{"title":"The Normative Economics of Social Risk","authors":"M. Fleurbaey","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198793991.013.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198793991.013.4","url":null,"abstract":"Social decisions in risky contexts raise a number of difficult questions. Should social decisions be more or less risk averse than the average person? Should we try to avoid large catastrophes more than frequent but limited harms with similar expected impact? Should social decisions be ambiguity-averse or stick to the expected-utility canon? This chapter reviews the normative economics of risk and uncertainty and examines possible answers to these questions, based on the pros and cons of utilitarianism, ex ante egalitarianism, and ex post egalitarianism. The divide between ex ante and ex post approaches reflects a deep trade-off between rationality (embodied in the key properties of the expected utility approach), respect for individual risk attitudes (embodied in the ex ante Pareto principle), and priority for the worse off (or aversion to inequality).","PeriodicalId":135734,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124927334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human Ethicality","authors":"S. Dhami, Ali al-Nowaihi","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793991.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793991.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"The neoclassical model in economics envisages humans as amoral and self-regarding (Econs). This model, also known as the homo economicus model, is not consistent with the empirical evidence. In light of the evidence, the continued use of the homo economicus model is baffling. It also stymies progress in the field by putting the burden of adjustment on auxiliary assumptions that need to compensate for an unrealistic picture of human motivation and behavior. This essay briefly outlines the evidence for a more inclusive picture of humans in which ethics and morality play a central role. It argues for replacing the homo economicus model with a homo behavioralis model that has already enabled great progress to be made in the field of behavioral economics.","PeriodicalId":135734,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116578896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ethics and Economics of Ecological Justice","authors":"D. Schmidtz","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793991.013.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793991.013.26","url":null,"abstract":"If we are to emerge from the process of growing up with an adult conception of justice, it will be a conception of our place and of our due, alongside a conception of what other people are due, within a community that has a logic of its own. That logic will be described by economics (among other social sciences) and by ecology. Realistic possibilities are implications of those logics. Adult views about ethics and about justice will be disciplined by those logics.","PeriodicalId":135734,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130979059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Evolution of Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behavior","authors":"D. Rose","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793991.013.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793991.013.9","url":null,"abstract":"The neoclassical view of human behavior emphasizes the rational pursuit of self-interest, aptly described as Max-U by Deirdre McCloskey. Most economists today are not aware that leading thinkers in the classical period had a very different view of decision-making. In the classical view most behavior is driven by people doing what they think they are supposed to do under various circumstances. This chapter proposes a framework that captures the spirit of the classical approach to decision-making. This framework is then used to explore how behavior that is better described by Max-U likely evolved in response to the continuing development of the market economy and the evolution of prevailing moral beliefs. Employing ideas from cognitive science, this exercise sheds new light on several persistent puzzles in experimental economics, most notably several shortcomings of expected utility theory. It also explains how new habits of mind increased both creativity and individuality.","PeriodicalId":135734,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121137605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Ethics and the Capability Approach","authors":"C. Binder, I. Robeyns","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198793991.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198793991.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the capability approach and discusses its role in economic ethics. More specifically, we discuss the concept of well-being and freedom underlying the general capabilitarian framework and argue that a number of characterizing features of the capability approach, such as its focus on ends instead of means or the conception of freedom employed in it, makes it particularly well suited for the evaluation of institutions and economic systems in economic ethics. The article concludes by pointing to a number of limits and constraints of the capabilitarian framework in economic ethics.","PeriodicalId":135734,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127620747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}