ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)最新文献_第2页

Interim Measures in the UK: Lessons from the Online Auction Services Case 英国的临时措施:网上拍卖服务案例的教训

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-01-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3317618

Simon Chisholm, Sarah Long, H. Parker

引用次数: 0

Gli Alti Livelli Di Npl Indeboliscono La Capacità Delle Banche Di Erogare Credito? (Do High Levels of NPL Weaken Banks' Ability to Provide Credit?) 高水平的Npl会削弱银行的放贷能力吗?(NPL Weaken银行提供信贷的能力有多高?)

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3218973

P. Angelini

{"title":"Gli Alti Livelli Di Npl Indeboliscono La Capacità Delle Banche Di Erogare Credito? (Do High Levels of NPL Weaken Banks' Ability to Provide Credit?)","authors":"P. Angelini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3218973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218973","url":null,"abstract":"Italian Abstract: Vari autorevoli commentatori hanno recentemente sostenuto che un elevato stock di crediti deteriorati (non-performing loans, NPLs) nei bilanci bancari possa ostacolare l’erogazione di credito e quindi il corretto funzionamento del meccanismo di trasmissione della politica monetaria. Questo articolo solleva dubbi su questa tesi e suggerisce un punto di vista più articolato. Evidenzia che non esistono serie analisi teoriche della relazione tra NPLs e dinamica del credito, e che l’evidenza empirica è scarsa. Le politiche di vigilanza dovrebbero porsi l’obiettivo di massimizzare il tasso di rientro in bonis, piuttosto che di eliminare gli NPL. English Abstract: It has recently been argued that high non-performing loan stocks can limit banks’ lending ability, and thus impair the effectiveness of monetary policy. The present article questions this claim and argues for a more nuanced view. It points to the lack of serious theoretical analysis of the relationship between non-performing loan stocks and credit dynamics; the empirical evidence is also scarce. Policy should focus on maximising the ‘cure rate’ rather than eliminating non-performing loans entirely.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125499225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Data-Driven Mergers Under EU Competition Law 欧盟竞争法下的数据驱动合并

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-06-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3199912

A. D. Chiriţă

{"title":"Data-Driven Mergers Under EU Competition Law","authors":"A. D. Chiriţă","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3199912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3199912","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter aims to review data-driven mergers including, but not limited to, major conglomerates involving large scale of individual user data, known as ‘big data’, by Facebook (WhatsApp), Microsoft (Yahoo!, Skype and LinkedIn), Google (Double Click), TomTom (Tele Atlas), Publicis/Omnicon, Telefonica/Vodafone UK, and so on. These mergers have been unconditionally cleared based on the traditional law and economic analysis of mergers, known as a ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ legal test. The test disregards public policy concerns, including the economics of privacy, i.e., data analytics; data sharing with third parties, e.g., publishers or retailers; and data selling. The chapter draws on previous research on the rise of big data and the loss of privacy, which sheds light inter alia on the ineffectiveness of the data, consumer and competition rules and on the intrusive privacy policies of the various digital platforms. \u0000 \u0000This chapter argues that the current assessment of mergers has to activate the public policy clause and to consider the economic implications of privacy following a merger. No merger should be unconditionally cleared if it involves a large amount of users’ data. \u0000 \u0000The chapter arrives at the conclusion that the new data protection framework is insufficiently robust. The contract theory of informed consent associated with the potential of sharing anonymised and/or aggregated data means that digital platforms are able to exploit data protection loopholes and abuse users’ trust in digital platforms. In addition, the chapter looks at the treatment of innovative digital platforms from the perspective of Schumpeterian economics and therefore identifies the fallacy of too great a reliance on ephemeral market shares. It discusses more critically the expectation of a robust and coherent theory of harm to consumers in the context of digital markets.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122397625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Preventing Anticompetitive Conduct Directly and Indirectly: Accuracy vs. Predictability 直接和间接防止反竞争行为:准确性与可预测性

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3100778

J. Broulík

引用次数: 2

Analysis of Current Trends and a First Assessment of the New Package 当前趋势分析和新一揽子计划的首次评估

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-21 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2956308

L. Hancher, F. Salerno, TILEC (Tilburg Law & Economic) Submitter

{"title":"Analysis of Current Trends and a First Assessment of the New Package","authors":"L. Hancher, F. Salerno, TILEC (Tilburg Law & Economic) Submitter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2956308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2956308","url":null,"abstract":"With three waves of internal energy market legislation already adopted and a fourth just tabled, a key question is “do we have an institutional structure that can effectively deliver the ambitious goals of the EU energy and climate change policy?”. To answer this question, the chapter employs a benchmark comparison, using general EU competition law as a benchmark for an effectively enforced EU policy. It compares the current as well as the emerging institutional structure of EU energy market regulation with that of EU competition law, to assess the extent to which there is a ‘competition law-ization’ of energy market institutions. \u0000The chapter finds that the Third Package of 2009 created an institutional structure that shares a number of features with competition law, hence laying the grounds for an effective institutional structure. The new ‘Winter’ package unveiled in November 2016 builds on the institutional acquis. However, there are also new trends – in particular a shift to relying on tools that require more Member State co-operation with the Commission. This trend might limit the effectiveness of competition law-ization unless such co-operation concerns aspects that are complementary to the core subject matter of competition law.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128165454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Effectiveness of Judicial Review in the Polish Competition Law System and the Place for Judicial Deference 波兰竞争法体系中司法审查的有效性及司法服从的场所

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-12-10 DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.4

M. Bernatt

{"title":"Effectiveness of Judicial Review in the Polish Competition Law System and the Place for Judicial Deference","authors":"M. Bernatt","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.4","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the effectiveness and the intensity of judicial review in the Polish competition law system. First, it studies whether the judicial review offered by the 1st instance Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw (SOKiK) is effective in practice. Next, the article analyzes whether Polish courts tend to defer to the findings of the Polish competition authority, UOKiK. Judgments of the Supreme Court concerning relevant market definition serve as case studies. Finally, the article discusses whether proceedings before the Polish competition authority ensure sufficient due process guarantees, the impartiality of decisionmakers, and the overall expert character of UOKiK’s decision-making process. On this basis the article examines whether there are grounds for the reviewing courts to defer to UOKiK’s findings. The article concludes that currently the review undertaken by SOKiK happens to be superficial and thus ineffective. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s review of the determination of the relevant market is not deferential towards UOKiK’s findings. The Supreme Court substitutes its own definition of the relevant market for that of UOKiK and that of the lower courts. However, the article shows that there are no grounds at the moment for arguing for greater judicial deference. Proceedings held before UOKiK, despite recently introduced improvements, still do not offer sufficient due process guarantees or a division between investigatory and decision-making functions. In addition, UOKiK’s expertise is not sufficient for both institutional and practical reasons.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"283 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122538532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Online Platforms, Rate Parity, and the Free Riding Defence 在线平台、费率平价和免费搭便车的辩护

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2802151

S. Vezzoso

{"title":"Online Platforms, Rate Parity, and the Free Riding Defence","authors":"S. Vezzoso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2802151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802151","url":null,"abstract":"A two-sided platform business is a new type of intermediary to be found in a growing number of economic sectors. As to the hospitability industry in particular, recent innovations in the field of digital technologies prompted the rise of so called Online Travel Agents (OTAs) and the demise of the traditional merchant model. Recently national competition authorities (NCAs) in the EU investigated so called rate parity clauses in the contracts between the three largest OTAs and their hotel partners. These are contract clauses laying down the hotelier’s obligation to display the same room prices across sales channels. The parallel investigations conducted by the NCAs revealed an array of anticompetitive effects stemming from rate parity obligations. While the German NCA concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the efficiency gains of these clauses, and therefore decided to prohibit them, the French, Italian and Swedish NCAs implicitly recognised that some level of protection against free-riding was necessary, and accepted commitments to reduce the scope of the rate parity obligation. The hotel online booking cases were closely followed in the EU and beyond, since they could help clarify a number of key assessment issues concerning a category of commercial practices already widely spread in online markets. In-depth analyses of the NCAs’ findings are now needed, especially in view of the promotion of an effective antitrust-based platform regulation. In particular, this article explores some of the challenges related to the application of the traditional free-riding defence to rate parity obligations.","PeriodicalId":130313,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133238925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

What Can Merger Retrospectives Tell Us? An Assessment of European Mergers 并购回顾能告诉我们什么?欧洲并购评估

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2781509

Franco Mariuzzo, Peter L. Ormosi, R. Havell

引用次数: 13

Administrative Sanctions: Between Efficiency and Procedural Fairness 行政处罚:在效率与程序公平之间

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.7590/187479816X14628633832166

M. Bernatt

引用次数: 6

Post-Merger Price Dynamics Matter, So Why Do Merger Retrospectives Ignore Them? 并购后的价格动态很重要，为什么并购回顾会忽略它们?

ERN: Antitrust (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2781510

Franco Mariuzzo, Peter L. Ormosi

引用次数: 3