{"title":"The Art of Controversies","authors":"S. D. Bella","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008188","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125664994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to Ohad Nachtomy on Possibilia in Leibniz, 1672-1676","authors":"Mogens Lærke","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ20081814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ20081814","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132650850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation","authors":"Lea F. Schweitz","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008184","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133885930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Newton, Spinoza, Stoics and Others: A Battle Line in Leibniz’s Wars of (Natural) Religion","authors":"M. Kulstad","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008183","url":null,"abstract":"Starting from Leibniz’s complaint that Newton’s views seem to make God the soul of the world, this paper examines Leibniz’s critical stance more generally towards God as the soul of the world and related theses. A preliminary task is determining what the related theses are. There are more of these than might have been thought. Once the relations are established, it becomes clear how pervasive the various guises of the issue of God as the soul of the world are in Leibniz’s thought and how central they are in his debates with contemporaries about the truths of natural religion and even more strictly philosophical issues. Leibniz’s arguments against God as the soul of the world are reconstructed and evaluated, and the difficult question of the exact meaning, or meanings, that Leibniz ascribes to the thesis that God is the soul of the world is taken up. The clearest core of meaning discussed in this paper is most directly relevant to Leibniz’s criticisms of Spinoza and the Stoics, as well as of Descartes. Less clear, but obviously important, are meanings relevant to Leibniz’s debates with the occasionalists and Newtonians. I begin with two of Leibniz’s criticisms of his contemporaries, one criticism fairly well known, the other not well known at all. The more familiar criticism appears in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence of 1715-16. In that correspondence, Leibniz is, among other things, attempting to find a theological Achilles’ heel in the Newtonians’ world view, just as Clarke is attempting to do the same in connection with Leibniz’s. In this context Leibniz claims that Newton’s views seem to make of God the soul of the world, the anima mundi. Leibniz makes the point, with varying degrees of intensity, several times during the correspondence, and with reference to a diverse aspects of Newtonian theory.1 Here is one of the examples, drawn from Leibniz’s Fourth Paper: There is hardly any expression less proper upon this subject, than that which makes God to have a sensorium. It seems to make God the soul of the world. And it will be a hard matter to put a justifiable sense upon this word, according to the use Sir Isaac Newton makes of it. (LC 4, sec. 27; G VII 375)","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130542760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses","authors":"Anja Jauernig","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"140 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131660990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Remarks on Possibilia in Leibniz, 1672-1676: Quod non omnia possibilia ad intelligentiam perveniant?","authors":"Ohad Nachtomy","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ20081813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ20081813","url":null,"abstract":"n a recent article Fabrizio Mondadori studies in detail the scholastic background for Leibniz's view of possibilia . Mondadori concludes that, \"Leibniz sharply distinguishes between the question of the possibility, and the question of the reality, of possibilia , and explicitly suggests that the reality - but not the possibility - of possibilia depends on the (actual) existence of God\". 1 The expression 'the possibility of possibilia' might seem a bit cumbersome for making a simple point, namely that possibility for Leibniz depends on the principle of contradiction alone, so that possibilities are defined by freedom from contradiction (or by self-consistency) and depend on nothing else. In particular, and against Descartes' voluntarist view of the eternal truths, for Leibniz, possibility is independent of God's will. According to Leibniz, God finds all possibilities fully formed in his understanding. This point provides a central premise in Leibniz's early reasoning in the confessio philosophi that God is not to be regarded as the Author of sin. Sins are understood and then permitted existence by God as part of the most harmonious series of things, but they are found (among the ideas of all things) in God's understanding and are not willed or made by God. Thus, Leibniz's God cannot make something possible impossible or vice versa. This is governed by purely logical considerations stemming from the law of contradiction. Even if indeed cumbersome, this terminology (the possibility of possibilia ) brings out some of the historical context (in its traditional jargon) and highlights the contrast with the question of the reality of possibilia . 2 The thesis that the reality of possibila depends on God means that, according to Leibniz, possibilities are not free floating or self-sufficient like platonic forms; rather, they are conceived in God's understanding and are among the objects of his understanding. This gives rise to a difficult question: if God does not think certain possibilities, are they to be considered possible or not? In somewhat different words, does it make sense to claim that God does not conceive certain possibilities, i.e., self-consistent concepts? While possibilities are certainly independent from God's will, and depend on the principle of contradiction, they do not seem to be entirely independent from some thinking agent. As Massimo Mugnai notes, \"there are no ideas without the intellectual activity of someone thinking (be it God or man or some other rational","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123520452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Leibniz’ Marginalia on the Back of the Title of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus","authors":"Ursula Goldenbaum","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ20081815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ20081815","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"69 22","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120929098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Space and Time in Leibniz’s Early Metaphysics","authors":"T. Crockett","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008182","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I challenge the common view that early in his career (1679-1695) Leibniz held that space and time are well-founded phenomena, entities on an ontological par with bodies and their properties. I argue that the evidence Leibniz ever held that space and time are well-founded phenomena is extremely weak and that there is a great deal of evidence for thinking that in the 1680s he held a position much like the one scholars rightly attribute to him in his mature period, namely, that space and time are merely orders of existence and as such are purely abstract and occupy an ontological realm distinct from that of well-founded phenomena. In the course of arguing for this interpretation, I offer an account of the nature of Leibnizian phenomena which allows Leibniz to hold the view that space and time are phenomena, while at the same time thinking of them as abstract, ideal orders of existence.","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126624499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"G. W Leibniz: Richerche generali sull’analisi delle nozioni e dell verità e altri scritti di logica","authors":"R. Adams","doi":"10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LEIBNIZ2008185","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":137959,"journal":{"name":"The Leibniz Review","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128433974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}