frac{n-1}{m}rightrfloor)</span> </span>. Moreover, for such a rule to exist, there must be at least <span> <span>(mleftlfloor frac{n-1}{m}rightrfloor +1)</span> </span> impartial experts with respect to each pair of candidates.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139953454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Participation constraints in first-price auctions 第一价格拍卖中的参与限制
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00884-x
Xiaoyong Cao, Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Guoqiang Tian, Wei Wang
{"title":"Participation constraints in first-price auctions","authors":"Xiaoyong Cao, Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Guoqiang Tian, Wei Wang","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00884-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00884-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the endogenous participation problem when bidders are characterized by a two-dimensional private information on valuations and participation costs in first-price auctions. Bidders participate whenever their private costs are less than or equal to the expected revenue from participating. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting with two-dimensional types of ex-ante heterogeneous bidders. When bidders are ex-ante homogeneous, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, but asymmetric equilibria may also exist. We provide conditions under which the equilibrium is unique (not only among symmetric ones). In the symmetric equilibrium, we show that the equilibrium cutoff of participation costs described above which bidders never participate, is lower when the distribution of participation costs is first-order stochastically dominated.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139759923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values 论价值相互依存的高效多边贸易机制的存在
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00883-y
Kwanghyun Kim
{"title":"On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values","authors":"Kwanghyun Kim","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00883-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00883-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies multilateral trading problems in which agents’ valuations for items are interdependent. Assuming that each agent’s information has a greater marginal effect on her own valuation than on the other agents’ valuations, the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of trading mechanisms satisfying efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post budget balance. The paper presents a trading mechanism that satisfies the four properties when the necessary and sufficient condition holds and shows that this mechanism maximizes the ex-post budget surplus among all efficient, ex-post incentive compatible, and ex-post individually rational trading mechanisms. The paper examines an environment where each agent can possess at most one unit of an item, and her information about the item is one-dimensional. It then extends the results to two general environments: the multiple units environment and the multidimensional information environment.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139759922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selling two complementary goods 销售两种互补商品
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00879-8
Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa
{"title":"Selling two complementary goods","authors":"Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00879-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00879-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific <i>ratio</i> and freely disposes of excess in either good. The value of the bundle and the ratio are the agent’s private information. In this two-dimensional type space model, we characterize the incentive constraints and show that the optimal (expected revenue-maximizing) mechanism is a <i>ratio-dependent posted price</i> or a <i>posted price</i> mechanism for a class of distributions. We also show that the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism when the value and the ratio are independently distributed.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition 等级竞争市场中的非合作寡占均衡
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00878-9
Ludovic A. Julien
{"title":"Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition","authors":"Ludovic A. Julien","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00878-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00878-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we study a non-cooperative sequential equilibrium concept, namely the Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium, in a game in which heterogeneous atomic traders interact in interrelated markets. To this end, we consider a two-stage quantity setting strategic market game with a finite number of traders. Within this framework, we define a Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium. Then, we show existence and local uniqueness of a Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium with trade. To this end, we use a differentiable approach: the vector mapping which determines the strategies of followers is a smooth local diffeomorphism, and the set of Stackelberg–Nash equilibria with trade is discrete, i.e., the interior equilibria of the game are locally unique. We also compare through examples the sequential and the simultaneous moves games. A striking difference is that exchange can take place in one subgame while autarky can hold in another subgame, in which case only leaders (followers) make trade.</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"7 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138494999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice 集体选择议价模型的纯策略纳什均衡
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
International Journal of Game Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00882-z
Malte Braack, Christian Henning, Johannes Ziesmer
{"title":"Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice","authors":"Malte Braack, Christian Henning, Johannes Ziesmer","doi":"10.1007/s00182-023-00882-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00882-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure Local and Global Nash Equilibrium under rather general settings. The mathematical proof is based on a fixed point argument, which can also be used as a numerical method to determine an equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium outcome as a lottery of legislators’ proposals and prove a <i>Mean Voter Theorem</i>, i.e., proposals result dimension-by-dimension as a weighted mean of legislators’ ideal points and are Pareto-optimal. Based on a simple example, we illustrate different logic of our model compared to mixed strategy equilibrium of the legislative bargaining model suggested by Banks and Duggan (Am Polit Sci Rev 94(1):73–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586381, 2000).</p>","PeriodicalId":14155,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Game Theory","volume":"7 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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