Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series最新文献

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Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings 分析师覆盖率与股权资本筹集成本:来自经验丰富的股票发行定价过低的证据

Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2007-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.417860

R. M. Bowen, Xia Chen, Q. Cheng

引用次数: 258

Do Earnings Explain the January Effect? 盈利能解释1月效应吗?

Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-12-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.479141

Qingzhong Ma, Hai-fan Lu

引用次数: 5

The Effects of Accounting Report Quality on the Bias in and Likelihood of Management Disclosures 会计报告质量对管理层披露偏差和可能性的影响

Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1399863

Y. K. Kwon, P. Newman, Yoonseok Zang

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引用次数: 6

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