History of Western Philosophy eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Three Principles of 'Political Theology' in the Stefan George Circle","authors":"Alexander Mikhailovsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2262207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2262207","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is concerned with one of the most prominent examples of German intellectual history at the beginning of the 20th century, the George circle. The study identifies three principles which are crucial for the “political theology” of the George circle – the principle of covenant, the principle of the charismatic leader and the principle of dominance and service. The main hypothesis is that the George circle was an ideologically integrated group of intellectuals who sought to reform politics by means of aesthetics, and influenced the language and ideology of the “conservative revolution” in Weimar Germany","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133435425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Soul’s Intensity and Individuality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit","authors":"Kirill Chepurin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2240226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2240226","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I explore a peculiar triad found in Hegel’s later anthropological thought: individuality, intensity, and daimon (or fate), the latter identified with what Hegel calls one’s “intensive form of individuality.” In his notion of the soul’s intensity, Hegel is reconceptualizing Kant’s idea of intensity of the soul towards an anthropological theory of individuality and the individual unconscious. Within this individual intensive “nucleus,” Kern, one’s “fate,” Schicksal, is enclosed, directing a human individual towards his “sphere” within Gemeinwesen, the free community of spirit.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128585158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Geist, Contingency and the Future of God: Hegel and Meillassoux","authors":"Kirill Chepurin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2227293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2227293","url":null,"abstract":"This paper traces the way Quentin Meillassoux’s metaphysics of the absolute and his thought on contingency and the future coming of God both follows Hegel’s notion of ‘Geist,’ in an unexpected manner, and creates an impasse that only a certain return to Hegel’s ontoanthropology can overcome. The challenge which Hegel accepts and Meillassoux takes up is to make thinkable the possibility for the secular to bring forth absolute newness and the event of the absolute – moreover, for Hegel, anthropologically, we are Geist, we are contingency, the possibility of being-otherwise incarnate","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"363 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116011453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Karl Popper and the Call for Academic Discipline","authors":"Jeffrey S. Ray","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2107590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2107590","url":null,"abstract":"Karl Popper was a philosopher that criticized traditional views of how knowledge was purported to support scientific and philosophical hypotheses. This paper analyzes the influence Popper had on how knowledge is used to support science. With respect to the formation of theories, the traditional view is observations are the basis of hypotheses that form rules that can be extended past the observations and original experimental constraints and assumptions. This approach causes several problems. The problem of demarcation concerns our inability to draw the line between statements of science and those that are pseudo-scientific, or religious in nature. There is no clear point where science ends and conjecture starts, so how do we know how much reverence to give particular theories? The problem of induction asserts that universal laws are based on specific assumptions, but yet are extrapolated out through an induction process to cover circumstances not originally observed. The assumption that the law applies to new, unobserved circumstances is a risky one and must be supported by new assumptions not verified by the original observations. Researchers still view scientific hypotheses as theories that are proven out by observations during controlled experiments. Popper, however, flipped this view around and argued that any theory was simply a hypothesis that had not yet been disproved. Science is said to be a struggle between competing theories. Every imperfect theory is thought of as a representation of reality that became preeminent by surviving the scrutiny of scientists as they experiment and observe the real world. Rigorous testing eliminates weaker theories, leaving the strong theories to survive. The longer theories survive, the more they are scrutinized and refined to accommodate new findings. Thus, researchers submit their hypothesis to severe testing to expose any flaws in the underlying theory. Although ideas certainly flow from observations, Popper makes a convincing argument that the observations can never be a basis for validating theories due to the problems of demarcation and induction. After some analysis, this paper adopts his contention that a theory cannot be verified through testing, but rather, the test results merely indicate that a theory has not been dis-proven and should be provisionally retained as the best available theory until it is eventually falsified.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123797222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rothbard vs. Strauss: Libertarianism, Rights and Reason","authors":"Colin D. Pearce","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1567601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1567601","url":null,"abstract":"This paper undertakes to make some comparative observations on the thought of Murray N. Rothbard and Leo Strauss. It hinges around Rothbard and Strauss’s different views on such subjects as the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke and Hume, the meaning of natural law, natural rights, and natural equality, the roots of liberalism, conservatism and totalitarianism, and la querelle entre les anciens et les moderns. While sharing a common commitment to reason and its power to explain our world and a common rejection of modern relativism, subjectivism, scepticism, nihilism and “postmodernism,” Strauss and Rothbard part company on a series of vital questions. The nub of their disagreement is to do with the compatibility of the doctrine of modern, “Lockean” natural rights with the pre-modern tradition of natural law and its claim that there are natural obligations or duties of equal or higher importance than natural rights. While himself not being a natural law thinker Strauss nevertheless insists against those who take the “Rothbardian” view that the doctrines of modern natural rights and pre-modern natural law, to say nothing of classical natural right, are incompatible. This difference on the history of western philosophy is reflected in the political disagreement between Rothbard and Strauss on the nature and meaning of modern liberal democracy. While Strauss is only a qualified supporter of modern liberalism given its premise of the absolute priority of the “self” or the Cartesian ego in more technical terms, Rothbard is a vigorous supporter of modern liberalism precisely because it accords absolute superiority to the “self” or ego. For Rothbard liberal democracy is estimable to the very extent to which it is prepared to push hard for the sovereignty of the “Lockean” absolute “self” and less so to the extent it does not. But for Strauss, this commitment to the primary and radical detachment of the individual from all social or political connection is exceedingly problematic precisely because it is a political reflection of the radical subjectivism of modern philosophy which radical subjectivism he takes to be at the root of liberal democracy’s most evident evils. In short, Rothbard pits the radically free and unencumbered self against the Leviathan state while Strauss pits classical vision of man as a naturally political or social animal against them both. While Strauss sees a necessary connection between “metaphysics” or “natural theology” and the good society, Rothbard sees any such connection as a implicitly representing an authoritarian or even totalitarian threat to “Lockean” rights and individual freedom, which rights and freedom he takes to be man’s highest achievement.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114083921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Individual Realism of Aristotle","authors":"Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1386937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1386937","url":null,"abstract":"This article compares Aristotelian and Christian ontology and sets out a new ‘de-christianised’ perspective on Aristotle’s realism. The difference between the realism of Aristotle and Christianity is a difference between individual and general realism. The individual realism of Aristotle elucidates why Greek thinking on mathematics, logic and natural science did not lead to further development of the natural sciences and why the detour by way of Christian metaphysics was necessary for further growth of these sciences. On the other hand, the individual realism of Aristotle led to the development of an exquisite theory of action, viz. Roman Law. In this respect it fits the renewed attention to the contextuality of action. The influence of individual realism on civil law as it still exists today is examined mainly with reference to its relevance for the concepts of the subject, the formality of law and the case method.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114614903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Rambler as Rotarian: H.L. Mencken's Samuel Johnson","authors":"Colin D. Pearce","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1375682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1375682","url":null,"abstract":"This short essay takes stock of H.L. Mencken's portrayal of Samuel Johnson as the \"first Rotarian\" and as nothing more than a mouthpiece for the prejudices and defender of the authorities of his time. I suggest by contrast that Johnson was fully appreciative of the need for the writer to be at a distance from the prejudices of his age and that rather than a mind blinkered by deep national prejudices Johnson was in fact a \"Good European\" as cosmopolitan in spirit as he was English in his character.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123193069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nonstandard Labour Values","authors":"Ian Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1146249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1146249","url":null,"abstract":"The paper argues that the standard definition of labour value assumes that capitalists abstain from consumption during the period of replacement. The non standard definition of labour value assumes that capitalists consume. Both the transformation problem and the problem of an invariable measure of values are necessary consequences of standard labour values. In constrast, non standard labour values resolve both classical contradictions.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"8 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113942396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy: Towards a New Pragmatist Politics","authors":"Robert B. Talisse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1005645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1005645","url":null,"abstract":"The revival of pragmatism has brought renewed enthusiasm for John Dewey's conception of democracy. Drawing upon Rawlsian concerns regarding the fact of reasonable pluralism, the author argues that Deweyan democracy is unworthy of resurrection. A modified version of Deweyan democracy recently proposed by Elizabeth Anderson is then taken up and also found to be lacking. Then the author proposes a model of democracy that draws upon Peirce's social epistemology. The result is a non-Deweyan but nonetheless pragmatist option in democratic theory.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"349 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115301741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History","authors":"T. M. Humphrey","doi":"10.4324/9780203327586-19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203327586-19","url":null,"abstract":"Henry Thornton (1760-1815) and Walter Bagehot (1826-1877) laid down a set of rules for stopping banking panics and crises. Known collectively as the classical theory of the lender of last resort, those rule stressed (1) protecting the aggregate money stock, not individual institutions, (2) letting insolvent institutions fail, (3) accommodating sound but temporarily illiquid institutions only, (4) charging penalty rates, (5) requiring good collateral, and (6) preannouncing these conditions in advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty. These precepts continue to inform central bank policy today.","PeriodicalId":128035,"journal":{"name":"History of Western Philosophy eJournal","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114115900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}