Giving Responsibility a Guilt-Trip: Virtue, Tragedy, and Privilege

In this paper, I argue for the ethical importance of the retributive emotion of ‗tragic-guilt,‘ namely, the feeling of self-recrimination for doing harm even if it could not be prevented. Drawing on empirical evidence concerning the phenomenology of such guilt, as well as thought-experiments concerning moral responsibility for inherited privilege, I distinguish tragic-guilt from the closelyrelated retributive emotions of regret, remorse, shame, and non-tragic guilt. I attempt to understand the emotion of tragic-guilt in light of an ethics of virtue, and I argue that sensitivity to tragic-guilt has significant theoretical, ethical, and motivational benefits. The reality of such tragic-responsibility reveals an uncomfortable, but undeniable messiness in the moral domain. The virtuous person is characterized by a deep emotional responsiveness to this messiness.  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Ghent University and to the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees and for the editorial and organizational expertise of Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, and Marijke de Pous.