Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings

R. M. Bowen, Xia Chen, Q. Cheng
{"title":"Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings","authors":"R. M. Bowen, Xia Chen, Q. Cheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.417860","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is limited direct evidence on the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of capital. In this paper, we hypothesize that the amount and nature of analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry among investors and thus lower the cost of raising equity capital. We investigate the effect of analyst coverage on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which is a substantial cost of issuing new shares. Based on 4,766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, our results suggest that more analyst coverage is associated with lower SEO underpricing. Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms with the median level of analyst coverage - three analysts - have a 1.19% lower SEO underpricing, a relative decrease of 38%. This effect is robust to controlling for other factors affecting SEO underpricing. We also examine additional attributes of analyst coverage and find that firms followed by analysts working for the lead underwriter, with a reputation for superior ability, or with lower forecast dispersion have incrementally lower SEO underpricing.","PeriodicalId":138031,"journal":{"name":"Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"258","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Singapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.417860","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 258

Abstract

There is limited direct evidence on the impact of analyst coverage on the cost of capital. In this paper, we hypothesize that the amount and nature of analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry among investors and thus lower the cost of raising equity capital. We investigate the effect of analyst coverage on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which is a substantial cost of issuing new shares. Based on 4,766 SEOs in the period 1984-2000, our results suggest that more analyst coverage is associated with lower SEO underpricing. Compared with firms without analyst coverage, firms with the median level of analyst coverage - three analysts - have a 1.19% lower SEO underpricing, a relative decrease of 38%. This effect is robust to controlling for other factors affecting SEO underpricing. We also examine additional attributes of analyst coverage and find that firms followed by analysts working for the lead underwriter, with a reputation for superior ability, or with lower forecast dispersion have incrementally lower SEO underpricing.
分析师覆盖率与股权资本筹集成本:来自经验丰富的股票发行定价过低的证据
关于分析师覆盖范围对资本成本影响的直接证据有限。在本文中,我们假设分析师覆盖的数量和性质可以减少投资者之间的信息不对称,从而降低筹集股权资本的成本。我们调查了分析师覆盖范围对经验丰富的股票发行(seo)定价过低的影响,这是发行新股的重大成本。基于1984-2000年期间的4,766个SEO,我们的结果表明,更多的分析师覆盖与较低的SEO低定价相关。与没有分析师报道的公司相比,有分析师报道中位数水平的公司(三名分析师)的SEO低估率低1.19%,相对降低38%。这种效果是稳健的,以控制其他因素影响SEO抑价。我们还研究了分析师覆盖范围的其他属性,发现为主承销商工作的分析师所跟随的公司,以卓越的能力而闻名,或者预测偏差较低,其SEO低估的程度逐渐降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信