{"title":". . . and Law","authors":"J. Schlegel","doi":"10.1017/9781316584361.019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316584361.019","url":null,"abstract":"The locution “law and . . . (some other discipline)” implicitly asserts the primacy of legal doctrine and institutions narrowly conceived for coming to understand phenomena in which law takes a part. The ordinary story of American legal theory – formalism then realism then contemporary legal thought – can be understood to repeat the triumphalism implicit in “law and . . .” Of course, the story of American legal theory could possibly be read differently -- as a series of responses to the inability of law to dictate the terms of its use and so as evidence law’s subordination to other ways of understanding such phenomena. Such a possibility would dictate a different ordering of important words into “. . . and Law.” This paper attempts to examine the plausibility of the latter locution by examining some of the crucial bodies of knowledge and recurrent actions of putatively non-legal actors that led up to the no longer recent Great Recession.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125069334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Need for Audacious Fully Armed Scholars: Concluding Reflections","authors":"W. van der Burg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2783302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783302","url":null,"abstract":"This is the concluding chapter of the edited volume Facts and Norms in Law. This volume explores the different ways in which researchers from various disciplines at present conceptualize facts, values, and norms, and the relation between them. The editors of this book argue that the current differences comprise a significant obstacle with regard to interdisciplinary cooperation. Therefore, understanding these differences and the extent to which the various disciplinary perspectives can be integrated is an important step towards interdisciplinary research. This chapter is not a concluding one in which everything can be nicely integrated. Today’s legal research is too diverse for that; more importantly, however, pluralism and perspectivism are unavoidable, and should even be valued in a positive manner. We need an eye for variation to do justice to the variety of legal cultures and legal fields, and to the range of disciplinary approaches that may help us to understand them. Therefore, I simply provide, under four headings, tentative reflections from my own selective perspective. First, I begin by situating the various contributions, and suggest some distinctions that might be helpful to understand the differences. Second, I discuss Peter Cserne’s suggestion of a tension between legal episteme and the episteme of the empirical sciences, and argue that we should adopt a more pluralist understanding of Lon Fuller to enrich his analysis. I then argue that we need to pay closer attention to normative research projects that are oriented towards evaluation and normative recommendation. In my view, legal scholarship should also contribute to debates on legal reform and policy recommendations, and law schools should take up that challenge. I conclude by distinguishing different types of interdisciplinary research, and examine how the relation between facts and norms does play a role in each of these types. I argue that perspectivism and selectivity are inevitable; in other words, there is no view from nowhere, nor is there a Herculean view that can integrate them all.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122822102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal Debarment for Non-Distributive Corporate Misconduct: On the Efficacy of Debarring the Individual from Government Contracts for Collective Wrongdoing","authors":"D. Schoeni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2763334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2763334","url":null,"abstract":"Debarments under the federal government procurement system are not supposed to punish but only to protect the public interest; they are unconcerned with past misconduct, only guarding the government from dealing with contractors who are not presently responsible. Although the system fancies itself indifferent to punishment, it depends on the justice system to adjudicate which firms and people endanger the public interest. And the justice system is fundamentally about punishment for past misconduct. Whatever the debarment system’s pretenses may be, the criminal law’s purpose is to punish the guilty, debarments are thus only one step removed from judgments of moral culpability, and effectively protecting the public interest depends on the justice system’s effectiveness. Like the justice system on which it depends, the debarment system concentrates too much on individual misconduct, neglecting the significance of collective misconduct. This Article examines the grounds on which a corporation itself may be morally responsible. The purpose is to illuminate unseen dangers corporations may pose. Debarring individuals, even those in high positions, for collective misconduct may be ineffectual scapegoating. Recognizing that some misconduct is collective may help debarment officials to better identify the locus of responsibility and issue debarments accordingly. And recognizing the existence of collective misconduct may lead policymakers to consider if the system should concentrate on corporate governance instead of debarments.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132024692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal Reconstitution of the Welfare State: A Latent Social Democratic Legacy","authors":"David Kettler","doi":"10.2307/3053384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3053384","url":null,"abstract":"The great challenge to contemporary political analysis and theoretical reflection is posed by the much discussed \"crisis\" of the welfare state in the wealthy nations of western Europe and North America, by the attendant dramatic reversals of public policy in several of the leading nations, and by the widespread loss of confidence and political initiative among the welfare state's dedicated partisans (Dunn, 1984). Although it is historically accurate enough to say that \"the essence of the welfare state is government protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a right, not as a charity\" (Wilensky, 1975, p. 1), a broader use of the term seems justified by usage in important parts of the literature (Lowi, 1985), as well as by analytical considerations. The new classes of expenditures and guarantees to which the historical definition refers have been everywhere closely intertwined with regulatory and planning measures, as well as with characteristic developments in the organization of government and the constitution of the political process. As Luhmann has pointed out, the welfare state utilizes law as well as money in the attempt to compensate all citizens for disadvantaged interests (Luhmann, 1981: pp. 25 32). Fiscal problems doubtless have fueled the allegations of \"crisis\", but the debate is by no means limited to issues directly affecting the public budget. The contemporary attack is aimed against the whole complex of developments associated with the great \"thrust\"in the direction of the welfare state, which Jurgen Habermas correctly identifies as the central political development of the twentieth century in these nations (Habermas, 1981).","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131192165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Toldova, I. Azerkovich, Yulia Grishina, A. Ladygina, Olga Lyashevkaya, A. Roytberg, Galina Sim, M. Vasilieva
{"title":"Pre-Experiments on Annotation of Russian Coreference Corpus","authors":"S. Toldova, I. Azerkovich, Yulia Grishina, A. Ladygina, Olga Lyashevkaya, A. Roytberg, Galina Sim, M. Vasilieva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2709072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709072","url":null,"abstract":"Building benchmark corpora in the domain of coreference and anaphora resolution is an important task for developing and evaluating NLP systems and models. Our study is aimed at assessing the feasibility of enhancing corpora with information about coreference relations. The annotation procedure includes identification of text segments that are subject to annotation (markables), marking their syntactic heads and identifying coreferential links. Markables are classified according to their morphological, syntactic and reference structure. The annotation is performed manually, providing gold standard data for high-level NLP tasks such as anaphora and coreference resolution. The paper reports on inconsistencies in selecting NPs of various types as markables and their borders, and in ways of constructing anaphoric pairs. We consider the types of NPs missed by annotators, and the discourse and semantic factors that may have affected the annotators’ judgements","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"589 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122937482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Vectorial Marginal Products and Modern Property Theory","authors":"D. Ellerman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2706232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706232","url":null,"abstract":"Neoclassical economic theory presents marginal productivity (MP) theory using the scalar notion of marginal products, and takes pains, in one way or another, to argue that competitive equilibrium satisfies the supposedly ethical principle: \"To each what he and the instruments he owns produces.\" This paper shows that MP theory can also be formulated in a mathematically equivalent way using vectorial marginal products -- which however conflicts with the above-mentioned \"distributive shares\" picture. Vectorial MP theory also facilitates the presentation of modern property theory which on the descriptive side is based on the fact that, contrary to the distributive shares picture, one legal party owes 100 percent of the liabilities for the used-up inputs and owns 100 percent of the produced outputs in a productive opportunity. On the normative side, modern property theory is the old \"labor theory of property\" presented in the modern form as the juridical-ethical principle of imputing legal responsibility in accordance with de facto responsibility for the liabilities and assets created in production -- where, of course, only persons and not things (\"the instruments he owns\") have responsible agency. Vectorial marginal products (with positive and negative components) thus facilitates presenting the actual ethical principle: \"To each person the assets and liabilities he or she produces (usually jointly with other persons).\"","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125235071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage a Response to Francis J. Beckwith","authors":"Gregory Walker","doi":"10.1111/raju.12095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12095","url":null,"abstract":"This article responds to an article by Francis J. Beckwith that argued that the consistent application of generic liberal principles requires that same‐sex marriage not be recognised in civil law. This response demonstrates that Beckwith's article contains a series of interpretative and substantive flaws that render his argument unsuccessful. These relate to a misinterpretation of core liberal principles and a sidestepping of the matter of undue bias against same‐sex partners. In correcting these flaws I tentatively propose a Voltairean argument in favour of same‐sex civil marriage for those citizens with moral qualms about same‐sex relationships derived from their reasonable comprehensive doctrine.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133876758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership and Exclusivity: Two Visions, Two Traditionsבעלות ובלעדיות: שתי השקפות, שתי מסורות","authors":"Benjamin Porat","doi":"10.5131/AJCL.2016.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2016.0005","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, many have come to consider the right to exclude as the Punctum Archimedis that the concept of property is based upon. In the present article, I seek to re-evaluate the relations between property and exclusivity from an unusual vantage point: a comparison between two deeply-rooted legal traditions – Anglo-American law and Jewish law. For this purpose, I analyze four fundamental doctrinal differences between these two legal traditions, namely the cases of unrequested improvement, of benefiting from someone else’s property, of performing legally binding actions regarding another person’s property, and of imposing positive duties on a non-owner in favor of the owner. The different solutions that were developed by each of the legal traditions explored herein are sharply and clearly reflected in these traditions’ unique respective visions regarding notions of property and exclusivity. This article intends to bring out the latent connections between the four aforementioned test cases, tracing the threads that weave the various doctrines into coherent conceptions. Ultimately, it also places each of the two legal systems discussed as a challenging mirror image for the other, calling for fresh thinking released from fixations.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128815020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IP as Metaphor","authors":"Brian L. Frye","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2586587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2586587","url":null,"abstract":"The constitutional justification for intellectual property is welfarist. In theory, it increases social welfare by solving market failures caused by free riding on innovation and transaction costs. But intellectual property rhetoric is metaphorical. Among other things, we compare intellectual property owners to farmers, infringers to pirates, and abusers to trolls. These metaphors obscure the welfarist justification for intellectual property by describing it as an expression of moral values. In order to understand intellectual property, we should stop using intellectual property metaphors.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"44 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129194505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Perpetual Pursuit of Sharing and Caring: Thomas Kleven's Equitable Sharing as a Guide for Legal Actors Chasing Meaningful Democracy","authors":"Sas Tullo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2570912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2570912","url":null,"abstract":"Equitable Sharing presents a strong argument for the pursuit, development, and dynamic maintenance of cooperative and complementary regulatory and governance systems (including taxation) that all have the same aim: promoting equitable sharing and countering the concentration, entrenchment, and propagation of power and privilege. We are asked to look at the reasons why societies form, the ideologies justifying and supporting social formation and cooperation by all of society’s members, the manner in which they function, and the very necessary relations that form the core of social existence and operation. We are then asked to develop systems that order society and distribute the resultant desirable and burdensome outputs/outcomes in light of this. Like Plato in the Republic, Kleven is pursuing the design of an ideal society. Unlike Plato, however, Kleven seeks to find the ideal in equality (not class stratification), in truth and reality (not virtuous lies), and in dynamic responses to necessarily/naturally changing social needs/growth (not in stable enclaves that prevent change or growth).","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"244 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132012453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}