{"title":"Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance: A Contract Theory Analysis","authors":"Yutaka Suzuki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2397562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397562","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of eurozone financial governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n Ministries of Finance as the first movers and the European Central Bank as the second mover, we show that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government spending, but that this will increase inflation, resulting in a decrease in the value of the euro. As these effects are shared equally by eurozone countries (cost sharing), an incentive to free-ride at the expense of other countries is present. We then analyze a penalty-based solution to the free-rider problem and derive a second-best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. The optimal solution shows that “limited sovereignty,” that is, substantially constrained fiscal sovereignty, should be imposed as a high marginal cost for the issuance of public debt. Finally, we close the paper by discussing the possibility of Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union).","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131094894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In the Line of Fire: Political Violence and Decentralization in Colombia","authors":"M. Chacón","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2386667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2386667","url":null,"abstract":"Policies aimed at increasing the resources and administrative responsibilities of subnational governments are often proposed as a conict resolution strategy. This paper explores a particular threat to the effectiveness of decentralizing reforms in war-torn countries, namely the capture of local governments by non-state armed actors. These groups are reliant on rents and may increase their violence against local authorities in an attempt to capture local governments in a decentralized system. This relationship between decentralization and conict is explored using subnational-level data from Colombia during the 1990s, when local scal capacity greatly expanded. I exploit a key reform to identify the effect of automatic transfers from the center on conict casualties. The evidence shows that scal transfers are associated with higher murder rates of local authorities and politicians. Moreover, this effect is conditional on the state capacity of localities. These results are robust and consistent with the rent-seeking strategy of paramilitaries and guerrillas during the period.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131869043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sending the Pork Home: Birth Town Bias in Transfers to Italian Municipalities","authors":"Felipe Carozzi, Luca Repetto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2422891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2422891","url":null,"abstract":"We ask whether the birthplaces of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in the allocation of central government transfers. Using a panel of municipalities for the years between 1994 and 2006, we find that municipal governments of legislators' birth towns receive larger transfers per capita. Exploiting variation in birthplaces induced by parliamentary turnover for estimation, we find that this effect is driven by legislators who were born in a town outside their district of election. As a result, we argue that our findings cannot be a consequence of re-election incentives, the usual motivation for pork-barrel policies in the literature. Rather, politicians may be pursuing other personal motives. In line with this hypothesis, we find that the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are near. We explore several possible mechanisms behind our results by matching parliamentarians to a detailed dataset on local level administrators.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128984534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Деловая Игра 'Разработка Показателей Оценки Качества Управления Социальной Сферой Муниципального Органа Власти': Цели, Задачи, Методика (Simulation Game 'The Formation of the Indicators to Measure the Quality of Municipal Management of Social Sphere': Goals, Tasks, Methods)","authors":"Marina Kashina, Irina Vladimirovna Dreval","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2364498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2364498","url":null,"abstract":"Одним из перспективных методов подготовки специалистов по государственному и муниципальному управлению выступает использование деловых игр. Однако этот метод имеет свои сильные и слабые стороны. Сильная сторона заключается в возможности моделирования практически любых управленческих ситуаций. В данной статье приводятся аннотация и методика, специфика организации и проведения деловой игры 'Разработка показателей оценки качества управления социальной сферой муниципального органа власти.' Эта тема приобретает особую актуальность в связи со сложностями практической оценки и измерения социальной эффективности государственного и муниципального управления.One of the perspective methods of training for public and municipal administration is the use of simulation games. However, this method has its strengths and weaknesses. One of strengths is the ability to model almost any managerial situations. This article covers the methodology and specificity of organization and carrying out the simulation game, 'The formation of the indicators to measure the quality of municipal management of social sphere.' This topic is of particular relevance due to the difficulties of the practical assessment and measurement of the social effectiveness of public and municipal administration.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129071875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"(Re-)Building the Ship of State at Sea? State Capacity and Regime Dynamics in Post-Communist Coutries","authors":"A. Melville, D. Stukal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2192458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2192458","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between stateness and state capacity, on the one hand, and political regimes and their dynamics, on the other, has received increasing attention in comparative politics in recent years. Though empirical research does not provide consistent findings, arguments currently under discussion vary from “stateness first” (democratization only after effective state-building) to “building or rebuilding the ship of state while at sea” (state-building and democratization as complements). Several studies reveal a J-curve link connecting autocracy and democracy to levels of state capacity, implying that autocratic regimes have higher state capacity than hybrid ones. This paper questions these claims and reveals that democratization may start at low levels of state capacity, although democratic consolidation occurs at high levels of state capacity. Using a post-Communist sample, we reveal no J-shaped relationship between state capacity and political regime. We also show that state capacity does not remain unchanged in periods of social and political upheavals and its dynamics in numerous cases stipulate changes in the level of democracy. Particular patterns of this relationship are discussed in the paper in the context of clusters of post-Communist regime transformations.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125515559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
H. Schmitz, Dau Anh Tuan, P. T. Hang, N. McCulloch
{"title":"Drivers of Economic Reform in Vietnam's Provinces","authors":"H. Schmitz, Dau Anh Tuan, P. T. Hang, N. McCulloch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2196392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196392","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> Allowing provinces to find their own way forward was central to Vietnam's progress in institutional and economic development. This article examines who drives this process of economic reform and finds that, in those provinces making the most progress, the private sector played an important role, not against, but with government. Both national and foreign enterprises played a role, but small enterprises tended to be marginalised. Some of the best insights come from comparing provinces and observing how different alignments of interest influenced the reform process.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117134323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Iron Fist versus The Invisible Hand: Interventionism and Libertarianism in Environmental Economic Discourses","authors":"Philip Z. Maymin, T. Lim","doi":"10.1504/WREMSD.2012.049395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/WREMSD.2012.049395","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing from a broad range of sources, we define and discuss the two primary ways of contemplating issues related to environmental economics, namely, interventionism and libertarianism. We then interpret a cellular automaton as a model that allows for either approach, as well as anarchy, and show that interventionism exponentially reduces the number of possibilities while libertarianism, even when only probabilistically applied, tends to retain rather than destroy the underlying economic complexity. Thus, the libertarian, ex-post, remuneration approach may deserve more than the scant consideration it typically receives in such discourse, while the interventionist, ex-ante, regulation approach may have hidden long-term dangers not previously recognised. More generally, the approach outlined here may prove useful as a mechanism by which various regulatory proposals may be tested and compared.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"149 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122561179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The INGO Research Agenda: A Community Approach to Challenges in Method and Theory","authors":"Elizabeth A. Bloodgood, H. Schmitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2140440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2140440","url":null,"abstract":"IR scholars have demonstrated the significance of INGOs to international relations, but we have yet to establish more generalizable explanations and theories of why, and under what conditions, INGOs affect the interests and behavior of other actors or create institutional change.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133316236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Access to Flexible Working and Informal Care","authors":"M. Bryan","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9485.2012.00585.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2012.00585.x","url":null,"abstract":"We use matched employer–employee data to explore the relationship between employees’ access to flexible working arrangements and the amount of informal care they provide to sick or elderly friends and relatives. Flexitime and the ability to reduce working hours are each associated with about 13% more hours of informal care. Workplaces do not respond to the presence of carers by providing flexible work, instead there is some underlying selection of carers into flexible workplaces. The wider workplace environment beyond formal flexible work may also facilitate care.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127323232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Private Interest Contributions on Energy Policy Making","authors":"Steffen Jenner, L. Ovaere, S. Schindele","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2109374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2109374","url":null,"abstract":"In the last two decades, many U.S. states introduced support policies to promote electricity generation from renewable energy sources. Renewable portfolio standards are their most popular policy choices to date. This paper tackles the question why some state legislators were front-running the trend of RPS implementation while others adopted policies just recently, and again others have not incentivized investment so far. In short, what drives states to support renewable energy? We base our empirical analysis on theoretical reasoning. First, we present an application of the common agency model developed by Dixit et al. (1997) to better understand the impact of special industrial interests on policy decision-making. Second, we compile data on financial contributions of conventional energy interests (CEI) and renewable energy interests (REI) to state-level policymakers between 1998 and 2006. Third, in a series of panel, hazard and tobit regressions, we test the impact of these financial contributions on (i) the probability of a state to adopt a RPS policy and (ii) on the stringency of the RPS. We also control for state effects, time trends, and a set of socio-economic and political covariates. Combining our empirical framework with the theoretical model produces key insights into U.S. state level energy policy making. First, CEI have donated over-proportionally to state-level legislators affiliated with the Republican party while contributions from REI went largely to Democrats. Second, we reveal statistically significant links between the likelihood of RPS adoption and private interest contributions. Financial contributions from CEI have a negative impact on the likelihood of RPS adoption while REI contributions have a positive impact. Third, the estimates show a similar – albeit less significant – pattern on RPS stringency.","PeriodicalId":132360,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Political Economy: National","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122211603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}