{"title":"Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings","authors":"R. M. Bowen, Xia Chen, Q. Cheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.417860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.417860","url":null,"abstract":"There is limited direct evidence on the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of capital. In this paper, we hypothesize that the amount and nature of analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry among investors and thus lower the cost of raising equity capital. We investigate the effect of analyst coverage on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which is a substantial cost of issuing new shares. Based on 4,766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, our results suggest that more analyst coverage is associated with lower SEO underpricing. Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms with the median level of analyst coverage - three analysts - have a 1.19% lower SEO underpricing, a relative decrease of 38%. This effect is robust to controlling for other factors affecting SEO underpricing. We also examine additional attributes of analyst coverage and find that firms followed by analysts working for the lead underwriter, with a reputation for superior ability, or with lower forecast dispersion have incrementally lower SEO underpricing.","PeriodicalId":138031,"journal":{"name":"Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125227330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Earnings Explain the January Effect?","authors":"Qingzhong Ma, Hai-fan Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.479141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.479141","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents evidence on the correlation between stock returns in January and the earnings information released in the month. The annual earnings announced in January are predominantly positive, and the stock returns in late January are abnormally high than in the remainder of the year. Both time-series and cross-sectional analysis shows a strong relationship between stock returns and the earnings information released in January, particularly in the second half of the month. The results suggest that the earnings information may be one important driving force of the January Effect.","PeriodicalId":138031,"journal":{"name":"Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127670822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Accounting Report Quality on the Bias in and Likelihood of Management Disclosures","authors":"Y. K. Kwon, P. Newman, Yoonseok Zang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1399863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1399863","url":null,"abstract":"The central focus of this paper is on how the quality of anticipated mandatory accounting reports affects the bias in and likelihood of voluntary management disclosures. Our model integrates two paradigms used to analyze management disclosures, those in which managers choose to disclose or not when disclosures must be truthful, and those in which managers choose the extent of bias when disclosures always occur. Thus, we incorporate both proprietary (firm-wide) costs of disclosures and personal costs of biasing. In our model, the manager endogenously determines both whether to disclose and, if disclosure occurs, how much to bias the disclosure. We find that increases in the quality of mandatory accounting reports decrease the bias in management disclosures because investors rely relatively less on the disclosures in determining the firm’s value. Further, as the quality of accounting reports increases, the probability of management disclosures also increases because the cost to the manager of biasing the disclosures decreases. Finally, we show that the manager may prefer low to high quality mandatory accounting reports when the proprietary costs of disclosures are large or the manager’s stock-based incentives are large relative to the personal cost of biasing.","PeriodicalId":138031,"journal":{"name":"Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115400735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}