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Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy最新文献

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Reverification of a microprocessor 微处理器的验证
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8109
S. D. Crocker, E. Cohen, Sue Landauer, H. Orman
{"title":"Reverification of a microprocessor","authors":"S. D. Crocker, E. Cohen, Sue Landauer, H. Orman","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8109","url":null,"abstract":"The FM8501 microprocessor was defined and verified by W.A. Hunt (1986) using the Boyer-Moore theorem-prover. The authors have carried out a reverification of the machine using the State Delta Verification System. Their work correlates strongly with work done by Hunt, demonstrating that the verification community is capable of supporting its own results, drawing on the diversification of proof tools to provide independent validation of previous work. The proof strategies and the complexities that are encountered in proving correctness of microcoded processors are discussed.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132935038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
A fault tolerance approach to computer viruses 计算机病毒的容错方法
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8097
Mark K. Joseph, A. Avizienis
{"title":"A fault tolerance approach to computer viruses","authors":"Mark K. Joseph, A. Avizienis","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8097","url":null,"abstract":"Extensions of program flow monitors and n-version programming can be combined to provide a solution to the detection and containment of computer viruses. The consequence is that a computer can tolerate both deliberate faults and random physical faults by one common mechanism. Specifically, the technique detects control flow errors due to physical faults as well as the presence of viruses.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128396238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 92
Security policy modeling for the next-generation packet switch 下一代分组交换机的安全策略建模
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8113
D. E. Bell
{"title":"Security policy modeling for the next-generation packet switch","authors":"D. E. Bell","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8113","url":null,"abstract":"The general problem of protection in a network, focusing on its modeling in a packet-switch context, is considered. A general network interpretation of a standard computer security model is applied to the next-generation packet switch. The situation requires modeling at both the network and individual packet switch levels of discourse, using different interpretations.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132970618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Cascaded authentication 级联认证
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8108
K. Sollins
{"title":"Cascaded authentication","authors":"K. Sollins","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8108","url":null,"abstract":"The author addresses a problem that has arisen in building distributed systems in which incomplete trust exists and program composition is necessary. The problem is to permit authentication for both access control and accounting when cascading invocations. The problem can be identified as one of providing cascaded authentication. The author has developed a mechanism she calls passports that are passed along with each stage of the cascade and digitally signed at each transition. The information thus signed is that which is critical to the authentication. The focus is both on recognizing the problem and on devising a solution that is efficient enough to be usable, although there will be some cost associated with such a mechanism.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121266237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 75
A near-term design for the SeaView multilevel database system SeaView多层数据库系统的近期设计
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8115
T. Lunt, R. Schell, W. Shockley, M. Heckman, Dan Warren
{"title":"A near-term design for the SeaView multilevel database system","authors":"T. Lunt, R. Schell, W. Shockley, M. Heckman, Dan Warren","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8115","url":null,"abstract":"The SeaView formal security policy model admits a range of designs for a multilevel secure relational database system. The requirement for a near-term implementation suggests that the design should utilize existing technology to the extent possible. Thus the design uses an existing database management system ported to an existing TCB (trusted computing base) environment. A preprocessor translates key constructs of the SeaView multilevel relational data model to those of the standard relational model used by the commercial database system. The underlying reference monitor enforces mandatory and basic discretionary controls with A1 assurance. By combining single-level data into a multilevel view, it is possible to use a commercial database system and classify data at the relation level to implement the SeaView model, with element-level classification.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116782263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 67
Extended discretionary access controls 扩展的自由访问控制
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8096
S. Vinter
{"title":"Extended discretionary access controls","authors":"S. Vinter","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8096","url":null,"abstract":"A discretionary access control mechanism proposed for a secure distributed operating system (DOS) being designed at BBN Laboratories is presented. The DOS is an object-oriented system that uses access control lists to authorize access to objects. Discretionary controls are implemented in a type-specific manner inside the managers of objects. Several extensions to conventional access control lists are proposed, including a limited form of privilege transfer, module interconnection control, support for direct operations roles, and restricted roles. A technique for automatically generating access control implementations is presented that is based on nonprocedural specifications, and an implementation approach is proposed that allows the generated code to be embedded with high assurance in untrusted object managers using hardware protection rings. The concepts and mechanisms are illustrated with a simple banking example.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127872703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 30
The trusted path between SMITE and the user SMITE和用户之间的可信路径
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8107
S. Wiseman, P. Terry, Andrew Wood, C. Harrold
{"title":"The trusted path between SMITE and the user","authors":"S. Wiseman, P. Terry, Andrew Wood, C. Harrold","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8107","url":null,"abstract":"If signaling channels can only be driven by a trusted path, they cannot be exploited by trojan horses in untrusted software. To this end, the SMITE secure computer system provides a general-purpose trusted path, based on a screen editor, which would act as the users' normal interface to the system. The feasibility of the approach relies on the use of a sympathetic computer architecture, which supports a fine grain of protection. The authors describe the trusted path and the user interface of the SMITE system. They discuss the formal specification of the display functions. They examine the use of SMITE for high-assurance applications.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130145958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
A secure distributed operating system 一个安全的分布式操作系统
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8095
T. A. Casey, S. Vinter, D. Weber, R. Varadarajan, D. Rosenthal
{"title":"A secure distributed operating system","authors":"T. A. Casey, S. Vinter, D. Weber, R. Varadarajan, D. Rosenthal","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8095","url":null,"abstract":"Some issues in distributed system security are discussed in the context of the design of a secure distributed operating system (SDOS). The design is targeted for an A1 rating. Some developments in formal verification methods are reported. Distributed system security is contrasted with single-host and network security, and described in the context of the Trusted Network Interpretation. Problems unique to distributed system security are discussed. An argument is made for implementing security features in higher layers, corresponding roughly to the session through application layers of the OSI model. A security policy based on message-passing rather than reads and writes is described. The SDOS design is summarized.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123640135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
The SeaView security model SeaView安全模型
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8114
D. Denning, T. Lunt, R. Schell, W. Shockley, M. Heckman
{"title":"The SeaView security model","authors":"D. Denning, T. Lunt, R. Schell, W. Shockley, M. Heckman","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8114","url":null,"abstract":"A formal security policy model that uses basic view concepts for a secure multilevel relational database system is described. The model is formulated in two layers, one corresponding to a security kernel of reference monitor that enforces mandatory security, and the other defining multilevel relations and formalizing policies for labeling new and derived data, data consistency, discretionary security, and transaction consistency. This includes the policies for sanitization, aggregation, and downgrading. The model also defines application-independent properties for entity integrity, referential integrity, and polyinstantiation integrity.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131039671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 318
Noninterference and the composability of security properties 不干扰和安全属性的可组合性
Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1988-04-18 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8110
D. McCullough
{"title":"Noninterference and the composability of security properties","authors":"D. McCullough","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1988.8110","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of composability of multilevel security properties, particularly the noninterference property and some of its generalizations, is discussed. Examples are used to show that some of these security properties do not compose; it is possible to connect two systems, both of which are judged to be secure, so that the composite system is not secure. A property called restrictiveness is introduced that is generally composable, so that two restrictive systems connected legally result in a new restrictive composite system. A novel feature in the brief discussion of restrictiveness is a state-machine version of the property.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":131674,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1988 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"195 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121743036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 267
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