{"title":"The Association between Audit Committee Effectiveness and Audit Risk","authors":"Christine Contessotto, Robyn A. Moroney","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12010","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:id=\"acfi12010-abs-0001\"> Audit committees (ACs) are expected to play a key role in improving financial statement integrity and as a consequence reduce audit risk. Companies reporting conformity with regulations can have an AC that appears effective but is not actually effective in substance. We surveyed audit partners and managers to identify their indicators of actual AC effectiveness (auditor-chosen list). We hypothesize a negative association between AC effectiveness and audit risk, only when an auditor-chosen list, rather than extent of conformity with regulations, is used to measure effectiveness. Results support our expectations.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124968972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Insider Trading Explain Price Run‐Up Ahead of Takeover Announcements?","authors":"Angelo Aspris, Sean Foley, A. Frino","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12003","url":null,"abstract":"This study empirically examines the impact of changes in substantial shareholdings ahead of 450 Australian takeover offers between the years 2000 and 2009. Previous studies have attributed a significant proportion of the price run‐up effect in takeover targets to insider‐trading behaviour. This study examines the contribution of a broad range of public information sources that are known to typically generate market anticipation, including the acquisition of toeholds ahead of takeover announcements. Our findings show no significant pre‐bid run‐up for takeover targets after considering these sources. We conclude from these results that previous findings attributing pre‐bid share price run‐up to illegal insider trading may overstate the existence of such conduct.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131721879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Factors that Influence Perceptions of Greenhouse Gas Assurance Provider Quality","authors":"Wendy Green, Stuart Taylor","doi":"10.1111/ijau.12004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12004","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the key factors that influence perceptions of greenhouse gas (GHG) assurance provider quality. A survey questionnaire was completed by 53 participants, including all three parties to the GHG assurance relationship (i.e., preparers, users and assurers of GHG emissions reports) who rated the importance of 34 factors to their perception of assurance provider quality. Results indicate that perceptions of assurance provider quality in the GHG setting are primarily influenced by the ethics and integrity of the assurer as well as the assurance, GHG emissions and regulatory knowledge of the assurance team leader and the assurance team. Less importance was placed on the experience and industry-specific knowledge of the assurer and on the degree of communication between the assurer and the client. It is also found that there are significant differences in the factors that influence the perception of GHG assurance provider quality between preparers, users and assurers.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131454322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Managerial Shareholding on Audit Fees: Evidence from Hong Kong","authors":"Z. Lin, Ming Liu","doi":"10.1111/ijau.12000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12000","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates how managerial shareholding affects audit pricing for listed companies in Hong Kong. Based on agency theory, we examine the relationship between managerial shareholding and audit fees, from the perspectives of the alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. We posit a non‐linear relationship, which is tested by grouping sample firms into three levels of managerial shareholding: low, intermediate, and high regions of management ownership. The empirical results reveal that the association of managerial ownership with audit fees is non‐linear: managerial shareholding is significantly and negatively associated with audit fees in the low and high regions of managerial ownership, whereas the association is significantly positive in the intermediate region. These correlations are further confirmed by the results of curvilinear regression analysis.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116137853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auditor Independence and Auditor Bargaining Power: Some Spanish Evidence Concerning Audit Error in the Going Concern Decision","authors":"Marcos Antón Renart, P. Barnes","doi":"10.1111/ijau.12003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12003","url":null,"abstract":"It is well known that where an auditor's relative bargaining power is high, this may help its independence and prevent a Type II error (no qualification but corporate failure). It is less well known that this may also lead to a lack of independence in the form of over‐conservatism and an unjustified inclination by an auditor to qualify to protect its reputation leading to a Type I error (a qualification but no corporate failure). We therefore hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the auditor's relative bargaining power and Type I errors (‘H’) and a negative relationship between it and Type II errors (‘H’). The empirical study supports H but rejects H. Taken together, these results suggest that Spanish auditors have a high propensity to qualify to protect their reputation, undeterred by pressure from client companies, in order to protect their reputation – ‘over‐conservatism’ as we have called it.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130569718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nina Sormunen, K. Jeppesen, S. Sundgren, Tobias Svanström
{"title":"Harmonisation of Audit Practice: Empirical Evidence from Going‐Concern Reporting in the Nordic Countries","authors":"Nina Sormunen, K. Jeppesen, S. Sundgren, Tobias Svanström","doi":"10.1111/ijau.12007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12007","url":null,"abstract":"Auditor’s going concern reporting before Bankruptcy – a Study of Bankrupt companies in Scandinavia","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122147441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Weekend Gold Returns in Bull and Bear Markets","authors":"L. Blose, V. Gondhalekar","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00497.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00497.x","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the weekend effect in gold returns during bull and bear markets over the period 1975 through 2011. It shows that gold returns from close on Friday to close on Monday are significantly lower than returns during the rest of the week. This result is due largely to gold returns during bear markets. During gold bull markets, gold weekend returns are not significantly different from weekday returns. The study shows that the effect has substantial economic implications for gold investors. The effect is shown to be related to a significantly negative skewness in the weekend returns.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131398863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effect of Financial Constraints, Investment Policy, Product Market Competition and Corporate Governance on the Value of Cash Holdings","authors":"H. Chan, Yufei Lu, H. Zhang","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00463.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00463.x","url":null,"abstract":"This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash-flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126880969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Board Characteristics Influence the Shareholders' Assessment of Risk for Small and Large Firms?","authors":"J. A. Christy, Z. Matolcsy, Anna Wright, A. Wyatt","doi":"10.1111/abac.12005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the association between board characteristics and shareholders' assessment of their exposure to economic and agency risks as reflected in the volatility of stock returns. Our hypotheses incorporate prior evidence that small and large firms have ‘dramatically’ different board structures, reflecting the firms' different monitoring and advising needs. We hypothesize and find evidence that only the shareholders of well-established large firms are able to generate positive net benefits, in the form of lower equity risk, from independent boards and well-connected independent directors with multiple directorships. We also find professional and formal industry degree qualifications on the board are associated with shareholders' risk assessment for some small firms consistent with the focus of small firms on building growth and scale. While we find evidence that formal industry professional affiliations (weak evidence) and MBAs provide benefits for the shareholders of large firms, there is limited evidence that financial expertise on the board systematically influences shareholders' risk assessments for small or large companies. The key conclusion from the evidence in this paper is that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to governance in relation to the board of directors may not meet the diverse needs of companies at different stages of economic development.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"126 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113939942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): The History of a Failed Revolutionary Idea in Finance?","authors":"M. Dempsey","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6281.2012.00379.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.2012.00379.x","url":null,"abstract":"The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) states that assets are priced commensurate with a trade-off between undiversifiable risk and expectations of return. The model underpins the status of academic finance, as well as the belief that asset pricing is an appropriate subject for economic study. Notwithstanding, our findings imply that in adhering to the CAPM we are choosing to encounter the market on our own terms of rationality, rather than the market's.","PeriodicalId":134477,"journal":{"name":"ARN Wiley-Blackwell Publishers Journals","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125600275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}