非分配性企业不当行为的个人限制:论个人从集体不当行为的政府合同中取消限制的效力

D. Schoeni
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摘要

联邦政府采购制度下的禁令不应该是惩罚,而应该是保护公共利益;他们不关心过去的不当行为,只是保护政府不与目前不负责的承包商打交道。尽管该系统自认为对惩罚漠不关心,但它取决于司法系统来裁决哪些公司和个人危及公共利益。而司法系统从根本上来说就是惩罚过去的不当行为。无论资格限制制度的借口是什么,刑法的目的是惩罚罪犯,因此资格限制与道德罪责的判断只有一步之遥,有效地保护公共利益取决于司法制度的有效性。就像它所依赖的司法制度一样,资格剥夺制度过于关注个人的不当行为,而忽视了集体不当行为的重要性。本文考察了公司本身可能负有道德责任的理由。其目的是阐明企业可能造成的看不见的危险。因集体不当行为而将个人(即使是那些身居高位的人)革职可能是无效的替罪羊。认识到某些不当行为是集体行为,可能有助于禁制官员更好地确定责任所在,并相应地发出禁制令。认识到集体不当行为的存在,可能会促使政策制定者考虑,司法体系是否应该把重点放在公司治理上,而不是法律制裁上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Personal Debarment for Non-Distributive Corporate Misconduct: On the Efficacy of Debarring the Individual from Government Contracts for Collective Wrongdoing
Debarments under the federal government procurement system are not supposed to punish but only to protect the public interest; they are unconcerned with past misconduct, only guarding the government from dealing with contractors who are not presently responsible. Although the system fancies itself indifferent to punishment, it depends on the justice system to adjudicate which firms and people endanger the public interest. And the justice system is fundamentally about punishment for past misconduct. Whatever the debarment system’s pretenses may be, the criminal law’s purpose is to punish the guilty, debarments are thus only one step removed from judgments of moral culpability, and effectively protecting the public interest depends on the justice system’s effectiveness. Like the justice system on which it depends, the debarment system concentrates too much on individual misconduct, neglecting the significance of collective misconduct. This Article examines the grounds on which a corporation itself may be morally responsible. The purpose is to illuminate unseen dangers corporations may pose. Debarring individuals, even those in high positions, for collective misconduct may be ineffectual scapegoating. Recognizing that some misconduct is collective may help debarment officials to better identify the locus of responsibility and issue debarments accordingly. And recognizing the existence of collective misconduct may lead policymakers to consider if the system should concentrate on corporate governance instead of debarments.
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