{"title":"Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments from Inescapability","authors":"A. Szigeti","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82152","url":null,"abstract":"Peter Strawson defends the thesis that determinism is irrelevant to the justifiability of responsibility-attributions. In this paper, I want to examine various arguments advanced by Strawson in support of this thesis. These arguments all draw on the thought that the practice of responsibility is inescapable. My main focus is not so much the metaphysical details of Strawsonian compatibilism, but rather the more fundamental idea that x being inescapable may be reason for us to regard x as justified. I divide Strawsonian inescapability arguments into two basic types. According to arguments of the first type we cannot give up the practice. According to arguments of the second type we should not give up the practice. My reasons for revisiting these Strawsonian inescapability arguments are, first, to establish that these are different and to some extent conflicting arguments. Second, I hope to show that none of Strawson’s inescapability arguments are convincing. Third, I discuss the possibility that the practice of responsibility is inescapable in a different, more pessimistic sense than envisaged by Strawson. What may be inescapable under conceivable scenarios is the conflict of theoretical and practical considerations in the justification of the practice. (Less)","PeriodicalId":126298,"journal":{"name":"Moral Responsibility","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116915247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Giving Responsibility a Guilt-Trip: Virtue, Tragedy, and Privilege","authors":"K. Delapp","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82150","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue for the ethical importance of the retributive emotion of ‗tragic-guilt,‘ namely, the feeling of self-recrimination for doing harm even if it could not be prevented. Drawing on empirical evidence concerning the phenomenology of such guilt, as well as thought-experiments concerning moral responsibility for inherited privilege, I distinguish tragic-guilt from the closelyrelated retributive emotions of regret, remorse, shame, and non-tragic guilt. I attempt to understand the emotion of tragic-guilt in light of an ethics of virtue, and I argue that sensitivity to tragic-guilt has significant theoretical, ethical, and motivational benefits. The reality of such tragic-responsibility reveals an uncomfortable, but undeniable messiness in the moral domain. The virtuous person is characterized by a deep emotional responsiveness to this messiness. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Ghent University and to the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees and for the editorial and organizational expertise of Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, and Marijke de Pous.","PeriodicalId":126298,"journal":{"name":"Moral Responsibility","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114750578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Compatibilist Origination of Moral Responsibility","authors":"S. Cuypers","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82149","url":null,"abstract":"Derk Pereboom defends a successor view to hard determinism in the debate on free will and moral responsibility. Pereboom‘s hard incompatibilism challenges libertarians and compatibilists alike to address the problem of origination. In the present article, I discharge this task on behalf of compatibilism.","PeriodicalId":126298,"journal":{"name":"Moral Responsibility","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132387589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Morally Embedded Selves and Embedded Compatibilism","authors":"Guy Pinku","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82151","url":null,"abstract":"The principal argument suggested here is that we are all morally embedded selves: We have no control over the abilities that make us moral agents nor can we control the degree to which we have these abilities; in other words, we are not responsible for our good or bad qualities as moral agents. This, I believe, calls for the adoption of embedded compatibilism (EC). According to EC, people have I would like to thank Saul Smilansky for long periods of generous guidance; Shaun Gallagher for hosting me in UCF (where I was able to finish writing this article); Josef Horowitz, Arnon Cahen, David Kaplan, Roy Sorenson and Shaun Gallagher for reviewing various drafts of this paper; Mason Cash for his comments; Marion Lupu for linguistic editing; Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, Marijke de Pous and two anonymous reviewers for final revisions; Maureen Sie, Arno Wouters and Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours for inviting me to give a lecture based on a draft of this paper; Annemarie Kallis for her helpful commentary on this lecture. I would also like to thank the participants of the workshop on Strawsonian and consequentialist views on personal responsibility which took place the 15 and 16 of October 2010 at Erasmus University, Rotterdam (where the debate between Derek Pereboom and Manuel Vargas concerning basic desert was an inspiration for me).","PeriodicalId":126298,"journal":{"name":"Moral Responsibility","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115015662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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