{"title":"Concerning 'modeling' of computer security","authors":"D. E. Bell","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8093","url":null,"abstract":"The author examines the notion of modeling, first as it applies to physical sciences, and then with reference to computer security. He identifies two undesirable aspects of models in general, which he calls incompleteness and inapplicability. A model of security given by D.E. Bell and L.J. La Padula (1975) is examined in light of the criticism that a model is a definition of that which it models; the author suggests that the critic's definition of the terms 'model' and 'security' is too wide.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116990839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implementing commercial data integrity with secure capabilities","authors":"P. Karger","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8105","url":null,"abstract":"The author examines the model of D.D. Clark and D.R. Wilson (1987) for commercial data integrity and proposes an implementation based on his own secure capability architecture. He shows how secure capabilities and protected subsystems are ideal for implementing commercial data integrity, but also indicates areas where the Clark-Wilson model may have difficulties in actual use. The level of formal verification required appears higher than would be feasible for most commercial systems and the user interface for specifying separation of duties appears extremely complex.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127292042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The algebra of security","authors":"J. McLean","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8092","url":null,"abstract":"A general framework is developed in which various mandatory access control security models that allow changes in security levels can be formalized. These models form a Boolean algebra. The framework is expanded to include models that allow n-person rules necessary for discretionary access controls in an industrial security setting. The resulting framework is a distributive lattice.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122138793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inference aggregation detection in database management systems","authors":"T. Hinke","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8101","url":null,"abstract":"The author identifies inference aggregation and cardinality aggregation as two distinct aspects of the aggregation problem. He develops the concept of a semantic relationship graph to describe the relationships between data and then presents inference aggregation as the problem of finding alternative paths between vertices on the graph. He presents an algorithm for processing the semantic relationship graph to discover whether potential inference aggregation problems exist. A method of detecting some aggregation conditions within the database management system (DBMS) is presented that uses the normal DBMS query language and adds additional catalytic data to the DBMS to permit a query to make the inference. The author also suggests the use of set theory to describe aggregation conditions and the addition of set operations to the DBMS to permit the description of aggregation detection queries.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124527099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}